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Abstract (English)
Procedures for the selection of subjects for participation in randomized
clinical trials -- usually formalized as eligibility criteria in the study protocol --
have both scientific and ethical implications. In this thesis, 1 undertake an
examination of eligibility criteria at three stages in the genesis and dissemination
of medical knowledge: clinical trial protocol~ interpretation by investigators, and
reporting of study results.
In the tirst chapter, ethical issues in subject selection are reviewed and the
main study questions are presented. In the second chapter, the results of an
examination of eligibility criteria in two sets of c1inical trials, one sponsored by the
NSABP, the other sponsored by POG, covering a twenty-year time span are
presented. The POG trials had far fewer eligibility criteria than the NSABP
studies, suggesting that large numbers of criteria rnay not be necessary for high
quality research. In the third chapter, the impact of subjective eligibility criteria on
enroUrnent and investigator uncertainty is explored. Subjective criteria were
associated with more variable enrollment decisions and greater uncertainty. Such
criteria represent a threat to the validity, conduct and interpretation of trials and,
therefore, should only be included when carefully justified. The fourth chapter
examines the accuracy of the reporting of eligibility criteria in sets of
corresponding study protocol, methods paper, journal article, and Clinical Alert.
((
3
Important information is lost al each step in the dissemination of study results.
Unnecessary criteria ought ta be dropped at a triaI's inception; ail other criteria
must be reported faithfully. The fifth chapter attempts ta provide a comprehensive
philosophical account ofjust selection procedures for clinical research using the
political philosophy of Michael Walzer. The sixth, and last, chapter, discusses
explanatory and pragmatic approaches to clinical trial design, overlapping
scientific and ethical concems related to eligibility criteria, and questions for
further study.
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Abstract (French)
Les procédures de sélection des sujets invités à participer à des essais
cliniques randomisés (qui s'inscrivent généralement dans le cadre des critères
d'admissibilité des protocoles de recherche) revêtent des conséquences à la fois
scientifiques et éthiques. Dans cette thèse, j'examine les critères d'admissibilité à
trois étapes de la genèse et de la divulgation des connaissances médicales :
protocole d'essai clinique, interprétation par les chercheurs et établissement de
rapports sur les résultats de la recherche.
Le premier chapitre examine les questions éthiques liées à la sélection des
sujets et présente les principales questions à l'étude. Le deuxième chapitre est
consacré aux résultats d'un examen des critères d'admissibilité dans deux
ensembles d'essais cliniques, les uns parrainés par le NSABP et les autres par le
POG, sur une période de vingt ans. Les essais PDG ont beaucoup moins de
critères d'admissibilité que les essais NSABP ce qui donne à penser qu'un nombre
important de critères n'est pas nécessairement un gage de la qualité de la
recherche. Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse à l'impact des critères d'admissibilité
subjectifs sur la participation des sujets et l'incertitude des chercheurs. Les critères
subjectifs sont associés à des décisions en matière de participation plus variables et
à une plus grande incertitude. Ces critères menacent la validité, le déroulement et
l'interprétation des essais et partant, ne devraient être inclus qu'au prix d'une solide
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justification. Le quatrième chapitre examine avec quelle exactitude les critères
d'admissibilité sont signalés dans les ensembles correspondants de protocoles~ dans
les articles sur les méthodes, dans les articles qui paraissent dans des revues
savantes et dans Clinical Alert. D'importantes données se perdent à chaque étape
de la divulgation des résultats de l'étude. Les critères inutiles devraient être exclus
lors de la conception de l'essai; tous les autres critères doivent faire l'objet d'une
signalisation fidèle. Le cinquième chapitre tente de fournir un compte rendu
philosophique complet des procédures de sélection visant la recherche clinique sur
la base de la philosophie politique de Michael Walzer. Le sixième et dernier
chapitre présente les méthodes explicatives et pragmatiques de conception des
essais cliniques, en recoupant les préoccupations scientifiques et éthiques liées aux
critères d'admissibilité et soulève des questions auxquelles d'autres études pourront
éventuellement tenter de répondre.
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Preface
In accordance with the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research document
"Guidelines for Thesis Preparation" the candidate has taken the option, according
to section 3, ofwriting the experimental part of the thesis (chapters two through
five) in the form of original papers submitted for publication to learnedjournals.
This provision reads as fol1ows:
Candidates have the option of including, as a part of the thesis, the
text of one or more papers submitted or to be submitted for
publication, or the clearly-duplicated text of one or more published
papers. These texts must be bound as an integral part of the thesis.
If this option is chosen, connecting texts that provide logical
bridges between the different papers are mandatory. The thesis
must be written in such a way that it is more than a rnere collection
of rnanuscripts; in other words, results of a series ofpapers must be
integrated.
The thesis must still conform to aIl other requirement of the
"Guidelines for Thesis Preparation". The thesis must ioclude: A
Table of Contents, an abstract in English and French, an introduction
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which clearly states the rationale and objectives of the study, a
review of the literature, a final conclusion and summary, and a
thorough bibliography or reference liste
Additionai materiaI must be provided where appropriate (e.g. in
appendices) and in sufficient detail to allow clear and precise
judgement to be made of the importance and originality of the
research reported in the thesis.
In the case of manuscripts co-authored by the candidate and others,
the candidate is required to make an explicit statement in the
thesis as to who contributed to sncb work and to what extent.
Supervisors must attest to the accuracy of such statements at the
doctoral oral defence. Since the task of the examiners is made more
difficult in these cases, it is in the candidates interest to make
perfectly clear the responsibilities of ail the authors of the co-
authored papers.
Thus, chapters two through four of this thesis have an abstract, introduction,
methods, results, discussion and references; chapter five, a theoretical paper, omits
methods and results sections. Also, as required by the Guidelines, there is a
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common abstract, a general introduction (chapter one) and a general discussion
(chapter six) which includes claims to originality and suggestions for further
research.
The submitted manuscripts are as follows:
• Chapter 2.Fuks A, Weijer C, Freedman B, Shapiro S, Skrutkowska M, Riaz A.
A study in contrasts: eligibility criteria in a twenty-year sample ofNSABP and
POG clinical trials. (Submitted for publication).
• Chapter 3. Weijer C, Freedman B, Shapiro S, Fuks A, Skrutkowska M,
Sigurjonsdottir M. Measuring the interpretation of criteria for clinical trial
eligibility: a survey of 365 oncology investigators. (Submitted for publication).
• Chapter 4. Shapiro S, Weijer C, Freedman B. Reporting the study populations of
clinical trials: clear transmission or static on the line? (Submitted for publication).
• Chapter 5. Weijer C. Selecting subjects for participation in clinical research: one
sphere ofjustice. (Submitted for publication).
The candidate was responsible for the following work in the above papers:
• Chapter 2: the candidate participated in discussions regarding the planning and
conduct of the research, designed the questionnaire to evaluate inter-rater
reliability, assisted in collecting the data, performed the data analysis (under the
supervision of Prof. Shapiro), and wrote the tirst draft of the paper.
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• Chapter 3: the candidate participated in planning the research, assisted in
designing the questionnaire, conducted the questionnaire mailings, data entry and
data editing, performed the data analysis (under the supervision of Prof. Shapiro)
and wrote a substantial portion of the first draft of the paper (introduction,
methods, results, and part of the discussion, plus ail figures and tables).
• Chapter 4: the candidate participated in planning sessions for the project, assisted
in data collection, assisted in data analysis, and wrote the methods and results
sections and prepared aIl figures and tables for the first draft of the paper.
• Chapter 5: the candidate is the sole author of the paper.
The candidate's work is supported by a fellowship from the Medical
Research Council of Canada. Throughout the preparation of the candidate's
doctoral thesis, helpful advice and comments on earlier versions of papers was
received from his colleagues in the Clinical Trials Research Group, McGill
University: Benjamin Freedman, Ph.D., Abraham Fuks, M.D., C.M., F.R.C.P.CC),
Stanley Shapiro, Ph.D., Kathleen Cranley Glass, D.C.L., Karen Lebacqz, Ph.D.,
Trudo Lemmens, LL.L. and Myriam Skrutkowska, B.Sc.N..The candidate would
like to express his sincere gratitude to his colleagues for their encouragement and
support during the preparation of this thesis.
He would also like to thank Anthony Belardo, M.A.(cand.) and Robert
Crouch, M.A. who provided editorial assistance with the thesis manuscript. The
((
10
candidate is particularly grateful to his supervisors, Professors Benjamin Freedman
and Abraham Fuks, for their intellectual and moral guidance. T0 them he owes a
debt which only a lifetime of scholarly work could repay.
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Wisdom is as good as an inheritance,
a real profit for mankind;
for wisdom like wealth is a defence,
but knowledge does more good than money,
it safeguards a man 's life.
Who is like a wise man?
Who can explain things?
Man' s wisdom lights his face up,
it transfigures even a rough countenance.
Ecclesiastes 7: Il, 12 and 8: 1
Il
( 12
Table of Contents
2
1
6
4
12
Title page
Abstract (English)
Abstract (French)
Preface
Table of contents
Chapter 1: Introduction: The Belmont Report framework, evolving ethical
issues in the selection of subjects for clinical research, and
questions for study. 20
1.1 Introduction 21
1.2 The Belmont Report 23
1.2.1 Respect for persons 24
1.2.2 Beneficence 25
1.2.3 Justice 26
1.3 Evolving ethical issues in the selection of subjects for research 27
1.3.1 Protecting the vulnerable from harm 28
1.3.2 Study participation as a henefit 31
1.3.3 The importance of widely-applicable research results 34
( 1.4 Questions for study 35
( 13
1.5 References 39
Chapter 2: A study in contrasts: eligibility criteria in a twenty-year sample of
NSABP and POG clinical trials. 43
2. 1 Abstract 44
2.2 Background 46
2.3 Methods 49
2.4 Results 53
2.5 Discussion 55
2.6 Recommendations 64
2.7 Acknowledgements 67
2.8 Figure 1: Eligibility criteria in NSABP and POG clinical trials,
1972 to 1992. 68
2.9 Table 1: Eligibility criteria in NSABP-subset clinical trials. 70
2.10 Table 2: Eligibility criteria in POG clinical trials. 72
2.11 Figure 2: Tracking individual eligibility criteria in the series
of NSABP-subset clinical trials. 74
2.12 References 76
2.13 Appendix 1: Full text ofeligibility criteria in NSABP-subset
clinical trials. 82
( 2.14 Appendix 2: Inter-rater reliability questionnaire. 89
C 14
Bridging section 106
Chapter 3: Measuring the interpretation of criteria for clinical trial eligibility:
a survey of 365 oncology investigators. lOS
3.1 Abstract 109
3.2 Introduction III
3.3 Methods 115
3.4 Results 119
3.5 Discussion 123
3.6 Table 1: Response rates and characteristics of respondents. 127
3.7 Figure 1: Accrual decisions for the clinical vignettes. 129
3.S Figure 2: Investigator certainty associated with accrual decisions
for the clinical vignettes. 131
3.9 Table 2: Differences in accrual decisions and investigator
uncertainty between objective and subjective eligibility
criteria. 133
3.10 References 135
3.11 Appendix 1: Study instrument. 139
3.12 Appendix 2: Demographie characteristics ofquestionnaire
respondents as potential explanatory factors for observed
C differences. 144
( 15
3.13 Acknowledgements 146
Bridging section 147
Chapter 4: Reporting the study populations of clinical trials:
clear transmission or static on the line? 149
4.1 Abstract 150
4.2 Introduction 152
4.3 Methods 157
4.4 Results 159
4.5 Discussion 163
4.6 Table 1: Reporting of eligibility criteria in clinical trial
communications. 171
4.7 Table 2: Reporting of eligibility criteria in clinical trial
communications by category of eligibility criteria. 173
4.8 Figure 1: Proportion of protocol criteria appearing in clinical
trial communications. 175
4.8 References 177
Bridging section 184
Chapter 5: Selecting subjects for participation in clinical research:
one sphere ofjustice. 186
( 5.1 Abstract 187
( 16
5.2 Introduction 189
5.3 Spheres ofJustice 195
5.4 Medical care 200
5.5 Medical research 203
5.6 The distributive logic of medical research 210
5.7 Unjust inclusion as domination 216
5.8 Unjust exclusion as domination 219
5.8.1 Women 220
5.8.2 The elderly 228
5.9 New areas for ethical attention 231
5.10 Privately-funded research 232
5.11 Conclusion 237
5.12 Acknowledgements 240
5.13 References 241
Chapter 6: Discussion: explanatory versus pragmatic approaches to
selecting subjects for research participation. 251
6.1 Introduction 252
6.3 Explanatory and pragmatic clinical trials 252
6.3 Arguments for an explanatory approach to subject selection 258
(
( 17
6.3.1 Including patients of differing prognosis (i.e., a
heterogeneous study population) will increase variability
in a study and, hence, decrease its power. 259
6.3.2 Studies involving homogeneous groups of patients
are more efficient (in tenns of"residual sample size
requirements"). 260
6.3.3 Within a heterogeneous study population, qualitative
differences among subgroups may cancel one another out,
thus obscuring the treatment's "true" effect. 262
6.3.4 In a heterogeneous study population, there are
insufficient numbers in individual subgroups to do a
meaningful statistical analysis. 264
6.3.5 Studies with broad inclusion criteria (and, hence, numerous
subgroups ofpotential interest) may lead to misleading multiple
subgroup analyses. 264
6.4 Arguments for a pragmatic approach to subject selection 266
6.4.1 A truly homogeneous patient population cannat be
defined; patient-ta-patient variability is the largest source
of variation. 266
(
( 18
6.4.2 A study's power is maximized by removing eligibility
criteria and making the sample size larger, not further
restricting the study population. 268
6.4.3 Trials with highly restrictive eligibility criteria may
have difficulty accruing adequate numbers ofpatients. 270
6.4.4 Added eligibility criteria increase trial complexity
'and costs; minimizing criteria reduce complexity and cost. 271
6.4.5 Studies involving heterogeneous groups of patients are
more efficient (in terms of accrual rate and time to completion). 272
6.4.6 Qualitative differences among subgroups are, generally
speaking, uncommon. 273
6.4.7 Statistical techniques exist to adjust for important
known covariates. 275
6.4.8 The results of narrowly-focused studies May not be
applicable to the patient population at large; trials with
heterogeneous patient populations are more likely ta be widely
applicable in clinical practice. 275
6.5 Where science and ethics meet. 280
6.6 Methodology used in this thesis and suggestions for
( further research. 288
((
6.7 Claims to originality.
6.8 Conclusion.
6.9 Figure 1. Explanatory and pragmatic clinical trial designs.
6.10 Table 1. Summary of arguments for explanatory selection
procedures and reasons for pragmatic selection procedures for
clinical trials.
6.11 Table 2. Reductions (% ± standard error) observed with
various treatments for vascular disease, demonstrating similarity
of the direction of effect on the same endpoint in quite different
populations.
6.12 References
19
294
295
297
299
301
303
((
Chapter 1:
Introduction:
The Belmont Report framework, evolving ethical issues in
the selection ofsubjects for clinical research, and
questions for study.
20
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Introduction
In 1994, the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) released a policy,
entitled NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion ofWomen and Minorities as Subjects in
Clinical Research, rnandating the inclusion ofwomen and mernbers ofminority
groups in NIH-funded research studies. 1 The policy additionally requires that
phase III clinical trials (large clinical trials aimed at changing medicaI practice)
examine potential differences in intervention effect between genders or among
racial groups, and that investigators define a program for enrolling and retaining in
the study women and mernbers of minority groups. While these ends rnay not be
practical in sorne cases (for example, when the disease in question is specifie to
one gender or racial group), the policy does not allow for exemptions based on the
cost that such additional procedures may incur. Institutional Review Boards
(lRBs), committees that review such research for ethicaI acceptability, are one of
the parties charged with the task ofensuring that investigators abide by these new
requirements.
Research policies prior ta the NIH Guidelines have addressed ethical
issues related to the selection of subjects for clinical research. As we shaH see,
these policies focused on the inappropriate inclusion ofso-called vulnerable
groups or the wrongful exclusion of groups of individuals who may benefit from
research participation. The innovation of the NIH Guidelines is the recognition that
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the wide-spread applicability ofknowledge generated from phase III clinical trials
is a scientific and ethical imperative. From a scientific perspective, research that
aims to change clinical practice ought to be based on study populations that mirror
patients in clinical practice. From an ethical viewpoint, the knowledge arising from
clinical research is a social good that ought to be distributed equitably. The
systematic exclusion of segments of the patient population from research studies
is, therefore, problematic for both ethical and scientific reasons. The NIH
Guidelines represent an attempt to address this problem:
Since a primary aim of research is to provide scientific evidence
leading to a change in health policy or a standard of care, it is
imperative to determine whether the intervention or therapy being
studied affects women or men or members of minority groups and
their subpopulations differently. To this end, the guidelines
published here are intended to ensure that aIl future NIH-supported
biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects will be
carried out in a manner sufficient to elicit information about
individuals of both genders and the diverse racial and ethnic groups
and, in the case ofclinical trials, to examine differential effects on
such groupS.2
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Scientific and ethical concems in research are often viewed -- rightly or
wrongly -- as non-overlapping. Scientists may see requirements such as inforrned
consent as purely ethical matters, and without scientific implication; ethicists may
view aspects of the study protocol, for example sample-size calculations, as purely
scientific and without ethical implication. Selection procedures for participation in
clinical research, often operationalized within study protocols as eligibility criteria,
have clear ethical and scientific implications. Such selection procedures, therefore,
represent a fascinating opportunity ta examine one area of overlap between science
and ethics.
The purpose ofthis initial chapter is three-fold. First, to lay out the
predominant framework for the analysis of ethical problems in human
experimentation. Second, to outline briefly the evolving ethical issues in the
selection of subjects for clinical research. Third, and finally, to present the main
questions addressed in this thesis.
The Belmont Report
The O.S. National Commission tor the Protection ofHuman Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research (hereafter, the "National CommissionH ) was
created when the National Research Act was signed into law on July 12, 1974.3
The National Commission was charged, inter alia, with defining a set of ethicaI
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principles which could serve to guide the conduct of research involving human
subjects. The objective was to "'provide an analytical framework that will guide the
resolution of ethical problerns arising from research involving human subjects."4 In
their final publication, the Belmont Report, the mernbers of the National
Commission lay out three such principles, respect for persons, beneficence, and
justice.
Respect for persons. The principle of respect for persons requires that
individual autonomy be acknowledged and that persons with dirninished autonomy
be protected. An autonomous person is "an individual capable of deliberation
about personal goals and of acting under the direction of such deliberation."5 The
choices of such persons should be respected and ought not be interfered with
unless there is a clear risk ofhann to others. Not aIl persons, however, are capable
of autonomous choice. Sorne, such as children or the mentally infinn, may lack the
capacity for "deliberation about personaI goals;" others, perhaps including
prisoners, may be in circumstances that restrict their liberty so severely as to bring
into question their capacity for free choice. Such persons, according to the
National Commission, are entitled ta added protections, the degree of additional
protection depending on the probabilities of harm and benefit presented by an
individual research study.
The principle of respect for persans finds expression most obviously in the
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requirement for infonned consent to research participation. In order for consent to
participate in research ta be valid, consent must be based on adequate information,
the information must be understood sufficiently and consent must be given freely.
How much must research subjects be told? The members of the National
Commission propose the standard of the "reasonable volunteer;" in other words,
potential subjects must be told information that a reasonable person in that
situation would need ta know to make an informed decision. This information will
likely include: the purpose of the research, procedures involved, potential benefits
and harms, alternatives to study participation, and the fact that subjects have the
right to ask questions and to withdraw from the study at any time. Researchers
have an obligation to present the information in a comprehensible manner and ta
make efforts to ascertain that subjects have understood the information provided.
Finally, potential research subjects must neither be coerced (i.e., threatened or
bullied into participation) nor subjected to undue influence (i.e., offered an
excessive reward for participation); the decision whether to participate must be
made freely.
Beneficence. The principle ofbeneficence requires that persans not ooly he
protected from harm, but also that steps be taken to ensure their weIl being. The
principle is operationalized by two complementary mies: tirst, do not harm, and,
second, maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms. In the context of
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research, investigators (and Institutional Review Boards) have an obligation to
maximize potential benefits and reduce risks associated with individual research
projects.
Risk refers to both the probability and magnitude of potential harm and is
properly compared with potential benefits. Potential harms and benefits may
accrue to the individual research subject, their families, and to society in general; a
thorough analysis of risks and potentiaI benefits requires that aIl of these be
examined. The National Commission recommended that ethically acceptable
research should, at a minimum, retlect the following requirements: the treatment of
research subjects should never be inhumane; risks should be minimized (in accord
with the exigencies of science); the assessment of risk should be particularly
scrupulous when the study population involves persans with diminished
autonomy; studies should justify the inclusion of vulnerable groups; and relevant
risks and potential benefits should be fully and accurately disclosed in the consent
process.
Justice. Justice, as conceived by the members of the National Commission,
refers to the fair distribution ofgoods; in the context of research, it refers ta the
equitable distribution of the risks and potential benefits of research participation.
As the principle of respect for persans is the foundation for requirements for
infonned consent, 50 too the principle ofjustice provides the underpinnings for the
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obligation that research subjects be selected fairly.
IRBs have an obligation to scrutinize the selection of subjects for clinical
research ta ensure that fair procedures are implernented. On the level of the
individual, researchers ought neither select patients who they like for potentially
beneficial research nor choose "undesirable" patients for potentially harmful
research. On a societal level, IRBs ought to ensure, for example, that classes of
persans are not "being systematically selected simply because of their easy
availability, their compromised position, or their manipulability, rather than for
reasons directly related to the problem being studied."6 Social justice may require
that sorne classes of subjects be selected before others for research participation;
for example, celeris paribus, autonomous adults should be enroHed in research
before persans of diminished autonomy. As we shaH see, the nature ofjustice-
related concerns in research has changed over the last decades.
Evolving ethicaI issues in selection of subjects for clinical research
Although we have characterized justice in the context of research as the
"equitable distribution of the burdens and benefits of research participation," 1
have argued elsewhere that the emphasis and scope ofjustice-related issues in
clinical research have evolved over time.7 (The following is a summary of these
earlier findings.) Early concems in research ethics were fueled by the revelation of
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research scandaI and focused on protecting so-called vulnerable groups from the
potential burdens associated with research participation. As research participation
came to be seen as a potential benefit, because either clinical care within studies
was thought to be superior or experimental treatments were available only in
studies, ethicists argued that unnecessary barriers to research participation ought ta
be removed. Most recently, concern has been expressed that the systematic
exclusion of certain groups from research has led to insufficient knowledge
regarding the optimal treatment ofpersons from such groups. How, then, did each
of these concems develop? And what were (and are) the implications for the
regulation and conduct of clinical research?
Protecting the vulnerablefrom harm. From the end of the Second World
War until the early 1970s, a number of research scandais highlighted the
inappropriate inclusion of vulnerable groups in research. As Freedman has pointed
out, the ethical violations ofthese scandaIs were multi-dimensiona1.8 In sorne
cases, informed consent was not obtained at all, in others subjects were infonned
incompletely or deceived. Many of the studies presented a poor balance of benefits
and harms, ranging from research that deprived subjects of needed treatments, to
that which knowingly and predictably harmed subjects. Subjects for such
experimentation were drawn from vulnerable or "undesirablen classes ofpersons,
including the mentally infirm or demented, political prisoners, racial minorities,
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the poor and the under-educated. Taken as a whole, this unethical research
generated the belief that participation in research was a risky venture, one from
which persons would wish to be protected.
Perhaps the best known example of unethical research is the heinous human
experimentation carried out in Nazi Gennany during World War II. German
physicians and scientists subjected Jews, Russians, Gypsies, political prisoners,
homosexuals9 and others to a wide range of research. 1O The efforts of the Nazi state
to eliminate non-Aryan people (the policy of"racial hygiene") led to experiments
examining sterilization techniques and rnethods of mass murder. Other research
studies were motivated by the exigencies of war; for example, the hypothermia
experiments at Dachau were sparked by high lasses of Axis aviators shot down in
the North Sea. 11 In the Dachau experiments, research subjects were immersed in
tanks of ice water and either observed until death or a variety of revival techniques
were tested. Approximately 25% of the research subjects died as a direct result of
their participation in the hypothermia experiments.
The tirst widely-publicized research scandaI in the United States involved
three physicians at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in Brooklyn, New York. 12
As a part ofa larger research project examining the immunology of cancer,
twenty-two long-term care patients in the hospital were injected with suspensions
containing live cancer cells. Although aIl of the study participants were chronically
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iIl, none had cancer. Problematically, participants in the study were not informed
of the fact that the injections contained cancerous cells. Furthennore, at the time
that the scandaI broke, it was alleged that many of the participants were incapable
of giving valid informed consent. Fortunately, as the investigators had
hypothesized (but not known ab initio), none of the patients developed cancer as a
result of the injections.
The Tuskegee syphilis experiment remains one of the most widely-known
examples of unethical research in the United States.') Perhaps the longest running
research project funded by the V.S. Public Health Service (1932-1972), the
Tuskegee syphilis study examined the course of untreated syphilis in four hundred
Afro-American men in rural Alabama. Study participants were misinformed and
told that invasive tests, such as spinal taps, done solely for research were
"treatments." Furthermore, when penicilIin, a safe and highly-effective treatment
for the disease, became available after World War fi it was withheld from study
subjects. It is estimated that twenty percent of the study participants died
prematurely.
Against this backdrop of scandaI and deceit it is not surprising that research
participation was thought to be a risky business. Early writers on the ethics of
research were preoccupied with protecting potentially vulnerable groups from the
burdens of research participation. Indeed, the members of the National
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Commission required that the involvement of certain groups, including
"hospitalized patients, or other institutionalized persons, or disproportionate
numbers of racial or ethnic minorities or persons of low socioeconomic status
should be justified."14 The notion that certain classes of subjects need to he
protected survives into CUITent Department of Health and Hurnan Services
regulations:
(3 )[the IRB must detennine that] Selection of subjects is equitable.
In making this assessrnent the IRB should take into account the
purposes of the research and the setting in which the research will be
conducted and should be particularly cognizant of the special
problerns of research involving vulnerable populations, such as
children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or
economically or educationally disadvantaged persons
(7)(b)When sorne or ail of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable ta
coercion or undue influence, such as children, prisoners, pregnant
women, mentally disabled persans, or economically or educationally
disadvantaged persans, additional safeguards have been included in
the study ta protect the rights and welfare ofthese subjects. 15
Study participation as a benefit. In the 1980s the public perception of
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research participation changed substantially. Levine observes that
what was once seen as threatening - a burden from which people
wouId wish to be protected - is now seen as a benefit. People are
clamoring for access to clinical trials and ta experimental drugs.
People are demanding that they, and others who are like them, are
owed such as a matter ofjustice. 16
Several factors were responsible for this shift. Between 1976 and 1982, a
number of studies were published which for the first time examined the risk
associated with research participation. 17 The studies found that the level of risk
presented by research participation was relatively smal!. Research studies with
therapeutic interventions, particularly those examining the treatment of cancer,
seemed to present more risk than studies without such interventions, but the risks
in such studies did not differ, at least in kind, from those present in clinical
practice. 18 The advent ofHIV/AIDS in the early 1980s was, however, the major
catalyst for the change in perception. In the early years of the epidemic, no
effective treatments were available and experimental treatments seemed to many ta
offer the best hope for survival.
As a result of these changes, many of the groups excluded from research
participation for protection, were now seen to be disadvantaged or even harmed by
being denied access to experimental treatments available only in clinical trials. As
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a result, the ethical issue of the day changed from the equitable distribution of the
burdens of research participation to the fair distribution ofthe benefits ofresearch
participation. For example, Carol Levine asks
How can groups of prospective subjects traditionally excluded from
clinical trials because of their physical or social vulnerability
(women of child bearing age, infants, prisoners, intravenous drug
users, prostitutes) be given access to clinical trials that may, perhaps,
prove ofbenefit to them?19
Ethicists and regulators responded to this question by arguing (and requiring) that
groups of subjects not be excluded from research participation without good
reason. In the context of HIV/AIDS research, trial designers have been advised
that
Criteria for inclusion in phase II and III c1inical trials should he
based on a presumption that aIl groups affected by the research are
eligible, regardless of gender, social or economic status, use of illicit
drugs, or stage of illness unless the study is particularly designed to
look at a particular stage of illness.2o
Such requirements have not yet made their way into Department of Health and
Human Services regulations. However, the Office for Protection from Research
Risk's Institutional Review Board Guidebook does ask IRBs to consider the
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following questions when reviewing subject selection procedures in research
proposais:
To the extent that benefits to the subject are anticipated, are they
fairly distributed? Do other groups of potential subjects have a
greater need to receive any of the anticipated benefit?
Has the selection process overprotected potential subjects who are
considered vulnerable (e.g., children, cognitively impaired,
economically or educationally disadvantaged persons, patients of
researchers, seriously ill persons) so that they are denied
opportunities to participate in research?21
The importance ofwidely-applicable research results. Recently, a new
justice issue has been added: the results of research ought to be applicable to the
wide range of affected persons in society. The concem was tirst raised in the
context of HIV/AIDS: women, children and other groups were excluded from
early treatment studies and, thus, little was known about how best to treat these
groups of HIVlAIDS sufferers.22 In the early 1990s the issue expanded in scope
dramatically. In an influential article in 1992, Dresser claimed that "the failure ta
include women [and members of racial and ethnic minority groups] in research
populations is ubiquitous."23 The exclusion ofsuch groups from research, said
34
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Dresser, makes it inappropriate to conclude that new treatments are safe and
effective in groups not included in research studies.
Politicians responded ta the ensuing public outcry with a number of
important measures. First., the V.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) removed
existing barriers to the participation of women of reproductive potential in early-
stage clinical research testing the safety and efficacy of new drugS.24 In the new
guidelines, the FDA acknowledges that "[t]he patients included in clinical studies
should., in general, ref1ect the population that will receive the drug when it is
marketed."25 Second, as discussed in the opening section ofthis chapter, in 1994,
the V.S. NIH released guidelines requiring the inclusion ofwomen and members
of racial and ethnic minorities in all NIH-funded research.
Questions for study
Given the wide spread recent interest in the ethical and scientific
implications of selection procedures for clinical research participation, a
systematic examination of criteria for clinical trial eligibility is both timely and
important. As outlined below, 1will examine selection procedures for research
participation at a number ofpoints in the genesis and dissemination of medical
knowledge: the clinical trial protocol, the interpretation ofcriteria by clinicai
investigators, and the communication of study results. Also, a variety of study
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methods will be employed, including both ernpirical and theoretical
(philosophical) approaches.
ln their study of a set ofconcurrent breast cancer clinical trials, Begg and
Engstrorn report that oncology studies often contain numerous eligibility criteria
and that many ofthese criteria are seemingly arbitrary.26 The number of restrictive
criteria in trials is so great, they conclude, as to bring into question the wide spread
applicability (generalizability) of such narrowly focused studies. Building on Begg
and Engstrom's important work, colleagues and 1sought to answer a number of
related questions:
• How have nurnbers of criteria in comparable trials changed over time?
• What is the nature of criteria that have been added or dropped?
• How do these changes affect the generalizability of study results?
In order to address the questions, we undertook an empirical study of eligibility
criteria round in cancer clinical trials funded over a twenty-year period by two
important cooperative groups: the Pediatric Oncology Group (POG) and the
National Surgical Adjuvant Breast and Bowel Project (NSABP). The results of this
study are presented in chapter 2.
In our study of POG and NSABP eligibility criteria, my colleagues and 1
were struck by the fact that sorne eligibility criteria were phrased subjectively
(e.g., "patients must have a life expectancy of at least 10 years, excluding their
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diagnosis ofcancer, to be enrolled in the study") whereas others were phrased
objectively (e.g., "ta be included in the study the patient must have a white blood
cell count (WBC) greater than or equal to 4,000/ mmJ and a platelet count greater
than or equal to 100,000/ mm)"). Hypothesizing that subjective criteria could be a
source of variability in decisions by investigators to enroll patients and investigator
uncertainty, we sought to answer two questions:
• Are subjective eligibility criteria associated with more variable enrollment
decisions?
• Are investigators less certain of their decisions when using such criteria?
In order to answer these questions, we surveyed 365 oncologist-investigators from
the United States and Canada. The results ofthis study are presented in chapter 3.
Eligibility criteria are not merely of importance in the planning and conduet
of researeh. Eligibility criteria must be aecurately and completely reported in
communications of study results for a couple of reasons. First, other investigators
can only replicate a study if eligibility criteria are fully reported. Second, and more
important, clinicians in practice need aecess ta the full list of eligibility criteria in
arder ta make an accurate assessment as ta which patients in their clinical practice
the results of a particular study apply. Colleagues and l, therefore, undertook to
answer the following questions:
• Are eligibility criteria accurately reported in communications regarding the
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results of clinical trials?
• If reporting is not complete, what is the nature of information loss (i.e., what
types of criteria are not reported)?
In order to examine these questions, we studied the reporting of eligibility criteria
in study protocol, methods paper, journal article, and Clinical Alert issued by the
V.S. National Institutes of Health of eight important clinical trials. The results of
this study are presented in chapter 4.
FinaIly, if recent regulatory requirements regarding selection procedures for
clinical research participation are to be applied optimaIly, we need a
comprehensive theoretical understanding ofjust and unjust eligibility criteria. One
possible starting point for this philosophical problem is Michael Walzer's view of
the complex egalitarian society presented in Spheres ofJustice. 27 1ask:
• What are the implications of Walzer's political philosophy for the just selection
of subjects for research participation?
The fifth chapter cantains the results of this philosophical analysis.
The sixth and final chapter of the doctoral thesis discusses the overIap of
scientific and ethical concerns in clinical research, reviews the methodology
presented in this thesis and suggests how it may be applied to other areas of
scientific and ethical concem in medical research.
((
39
References
I.Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health. NIH
guidelines on the inclusion of women and minorities as subjects in clinical
research. Federal Register 1994; 59: 14508-14513.
2.ibid.
3.National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research. The Belmont Report: ethical principles and guidelines for
the protection of human subjects of research. OPRR Reports; April 18, 1979: 1-8.
4.National Commission, op. cil., p. 3.
5.National Commission, op. cil., p. 4.
6.National Commission, op. cil., p. 5.
7.Weijer C. Evolving ethical issues in selection ofsubjects for clinical research.
Cambridge Quarterly ofHealthcare Ethics 1996; 5: 334-345. This paper was
based on work presented in my Master's Thesis: Weijer C. Characterizing the
population in clinical trials: barriers, comparability, and implications for review.
Master's Thesis. McGill University, Montreal, 1995.
8.Freedman B. Unethical research. In: W.T. Reich (ed.). Encyclopedia of
Bioethics. New York: Simon and Schuster MacMillan, 1995: pp. 2258-2261.
9.Levay S. Queer Science: The Use and Abuse ofResearch into Homosexuality.
Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 1996.
lü.Caplan, AL. (ed.). When Medicine Went Mad: Bioethics and the Holocaust.
((
40
Humana Press. Totawa, NJ., 1992.
II.Berger, RL. Nazi science - the Dachau hypothermia experiments. New England
Journal ofMedicine 1990; 322: 1435-1440.
I2.Katz J. Experimentation with Human Beings. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation,1972:pp.9-65.
13Jones, JH. Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. New York: The Free
Press, 1993.
I4.National Commission for the Protection ofHuman Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research. Report and Recommendations: Institutional Review Boards
[DHEW Publication (OS) 78-0009]. Washington, D.C.: Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, 1978: p. 22.
15.Department of Health and Human Services. Protection of Human Subjects.
Title 45, Code ofFederal Regulation. Part 46: Revised. 1991; June 18: 46.111 (a).
I6.Levine RJ. The impact ofHIV infection on society's perception ofclinical
trials. Kennedy lnstitute ofEthics Journal 1994; 4: 93-98.
17.Cardon PV, Dommel FW, Truble RR. Injuries to research subjects: a survey of
investigators. New England Journal ofMedicine 1976; 295: 650-654; Zarafonetis
CID, Riley PA, Willis PW, et al.. Clinically significant adverse events in a phase
one testing program. Clinicat Pharmacology and Therapeutics 1978; 24: 127-132;
McCann Dl, Pettit JR. A report on adverse effects insurance for human subjects.
In: President' s Commission for the Study of Ethics Problems in Medicine and
((
41
Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Compensatingfor Research Injuries: The
Ethica/ and Legal Implications ofPrograms to Redress Injuries Caused by
Biomedical and Behavioral Research (Appendices). Washington, D.C.: V.S.
Govemment Printing Office, 1982; Arnold ID. Incidence of injury during clinical
pharmacology research and indemnification of injured research subjects at the
Quincy Research Center. In: President's Commission for the Study of Ethics
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and BehavioraI Research. Compensatingfor
Research Injuries: The Ethical and Legal Implications ofPrograms to Redress
Injuries Caused by Biomedical and Behavioral Researclz (Appendicies).
Washington, D.C.: V.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.
18.Arnold, op. cil.; Cardon, op. cif..
19.Levine C. Has AIDS changed the ethics ofhuman subjects research? Journal of
Law, Medicine, and Health Care 1988; 16: 167-173.
20.Levine C, Dubler CC, Levine RJ. Building a new consensus: ethicaI principles
and policies for clinical research in HIV/ALOS. IRB: A Review ofHuman Subjects
Research 1991; 13(1-2): 1-17.
2I.Office for the Protection from Research Risk. Protecting Human Research
Subjects: Institutional Review Board Guidebook. Washington, D.C.: V.S.
Government Printing Office, 1993: 3.26.
22.Macklin R, Friedland G. AIDS research: the ethics of clinical trials. Journal of
((
42
Law. Medicine and Health Care 1986; 14: 273-280.
23.Dresser R. Wanted single, white male for medical research. Hastings Center
Report 1992; 22: 24-29.
24.Food and Drug Administration. Guideline for the study and evaluation of
gender differences in the clinical evaluation of drugs. Federal Register 1993; 58:
39406-39416.
25.ibid.
26.Begg CB, Engstrom PF. Eligibility and extrapolation in cancer clinical trials.
Journal ofClinical Oncology 1987; 5: 962-968.
27.Walzer M. Spheres ofJustice: A Defense ofPluralism and Equality. New York:
Basic Books, 1983.
((
Chapter 2:
A study in contrasts:
eligibility criteria in a twenty-year sample ofNSABP and POG clinical trials.
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Abstract
Background. While a number of barriers to enrollment in clinical trials have been
identified in the literature, eligibility criteria are the most important impediment to
accrual. We sought to study changes in criteria in two diachronous samples of
clinical trials.
Methods. ClinicaI trials from two cooperative groups, NSABP (n=Il) and POG
(n=7), covering a twenty-year time span (1972-1992) were included in the study.
After duplications were eliminated, the criteria in each protocol were enumerated
and classified according ta a novel schema.
Results. The NSABP trials contained more criteria (36.7 [mean] ± 1.70 [SE]) than
the POG studies (9.4 ± 1.38, p=O.OOO 1). NSABP studies added precision criteria
(criteria that attempt ta make the study population more homogeneous) at a faster
rate than POG studies. Furthermore, NSABP protocols contained criteria that
excluded patients thought to be vulnerable to toxicity whereas the POG trials did
not.
Conclusions. The NSABP studies typify an explanatory approach to clinical-trial
design, whereas the POG trials typify a pragmatic approach. The contrast between
the two groups suggests that large numbers of eligibility criteria may not be
necessary for good quality studies. We recommend that: (1) the distinction
between inclusion and exclusion criteria be abandoned; (2) eligibility criteria
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should be explicitly justified; (3) the need for each criterion ought to be assessed
when a new trial in a series is planned; (4) criteria in phase III clinical trials should
restrict the eligible patient population as little as possible; and (5) research is
needed to define the impact of criteria on generalizability. (250 words)
Key ~vords. Clinical trials, eligibility detennination, patient participation,
neopIasms/ treatment.
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Background
Clinical trials are the keystone in the development and evaluation of new
treatments in oncology. Despite the pivotaI role of clinicaI trials, only a small
proportion of cancer patients are actually treated in trials. Friedman and colleagues
report that only 1.6% ofU.S. cancer patients are enrolled in NCI-funded phase II
and III clinical trials. 1Low accrual rates have been identified repeatedly as a
critical problem affecting V.S. cancer triaIs.2.3
Why are so few patients enrolled in clinicaI trials? Many cancer patients
never have the opportunity to enroll in a research study either because they are
treated in a hospitaI that doesn 't participate in multi-center clinical trials or
because no trials are avaiIable for their type and stage of disease. The Ne!' s
Community Clinical Oncology Program (CCOP) aims towards -- and has been
successful in -- increasing the involvement of community hospitals in cancer
clinical trials.4•s.6•7 But even within institutions that actively participate in clinicaI
trials, only a minority of cancer patients for whom a study is available are treated
in studies.8
Much of what has been written on barriers to clinical trial enrollment in
oncology has focussed on physician9.10.11.12.13.14 and patientlS.16.17.18 factors
influencing accrual to research studies. In fact, however, criteria for clinical trial
eligibility are the largest barrier to trial accrual. McCusker and colleagues describe
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the enrollment experience of a cohort of454 patients in a single medicai oncology
clinic: of the 342 patients for whom a trial was available for their type and stage of
disease, 43°t1J were ineligible, 4% were not enrolled due to physician refusaI, 2%
refused ta give consent, 1% were not enrolled for "other" reasons and only 250/0
were actually enrolled in a research study.19 Kotwall and colleagues describe the
enrollment experience of a cohort of 592 women with stage l or II breast cancer (a
protocol was available for aIl of the women): 46% were ineligible, 5% were not
enrolled due to physician refusai, 25% refused ta provide consent, 6% were not
enrolled for "other" reasons and only 18% were actually enrolled in a research
study.20 Other studies ofaccruaI of oncology patients ta trials have reported similar
resuits.21.22
The exclusion of patients from cancer research is an important issue for a
number of reasons. Patients who are barred from study participation may be
deprived ofhenefits associated with trial tr~atment.23 A number of studies have
observed that cancer patients treated in clinicaI trials have better outcomes than
those who are treated outside oftrials.24.25.26 Weijer and colleagues examined
treatment differences between women with early stage breast cancer treated within
and outside clinical research studies at a single institution.27 Their findings suggest
a potential mechanism for the observed survival advantage for trial participants:
when age and stage of disease were controlled for in the analysis, women in trials
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received higher doses of chemotherapy and more frequent blood tests than other
patients.
Another problem with exclusions is that trials that prevent substantial
proportions of patients from participating may yield results that are not widely
applicable (i.e., not generalizable) to the broader patient population of interest.
Optimally, clinical trials should mirror the patient population in clinical practice;
such trials will maximize accrual rates and foster the widespread applicability of
results essential to maximize a trial' s impact on medical practice.28 Advocates of
more restrictive trials assert that narrow trials are more efficient because patient
heterogeneity (i.e., variance) is reduced.29 In oncology, however, we know too
little about prognostic factors to be able to defioe a truly homogenous population
of patients.30 Furtherrnore, both Buyse and George have independently argued that
including patients ofdiffering prognoses cao allow a trial to accrue patients more
quickly, and thus answer the question of interest more efficiently (in terms of time
required to complete a trial).3I.32
How many eligibility criteria do typical phase III cancer trials have? Are aIl
the criteria necessary? In an attempt to answer these questions, Begg and Engstrom
studied a synchronous sample of trials investigating chemotherapy in the treatment
of stage II, node positive breast cancer.33 They found that each of the studies
contained a large number of criteria defining the eligible patient population (the
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average number of criteria per study was 23). They also found that, among these
otherwise comparable trials, substantial variation existed in eligibility criteria.
Begg and Engstrom conclude that "[t]he rationale for these exclusions is not
clearly understood in many cases and may to sorne extent be due to the
unchallenged perpetration of conventions that are more applicable to laboratory
experiments in which the experimenter is able to exercise much more control of
the conduct of the study." The magnitude ~"1d nature of the exclusion criteria were
such as to "cast doubt on the generalizability of the results from the clinical trials
program."
Crucial questions remain regarding criteria for trial eligibility: How have
the numbers of criteria in comparable trials changed over time? What is the nature
of the criteria that have been added or dropped? How do these changes affect the
generalizability of study results? In order to begin to address these problems, we
undertook a study of two diachronous samples: clinical trials of the National
Surgical Adjuvant Breast and Bowel Program (NSABP) and the Pediatric
Oncology Group (POG).
Methods
Clinical trials from the NSABP and POG were selected because they each
constitute a single cooperative group that has focussed a series ofcIinicaI trials on
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a single disease: in the case of the NSABP, early-stage breast cancer; for POG,
acute lymphocytic leukemia. Furthennore, bath cooperative groups are the source
ofdistinguished and influential research results and recommendations. Finally,
bath groups of studies caver a similar time span: 1972 to 1992. Trials were chosen
up to the temporary suspension of NSABP studies. While all of the POG acute
lymphocytic leukemia studies were included, we selected a subset of the NSABP
trials for study. Of the 22 NSABP studies (B-04 to 8-25; protocols for 8-01 to B-
03 were no longer available either locally or from the NSABP central office), we
included, on the basis of an a priori decision, only studies of the treatrnent with
chemotherapy of stage II, node positive disease (the same type and stage of disease
as the trials studied by Begg and Engstrom).
The inclusion and exclusion criteria from each of the clinical trials were
extracted from the protocols. It was immediately apparent that substantial
duplications between inclusion and exclusion criteria were present and these were
eliminated. (E.g. -- from NSABP 8-15 -- inclusion criterion: "Patients must have a
life expectancy of at least 10 years excluding their diagnosis of cancer;" exclusion
criterion: "Patients who have a life expectancy of fewer than 10 years, excluding
their diagnosis of cancer.n ) The criteria in each study were then counted by at least
two of the study authors.
A schema for classifying eligibility criteria was developed by our group.
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The schema divides eligibility criteria into categories that describe the purpose of
each criterion. By a process of group discussion and negotiation~ a schema with
five categories (plus a catch-ail "other" category) was arrived al. The five main
categories with examples from NSABP B-15 are as follows:
• Definition of disease -- eligibility criteria that define the medical condition of
interest and represent factors that would be taken into account in clinical practice.
For example: ~~On clinical examination, the tumor was 4 cm or less in its greatest
dimension."
• Precision -- eligibility criteria concemed with the scientific validity of the study.
These criteria attempt to diminish variability in the study by either making the
patient population more homogenous or reducing measurement error. Precision
criteria involve factors that would not ordinarily be taken ioto account in clinical
practice. For example: "Patients with a previous malign~ncy, regardless ofsite [are
excluded]."
• Safety -- eligibility criteria that exclude persans thought ta be unduly vulnerable
ta treatment in general or one of the study treatments in particular. For example:
"The post-operative WBC ~ 4,000/ mni and platelet count ~ 100,000/ mnf."
• Ethical and legal -- eligibility criteria that are required in order ta ensure
confonnity with Department of Health and Human Services regulations governing
the conduet ofhuman experimentation. For example: "The patient eonsents ta be
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in the study."
• Administrative -- eligibility criteria which attempt ta ensure the smooth
functioning of the study. Administrative criteria include measures aimed at
ensuring compliance with treatment and follow-up faH into this category. For
example: HPatient is accessible geographically for follow-up."
Using 42 criteria from one of the NSABP studies (B-22), the inter-rater reliability
of the schema was assessed (appendix 2) with five clinical investigators and two of
the study authors (AF and CW).34 The schema proved ta have a very good inter-
rater agreement, 1<:=0.77.
Criteria from each of the studies were classified into one of the schema
categories by at least two of the study authors. Unfortunately, none of the studies
provided an explicit rationale for each eligibility criterion and disagreement over
classification of individual criteria was resolved by discussion and consensus.
Non-parametric correlations (Kendall's tau-b) and p-values were calculated
for number of eligibility criteria (and date of tirst accrual) for the two samples
using PROC CORR in SAS. Linear regression models were calculated for each of
the schema categories (with date of tirst accrual as the independent variable) using
PROC REG in SAS. 95% confidence intervals were calculated for linear
regression coefficients.
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Results
Of the twenty-two NSABP breast cancer trials between 1972 and 1992, Il
examined the roIe ofchemotherapy in the treatment of stage II, node positive
breast cancer (NSABP protocols 8-05, B-07, 8-08,8-09,8-10,8-11, 8-12, B-15,
8-16, B-22 and 8-25). The number of criteria for ail studies is shown in figure 1.
The number of eligibility criteria in the larger set of 22 studies increased from 21
ta 44 over the twenty year period (coefficient of correlation, tau=O.54, p=O.0006).
In the subset of Il trials (hereafier "NSABP subset"), the number of criteria
increased from 26 to 44 over a similar time period (tau=O.93, p=O.OOOl). Despite
the obvious treatment complexity in the POO studies (ALinC-1 0 through ALinC-
15b), the number of criteria per study (9.4 ± 1.38 [mean ± SE]) was significantly
less than NSABP-subset trials (36.7 ± 1.70, p=O.OOO 1). Over the twenty-year time
span, the number of criteria in the POO studies increased from 6 ta 12 (tau=O. 71,
p=O.04).
The sorting ofeligibility criteria for trials in the two groups according to the
classification schema is shown in table 1. In the NSABP subset, the majority of the
criteria feIl into the definition of disease (41 %) and precision categories (36%). A
minority of the criteria feIl inta the categories of safety (Il %), ethicaI and legaI
(9%) and administrative criteria (3%). Significant increases in the number of
criteria over time were seen only in the definition of disease (tau=O.88, p=O.0004)
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and precision categories (tau=O.88, p=O.0003). The rate ofincrease for each of the
categories is shown in table 1. On average, definition ofdisease criteria increased
by 0.41 criteria per year and precision criteria increased by slightly more than this,
0.44 criteria per year.
In the POG studies, most of the criteria fell into one of three categories:
definition of disease (38%), precision (27%) and administrative criteria (24%). A
few criteria were categorized as ethical and legal (11 %) and no safety criteria were
present in any of the studies. A clearly significant increase over the time period
was seen only in definition of disease criteria (tau=O.87, p=O.O 1). Marginally
significant increases were seen in administrative (tau=O.71, p=O.04) and precision
categories (tau=O.60, p=O.08). The rate of increase for definition of disease criteria
was 0.19 criteria per year. In table 1 and table 2, note that the 950/0 confidence
intervals around the estimates for definition of disease and precision criteria in the
NSABP and POG studies do not overlap. We may conclude, therefore, that the
NSABP studies added criteria to these two categories at a greater rate than the
POG studies did.
In an attempt to elucidate a mechanism for the observed increase in criteria
over rime, we undertook a closer study of the criteria in the NSABP subset. We
discemed 53 distinct criteria in the Il clinical trials (figure 2). Twenty-two criteria
were present in ail Il clinical trials. Of the 26 criteria added to trials after 8-05 but
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before 8-25 (i.e., criteria that were added to the series and at risk ofbeing
retained), 18 (69%) were present in aIl subsequent trials. Thus, when an eligibility
eriterion was added in this series of elinieal trials, it was unusual for it to be
removed.
Twenty-seven criteria were added to the NSABP subset after protocol 8-05.
Criteria added to protocol 8-07 are representative:
• definition ofdisease: women with "ipsilateral axillary nodes over 2 cm in
greatest diameter" were exeluded (criterion #27, figure 2); women with
inflammatory earcinoma were excluded (#28);
• precision: "therapy must begin within 2-4 weeks after mastectomy" (#29);
• safety: women must have "evidence of adequate hepatic function" (#30);
• ethical and legal: "patients with psychiatrie or addictive disorders" that would
preclude infonned consent (#31) or prevent them from receiving any of the study
treatments (#32) were exeluded; and
• no administrative criteria were added.
A complete listing of eligibility criteria in the NSABP-subset studies is given in
appendix 1.
Discussion
Until relatively recently, the scope ofethical enquiry into clinicaI research
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was limited ta a few discrete areas. Following the final report of the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, the Belmont Report, research ethicists have focussed their attention
primarily on informed consent and the assessment of risk-benefit ratio in clinical
research.35 Freedman recently reviewed the cumulative index (1979-1990) of the
main peer-reviewedjoumal for research ethics and review, [RB: A Review of
Human Subjects Research [unpublished data]. Articles on infonned consent (99
articles) and confidentiality (43) represented the largest group, a smaller number of
articles was related to risk-benefit assessment (40), and only a few examined
ethical issues in the selection of subjects for research (5).
Nonetheless, the scope of ethical concem regarding the selection of subjects
for clinical research has expanded over the last thirty years.36 In the 1970s,
ethicists and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) attempted to ensure that
potentially vulnerable subjects (e.g., members of racial minorities, under-educated
persons) were not unduly burdened by research participation. With the advent of
HIV/AIDS in the 1980s, the concern shifted to ensuring that groups of subjects
were not unjustly denied the benefits that might accrue from research participation.
Recent developments, including the NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women
and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research (hereafter, "NIH Guidelines"),
highlight a new domain of ethical interest: the effect of subject selection on the
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generalizability ofresearch findings. 37
ParaIIelIing these evolving concems, the eligibility criteria in a muiti-center
clinical trial May come under scrutiny -- and indeed may be changed -- by an IRB
for a number of reasons.38 First, a trial May fail to exclude persons at undue risk
from study participation or in need of a particular treatment that they may not
receive in the study. Second, a trial may, via an exclusion criterion, bar unjustly a
group ofpatients from the benefits of trial participation. For example, of the 25
cases in which the ethics committee studied by Freedman required changes to
eligibility criteria, five involved challenging the exclusion of persans with HIV.
Third, eligibility criteria may be so restrictive as ta make the accrual of an
adequate number ofpatients to the study unlikely. The NIH Guidelines add
another level ofsClUtiny ta eligibility criteria by requiring that the IRB question
eligibility criteria that impede directly or indirectly the enrollment of women or
minorities to NIH-funded clinicaI trials.
Our investigation represents, then, an enquiry into this expanding area of
ethical (and political) interest. In it, we present a novel avenue ofresearch into
eligibility criteria in clinical trials and characterize changes over time in two
important groups of studies. We found that eIigibility criteria in both the NSABP
and POG studies increased substantially over the study periad. But an increase in
the number of criteria aIone is not sufficient ta conclude that a problem exists. We
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must ask: What is the nature of the increase in these two groups of trials? How is
the generalizability ofstudy results affected?
Our classification schema was constructed with the issue of generalizability
in mind. For example, the definition of disease category was designed to include
criteria that mirror the factors that clinicians incorporate in decisions in medical
practice. Increases in definition of disease criteria are, therefore, unlikely to
interfere with the clinical applicability of trial results. The validity of our
classification is bolstered by the high rate of agreement between the study authors
and independent clinician-investigators. Increases in ethical and legal criteria and
administrative criteria are also unlikely to impede generalizability of trial results;
such criteria, for the most part, involve factors with little biologicaI significance
(e.g., "geographical availability"). Changes in precision criteria will, however,
likely impact on the applicability of research results: such criteria restrict the
patient population by biologically-relevant factors not used in clinical practice
(e.g., excluding patients over age 70). So too, the presence of safety criteria may
diminish the clinical applicability of trial results if excluded patients would be
treated in practice in ways similar to those on the protocol. Given their impact on
generalizability, we will focus most of our attention on precision and safety
criteria.
The increase in eligibility criteria in both the NSABP and POG clinical
((
59
trials was partly aecounted for by increases in definition of disease criteria. As we
have said, the generalizability of trial results is likely not threatened by changes in
such criteria. The greatest increase in criteria in the NSABP trials was accounted
for by precision criteria, i.e., criteria that have a direct impact on the applicabiIity
ofstudy findings to elinical praetice. Precision criteria were added at a greater rate
in the NSABP trials than in the PDG trials.
Sorne of the precision criteria are probably not ofgreat elinieal import. For
example, the criterion requiring that "therapy must begin 2-4 weeks after
mastectomy" (NSABP 8-07, criterion #27, figure 2) seems innocent enough.
Nonetheless, restricting the population in this manner means we have little
information on the effect of delaying treatment beyond this narrow window.
Furthermore, by restricting the pool of eligible patients by this seemingly trivial
criterion (and others like it), the trial designers may diminish the rate at which
patients can be accrued to studies. FinaIly, even if the addition of a single critenon
in this category has a relatively minor effect on the generalizability of study
results, the addition of a number of such criteria may have a substantial impact en
masse on clinicaI applicability.
Other precision criteria are of greater clinical importance. The NSABP
trials routinely excIuded patients "with previous malignancy" (eriterion #12, figure
2), with "concomitant malignaney" (#13), with serious "non-maIignant systemic
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disease" (#14), who received prior "irradiation ...[or] chemotherapy" (#15), or who
received "prior hormonal therapy" (#16). Exclusion ofthese groups ofpatients
Ieaves the clinician with no information on the risks and benefits of the
investigational treatments in such groups. The clinician may weIl wonder: 1s a
woman with breast cancer who has received prior cancer treatment more
susceptible to hannful effects from treatrnent? Do the benefits of the proposed
treatment outweigh these risks? Unfortunately, no information can be forthcoming
from trials that exclude such groups.
The exclusion of oider persons from cancer clinicai trials deserves special
attention. Despite the fact that the elderly carry the largest share of the burden of
cancer, relatively little information regarding cancer therapy in the elderly is
available.39 As a result, the elderly are at risk ofbeing undertreated, a problem that
has been connected with the paucity of clinical trials addressing the treatment of
cancer in the elderly.4o.41 ft is, therefore, a substantial concem that NSABP trials B-
08 through 8-12 excluded "patients over 70 years ofage" (cntenon #24, figure 2;
protocol 8-05 and B-07 excluded "patients over 75 years of age"). While such
exclusions may have been motivated in part by a concem that oider patients may
be more likely to experience toxicity from anticancer treatment, recent data does
not seem to bear this out.42•43 More recent NSABP protocois have replaced this
cntenon with the cntenon "patients must have a life expectancy of at least 10
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years exciuding their diagnosis of cancer" (#46), but it is uncertain how c1inician-
investigators in practice interpret this relatively vague requirement. There is no
evidence to suggest that Iarger numbers ofoider patients are being entered into
NSABP breast cancer studies. Indeed, according ta 1992 accrual data from the
NSABP, the proportion of women over the age ofsixty entered into trials actually
dropped after the criterion's introduction from 24% to 17% (p<O.OOOI). (When
NSABP B-15 and B-16 -- studies that excluded women greater than sixty years of
age (B-15) and women less than fifty years ofage (B-16) -- are dropped from the
comparison the magnitude of the drop diminishes: 24% to 20%, p<O.0002).
A striking difference between the NSABP and POG trials is the total
absence of safety criteria from the POG studies. AIl of the POG studies involved
complicated and relatively intense chemotherapy regimens. Despite this fact, the
POG trial designers left the matter of safety ta the individual clinician's
judgement. The NSABP studies excluded a number of groups of patients with
criteria thought ta be motivated by safety concems: patients with abnormal
hematologic (criterion #18, figure 2), renal (#19) or hepatic (#30) indices and
patients with a history ofheart disease (#35). To the extent that safety criteria in a
protocol make explicit prudent clinical judgement, they do not impact upon the
generalizability ofstudy results. Likely, the criterion relating to Adriamycin
toxicity (#35) falls inta this category. Other criteria, though, exclude from the
(c
62
study patients who would be treated in clinical practice. Patients with minimally or
moderately abnormal blood, hepatic or renal indices, certainly require treatment.
Excluding these groups from trials leaves clinicians with no infonnation on the
risks and benefits of treatment in such cases. For sorne groups of patients,
chemotherapy dose-modification may be appropriate, but again the failure to
examine such modifications in trials leave clinicians in practice with no
information as to how best to proceed.
An extensive list of exclusion criteria may not even proteet researeh
subjeets from harm. We have argued elsewhere that a clinical investigator has both
an ethical and legal obligation to ensure that individual researeh subjects will not
be exposed to undue risk by study participation.44 This duty is not fuifilled by
merely ensuring that a subject passes each of the eligibility criteria in the study
protocol. The elinical researcher must assess carefully the medical history,
physical findings, and relevant laboratory results ofeach prospective subject
before making the clinical detemzination that he or she is fit to enter the study.
George makes the intriguing argument that large numbers of "safety" criteria may
distract clinical researchers from this crucial task:
A detailed list of safety-type exclusions can paradoxically lead to
less attention to other specific details of the individual patient, and
this lack of attention can have disastrous consequences. An
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otherwise eligible patient for a c1inical trial in cancer who had just
been seriously injured in an automobile accident would almost
certainly be immediately excluded from further consideration even
though this situation was not specifically mentioned as an exclusion
criterion. However, another patient with a complicated set of
comorbid conditions that Ieads to an undue risk might be entered
confidently, but erroneously, if the (presumed) safety eligibility
checklist is met. The key point is that the clinical investigator must,
in aIl cases, make a judgement about the suitability ofeach patient
for entry onto the trial based on all relevant medical and other
considerations in addition to the checklist of eligibility requirements.
Viewed this way, the eligibility requirements serve as additional and
often unnecessary roadblocks to otherwise appropriate patients.32
Uitimately, we believe that the NSABP and PDG clinical trials represent
differing philosophies regarding the design and conduct of clinical cancer research.
In their classic paper, Schwarz and LeIIouch make a distinction between pragmatic
and explanatory clinical research.45 Explanatory research studies aim at answering
biological questions and may, therefore, utilize "strict selection" of eligible
research subjects. Pragmatic trials, on the other hand, involve questions relating
directly to clinical practice and, thus, a "heterogeneous population" of study
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patients is required. We believe that the NSABP trials embrace an explanatory-trial
philosophy. As we have seen, the NSABP studies have restricted the eligible
patient population for their studies with a variety of criteria that we have classified
in precision and safety categories. While such criteria may produce a more
homogenous population for study, this cornes at the expense of clinical
applicability. The POG trials clearly embrace the philosophy of the pragmatic trial.
Few precision criteria were added over time and no safety criteria were present in
any of the studies. While patient populations in their studies are certainly more
heterogeneous, the results of such trials are broadly applicable. Numerous factors
undoubtedly affect the proportion of patients treated in clinical trials. Among these
factors, differing philosophies of trial design appears ta be important: while only
3.3 ta 8% ofbreast cancer patients are treated in trials,'-46 79% of children with
acute lymphocytic leukemia are treated in research studies.47
Recommendations
Based on our findings, we have the following recommendations for the
design of clinical trials.
• The distinction between inclusion and exclusion criteria ought to be
abandoned. Clearly, nothing is gained by distinguishing between inclusion and
exclusion criteria: the two categories ofcriteria are interchangeable by merely
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adding a 'not' ta any given criterion. As we have seen, when the distinction is
made, duplications occur. Such duplications make IREs and perhaps even
clinician-investigators themselves wonder whether the protocol was prepared
thoughtfully.
• Eligibility criteria in clinical trials protocols should be explicitly justified.
The absence of transparent reasoning for each eligibility criterion forced our
group to guess as to the intention of trial designers. But the inclusion of a rationale
for criteria is of importance to more parties than just those doing research on
eligibility criteria. As we have seen, InstitutionaI Review Boards are paying closer
attention to criteria. Explanations for individual criteria will help assure IRBs that
each criterion has a sound and legitimate basis (as opposed ta a frivolous or
illegitimate basis).
• In a series of clinical trials by the same cooperative group, the continuing
need for each criterion ought to be assessed when each new trial is planned.
Our "textual analysis" of criteria in the NSABP subset showed that after criteria
are added to a series of studies, they usually remain. By scrutinizing carry-over
criteria more closely, trial designers can minimize the number of criteria thereby
simplifying the patient-enrollment process.
• Eligibility criteria in phase III clinical trials should restrict the eligible
patient population as little as possible, consonant with the demands of
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scientific validity. The contrast between NSABP and POG studies suggests that
large numbers of criteria may not be necessary for good quality clinical trials.
Minimizing restrictive precision and safety criteria tends to increase the eligible
population for the study and makes it more representative. As a result, accrual
rates to studies will be enhanced and study findings may have a greater impact on
clinical practice.
• Finally, research is needed to define the precise impact of eligibility criteria
on generalizability. What proportion of patients in a target population is excluded
by common eligibility criteria? Do clinician-investigators interpret relatively
subjective and objective eligibility criteria differently? How is the impact of study
results on clinical practice affected by criteria? Are eligibility criteria reported
faithfully in publications of clinical trial results? Do clinicians apply study results
to patients who would have been ineligible for study participation? The answers to
these questions await further research.
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Figure 1. Eligibility criteria in NSABP and PDG c1inical trials, 1972 to 1992. The total number ofeligibility criteria in
NSABP (n=22) and POG (n=7) studies (criteria duplications excluded) is plotted against the date offirst accrual for each
study. NSABP studies are divided into two groups: NSABP-subset studies (n=ll) are c1inical trials examining
chemotherapy in the treatment of node-positive breast cancer; and aIl other NSABP breast cancer studies (n= 11).
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Table 1.
Classification schema
Study Year of tirst accrual Total criteria Definition of disease Precision Safety Ethical and legal Administrative
-
8-05 1972 26 Il 9 3 2
B-07 1975 32 13 10 4 4
8-08 1976 32 12 Il 4 4
B-09 1977 34 13 12 4 4
8-10 1977 35 13 11 6 4
B-l1 1981 37 16 13 4 3
8-12 1981 37 16 13 4 3
B-15 1984 43 18 17 4 3
8-16 1984 42 18 16 4 3
8-22 1989 42 18 16 4 3
B-25 1992 44 18 17 5 3
Mean ± SE 36.72 ± 1.70 15.09 ± 0.83 13.J8±0.87 4.18 ± 0.23 3.27 ± 0.19 1.00 ± 0.00
Correlation (p-value) 0.93 (0.0001) 0.88 (0.0004) 0.88 (0.0003) 0.40(0.13) -0.33 (0.21)
Regression coefficient 0.41 0.44 0.03 -0.03
(CI9~) (0.28, 0.54) (0.32,0.56) (-0.06,0.12) (-0.10,0.05)
(en
~
·C
...
~
(,)
.s
'ü
...
QJ
Vl
.D
=Vl1
~
co
-<CI)
z
c
.-
C\S
ï:
u
....
•C::
0
.€
-:.E
:§>
-(.IJ
QJ( :ë~
E-
~ ~
Table 2.
Classification schema
Study Year of firsl accrual Tolal criteria Definition of disease Precision Safety Ethical and legal Administrative
--
ALinC-IO 1972 6 2 2 0
ALinC-II 1974 6 2 2 0
ALinC-12 1976 6 2 2 0
ALinC-13 1981 9 4 2 0 1 2
ALinC-14 1986 15 5 4 D 1 5
ALinC-15a 1991 12 5 3 0 1 3
ALinC-15b 1991 12 5 3 0 1 3
Mean ± SE 9.43 ± 1.38 3.57 ± 0.57 2.57 ± 0.30 0.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 2.29 ± 0.57
Correlation (p-value) 0.71 (.04) 0.87 (0.01) 0.60 (0.08) -- -- 0.71 (0.04)
Regression coefficient 0.19 0.08 -- -- 0.15
(CI95 ) (0.12, 0.26) (-0.004,0.16) (0.005,0.30)
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CRITERION
53 B
B B
A A
50 A DEFINITION OF DISEASE A A
B PRECISION B
C SAFETY B B
D ETHICAL AND LEGAL B B B B
E ADMINISTRATIVE B B B B
45 B B B B
A A
A A A A
A A A A
8 B B B B B
40 B B B B B B
A A
A A A A A A
A A A A A A
C C
35 C C C C C C C
B B B B B 8 B
B B B B B B B B B
D D 0 D
D 0 0 D 0 D 0 0 0 0
30 C C C C C C C C C C
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C C C C C
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A A A A A A A A A
E E E E E E E E E E E
0 D D D D D D 0 D 0 0
20 0 0 D 0 D 0 D 0 0 D D
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15 B B B B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B 8 B B B B
B B B B B B 8 B B B B
B B B B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B B B B
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Figure 2. Tracking individual eligibility criteria in the series ofNSABP-subset
clinical trials. The figure tracks the appearance and disappearance of the 53
discrete eligibility criteria found in the eleven NSABP-subset studies. The
classification of each critenon is indicated by a letter of the alphabet: A - definition
of disease, B - precision, C - safety, 0 - ethical and legal, E - administrative. The
full text of each criterion at entry ioto the series is given is appendix 1 (the text of a
criterion may have been modified slightly over the series).
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Appendix 1. Full text ofeligibility criteria in NSABP-subset clinical trials.
The full text ofeach of the 53 eligibility criteria in the NSABP studies is listed
here. The text is taken from the protocol in which the criterion tirst appeared.
Minor alterations in the text of the criterion may have occurred in subsequent
protocols. The numbering for each criterion corresponds ta figure 2.
Criteria present in aIl NSABP-subset studies
1. There is no edema of the arm.
2. The axillary nodes are movable in relation to the chest wall and
neurovascular bundle.
3. The tumor is contined to the breast or breast and axilla.
4. The tumour is movable in relation ta the underlying muscle and the chest
wall.
5. Patients with skeletal pain are considered curable if roentgen examination
or scan fails ta reveal metastatic disease. Scans are not required~ however,
ifthey demonstrate Metastases in patients having a positive finding at the
site ofpain, that patient is not eligible for the study; but, asymptomatic
patients having a positive bone scan will not be considered ineligible for
this protocoI unless there is biopsy or roentgen proofofMetastases.
7.
6.
(
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Patients with malignant breast tumors other than carcinoma [are excluded].
Patients with findings which relegate them to the category of inoperability
such as peau d'orange involving greater than 1/3 of the breast, satellite or
parasternal nodules [are excluded].
8. Patients with significant nodes in the opposite axilla or palpable
supraclavicular nodes are considered incurable unless there is biopsy proof
that these nodes are uninvolved [are excluded].
9. Patients with bilateral malignancy [are excluded].
10. Having one (1) or more positive axil1ary nodes proven histologically.
Il. Patients with previous oophorectomy (surgical or radiation castration) are
eligible for study if the oophorectomy was not perfonned for tumor.
12. Patients with a previous malignancy, regardless of the site [are excluded] -
EXCEPT patients with squamous or basal cell carcinoma of the skin which
can be effectively treated.
13. Patients with a concomitant malignancy, regardless ofsite [are excluded] -
EXCEPT patients with squamous or basal cell carcinoma of the skin which
can be effectively treated.
14. Patients who are poor surgical risks having non-malignant systemic disease
(cardiovascuIar, renaI, etc.) which would preclude their being subject to any
of the treatment options and who are at high-risk for prolonged follow-up
26.
(
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[are excluded].
15. Prior irradiation, surgery, or chemotherapy for breast cancer [necessitates
exclusion].
16. Prior honnonal therapy for breast cancer [necessitates exclusion].
17. Had a radical mastectomy (conventional or modified).
18. WBC > 4,OO/cu.mm. and Platelet count > 100,OO/cu.mm.
19. BUN < 25 mg%.
20. Patient consents ta be included in the study.
21. Patients who are pregnant [are excluded].
22. Patient is accessible (geographically) for follow-up.
Criteria present in 8-05, but not aIl subsequent protocols
23. Female patients.
24. Patients over 75 years of age [are excluded].
25. Patients who have been treated previously for their CUITent malignancy
including those whose previous "treatment" has been biopsy only (including
excisional biopsy) which was perfonned more than four weeks prior to
radical mastectomy [are excluded].
Patients who are lactating (includes those patients who have stopped
lactating in the past 6 months) [are excluded].
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Criteria added in B-07 and subsequent protocols
27. Ipsilateral axillary lymph nodes over 2 cm in greatest diarneter [mandate
exclusion].
28. Inflammatory carcinoma [necessitates exclusion].
29. Therapy must begin 2-4 weeks after mastectomy.
30. Evidence of adequate hepatic function (bilirubin :s 1.5 mg%, SGOT < 60
LU.lml).
31. Patients with psychiatrie or addictive disorders which would preclude
obtaining informed consent [are excluded].
32. Patients with psychiatrie or addictive disorders which would preclude their
being subject to any of the treatment options [are excluded].
33. Prior therapy for breast cancer, including prior imrnunotherapy for breast
cancer [necessitates exclusion].
34. Turnor of patient is available for estrogen/progesterone receptor site
analyses. (Patients whose tumors are tao small for receptor analysis as
documented by pathology report will be accepted and followed.)
35. Patients with a history of hypertension, coronary artery disease, previous
myocardial infarction or any other cardiovascular disease [are excluded].
36. Patients with hypersensitivity to any protein material or pre-existing auto-
e immune disorder [are excluded].
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37. The overlying skin must he movable with respect to the tumor.
38. The tumor is invasive on histological examination.
39. Having one or more tumors negative for estrogen receptors. Estrogen
receptor data must be reported quantitatively in finoUmg eytosol protein and
must be < 10 finol/mg cytosol.
40. Patients receiving any hormonal therapy other than that stipulated in the
protoeol, ego birth control pills, replacement therapy, etc., are eligible if this
therapy is discontinued while on protocol therapy.
41. Patients whose histologje diagnosis has been established more than four
weeks prior to mastectomy [are exeluded]. This includes exeisional,
incisional or needle biopsy and aspiration cytology.
42. On elinical examination, the tumor was 4 cm. or less in its greatest
dimension (mammographie measurements should be used when possible).
43. Patients treated with segmental mastectomy in whom there is another
dominant mass within the ipsilateral breast remnant [are exeluded]. Sueh a
mass must he biopsied and demonstrated to he histologically benign prior to
randomization.
(
44. Patients who have met the age and receptor criteria:
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AGE
<49
50-59
RECEPTOR STATUS
AlI patients regardless of receptor status
Patients with tumor PR < 10frnoi regardless of ER level.
(
45. Patients who received breast radiation therapy following segmental
mastectomy prior to randomization[are excluded].
46. Patients must have a life expectancy of at least 10 years excluding their
diagnosis ofcancer.
47. The breast was of sufficient size to pennit a cosmetically acceptable
resection.
48. Patients with breasts deemed too large to permit satisfactory radiation to be
delivered[are excluded].
49. Patients treated with segmental mastectomy in whom the nipple was
removed [are excluded].
50. Patients with any distant metastasis [are excluded].
51. Patients with diffuse tumors as demonstrated on xeroradiography or
mammography which would not be considered surgically amenable to
lumpectomy [are excluded].
52.
(
(
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The margins of the resected specimen must be histologically free of
invasive and non-invasive tumor. In patients where pathologie examination
demonstrates tumor present at the line of resection, one additionaI operative
procedure may be perfonned to obtain clear margins. This is pennissible
even ifaxillary dissection has been performed. Patients in whom tumor is
still present after the second resection must undergo total mastectomy.
53. Patients who have undergone a radical mastectomy (removal of the breast
and complete removal of the pectoralis major muscle [are excluded].
Partial excision of the muscle does not constitute a radical mastectomy.
((
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Appendix 2: Inter-rater reliability questionnaire.
Letter to Questionnaire recipients
Dear Colleague:
The Clinical Trials Research Group, as a part of its research on eIigibility
criteria and cIinicaI trials, has developed a schema for classifying eligibiIity criteria
used in clinical trials. We are requesting your assistance in assessing the inter-rater
reliabiIity ofour schema.
Our schema classifies eligibiIity criteria into five broad categories
according to their purpose (a sixth catch-all "other" category is added for
completeness). Criteria are classified into the following categories: (A) definition
of disease; (8) precision; (C) safety; (D) legal and ethical; and, (E) administrative.
Each ofthese categories is defined on the following page. If a given eritenon is
equally well described by two categories, the category closer to the beginning of
the list is chosen (e.g., if a critenon is both "precision" and "safety", then
"precision" is chosen).
We would like you to classify the criteria from a recent NSABP adjuvant
breast cancer protocoI. We have provided a brief overview of the study for you to
place the criteria in a contexte For each enterion, we would like you to select the
one category that best describes it. (We have not incIuded the "other" category as
an option as we wish to "force" a choice).
((
We estimate this "exercise lt will occupy twenty minutes of your time and
we are grateful for your help. If you do not wish to participate, please do not fiII
out the questionnaire. Your answers to the questionnaire will, of course, be kept
confidential.
Thank you for your kind assistance!
The Clinical Trials Research Group
Benjamin Freedman, Ph.D.
Abe Fuks, M.D., C.M., F.R.C.P.(C)
Stan Shapiro, Ph.D.
Kathy Glass, O.C.L.
Charles Weijer, M.D.
Myriam Skrutkowska, B.Sc.N. (Research coordinator)
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ELIGIDILITY CRITERIA CLASSIFICATION SCHEMA:
(A) DEFINITION OF DI8EASE
The purpose of definitional criteria is to set a defined study population of disease.
These criteria mirror the factors that would be taken into account in the clinical
setting, e.g., stage ofdisease, pathologie sub-type, etc.. E.g.,
[ExcludeJ Patients with tumors greater than 5 cm in size at the largest dimension
on clinical examination.
(D) PRECISION (POPULATION AND MEASUREMENT)
These criteria, unique to research protocols, are concemed with the scientific
validity of the research study. These criteria diminish variability in the study by
either making the patient population more homogenous or by reducing
measurement error. Typically, these are factors that would not influence treatment
decisions in clinical practice, e.g., prior history ofcancer, prior treatment with
study agents, etc.. E.g.,
[ExcludeJ Patients who have had prior therapy for their breast cancer, including
irradiation and chemotherapy.
c(
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(C) SAFETY
Criteria in this category serve the purpose of protecting the vulnerable subjeet from
the risks of treatment in general or from the risks of specifie treatments in the
particular research protocol. These criteria serve to identify and exclude patients
who are at a higher risk of developing ill-effects from the study treatments. E.g.,
There must be evidence postoperatively ofadequate hepatic functions (bilirubin
within normal limits. SGOT or SGPT within normallimits).
(D) LEGAL AND ETffiCAL
Criteria in this eategory ensure the complianee of the protocol with the regulatory
(MRC Guidelines; DHHS Regulations) and/or legal requirements for human
experimentation. E.g.,
Patients must consent to he in the study. The informed consent must be signed.
witnessed. and dated prior to randomization.
(E) ADMINISTRATIVE
Administrative criteria set out to ensure the smooth functioning of the mechanics
of the clinical trial. Criteria aimed at ensuring compliance with treatment and
follow-up fall into this category. E.g.,
Patients must he geographically accessible for follow-up.
((
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NSABP PROTOCOL NO. 8-22
A CLINICAL TRIAL TD EVALUATE THE EFFECT OF DOSE
INTENSIFICATION AND INCREASED CUMULATIVE DOSE OF POST-
OPERATIVE ADRIAMYCIN- CYCLOPHOSPHAMIDE (AC) THERAPY ON
THE DISEASE-FREE SURVIVAL AND SURVIVAL OF PATIENTS WITH
PRIMARY BREAST CANCER AND POSITIVE AXILLARY NODES.
Overview
Patients who have histologically proven primary operable breast cancer
with one or more histologically positive axillary lymph nodes and no evidence of
metastatic disease will be eligihle for this study. Patients will be stratified by
number of positive nodes, age, ER level and type of operation and then randomly
assigned to one ofthree treatment groups (see figure). Patients in ail groups will
undergo either (a) lumpectomy plus axillary dissection followed by breast
radiation after completion of aIl chemotherapy or (h) total mastectomy. Following
operation, patients in group 1will be treated with AC therapy, i.e., four cycles
(courses) ofAdriamycin (60 mg/m2) and cyclophosphamide (CY; 600 mg/m2),
with a 21 day interval between courses. Patients in group II will receive the same
((
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dose of Adriamycin (60 mg/m2) at 21-day intervals X 4, just as in group 1. CY,
however, will he 1200 mg/m2, adrninistered for two courses, i.e., on days 1 and 22,
with the Adriamycin. No CY will be given during courses 3 and 4. Patients in
group II will thus receive the same cumulative dose of CY as those in group l, but
aIl CY will be given in two "intensified" courses. Patients in group III will receive
an intensified dose of CY plus a greater cumulative (total) dose ta be administered
AC [Adriamycin (60 mg/m2) and cyclophosphamide (1200 mg/m2)] q21 days X 4.
ln aIl three groups, patients who are ~50 years will receive tamoxifen, ID mg bid,
beginning on Day 1 of Cycle l, and will continue this regimen for five years.
( A - DEFINITION OF DISEASE
B - PRECISION (OF POPULATION AND MEASUREMENT)
C - SAFETY
D - LEGAL AND ETHICAL
E - ADMINISTRATIVE
9:
1.(Exclude) Patients treated with lumpectomy in whom there is another dominant
mass within the ipsilateral breast remnant. Such a mass must be biopsied and
demonstrated to be histologically benign prior to randomization.
A 8 c o E
2.(Exclude) Patients who receive breast radiation therapy following lumpectomy but
prior to randomization.
A 8 c D E
3.Patients must have a life expectancy ofat least 10 years, excluding their diagnosis
of cancer.
A 8 c o E
4.(Exclude) Patients who have had prior therapy for their breast cancer, including
hormonal therapy.
A B c D E
5.(Include) (Patients) Treated by lumpectomy and axillary dissection or total
mastectomy and axillary dissection.
A B c D E
(
Please make only one choice for each criterion. If two categories seem equally good
descriptions, choose the one closest to the beginning ofthe alphabet. Please make a choice
for every criterion even ifyou are no! sure ofa given choice.
( A - DEFINITION OF DISEASE
B - PRECISION (OF POPULATION AND MEASUREMENT)
C - SAFETY
D - LEGAL AND ETHICAL
E - ADMINISTRATIVE
9<5
6.The postoperative WBC must be ~4 aoo/cu mm and platelet count ~100 OOO/cu mm.
A 8 c D E
7.There must be evidence postoperatively of adequate renal function (serum
creatinine ~ 1.5 mg%).
A B c D E
8.(Exclude) Patients with bilaterai malignancy or a mass in the opposite breast unless
there is biopsy proof that the mass is not malignant.
A 8 c D E
9.0n clinical examination, axillary nodes, ifpalpable, must be movable in relation ta
the chest wall and neurovascular bundle.
A B c D E
1O.The tumor must be confined ta the breast or breast and ipsilateral axilla.
A B c D E
Please make only one choice for each criterion. If two categories seem equally good
descriptions, choose the one closest to the beginning ofthe alphabet. Please make a choice
for every criterion even i[you are not sure ofa given choice.
( A - DEFINITION OF DISEASEB - PRECISION (OF POPULATION AND MEASUREMENT)
C - SAFETY
D - LEGAL AND ETHICAL
E - ADMINISTRATIVE
11.The overlying skin must be moveable with respect to the tumor.
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A 8 c D E
I2.The tumor must be invasive on histologie examination.
A 8 c o E
13.Patients receiving any sex hormonal therapy other than that stipulated in the
protocol, e.g., birth-control piUs, ovarian hormonal replacement therapy, etc., are
eligible ifthis therapy is discontinued whiIe on protocol (until tirst treatrnent failure).
A B c D E
14.(Exclude) Patients with ipsilateral axillary lymph nodes which are greater than 2
cm in greatest diameter.
A B c D E
15.(Exclude) Patients with inflammatory carcinoma.
A B c D E
(
Please make only one choice for each criterion. If two categories seem equally good
descriptions, choose the one cLoses! to the beginning ofthe alphabet. Please make a choice
for evea criteriQn even ifyou are nQ! sure Qfa given choice.
( A - DEFINITION OF DISEASE
B - PRECISION (OF POPULATION AND MEASUREMENT)
C - SAFETY
D - LEGAL AND ETHICAL
E - ADMINISTRATIVE
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16.(Exclude) Patients whose histologic diagnosis has been established more than 28
days prior to mastectomy. Diagnosis includes excisional, incisional or needle biopsy
and aspiration cytology.
A B C D E
17.(Exclude) Patients with active cardiac disease that would preclude the use of
Adriamycin. This includes:
(a) Any documented myocardial infarction.
(b) Angina pectoris which requires the use ofanti-anginal medication.
(c) Any history of documented congestive heart failure.
(d) Patients with a cardiac arrhythmia are eligible for this protocol, provided the
arrhythmia is not associated with concomitant heart failure or cardiac dysfunction.
(e) Valvular disease with documented cardiac function compromise.
(t) Cardiomegaly on chest x-ray.
(g) Paarly controlled hypertension, i.e., diastolic greater than lOOmm/Hg. Those
patients with hypertension that is weIl contralled on medicatian are eligible for entry.
A B c D E
(
Please make onLy one choice for each criterion. If two categories seem equally good
descriptions, choose the one closest to the beginning ofthe alphabet. Please mate a choice
for every criterion even ifyou are not sure ofa given choice.
1 A - DEFINITION Of DISEASEB - PRECISION (Of POPULATION AND MEASUREMENT)
C -SAFETY
D - LEGAL AND ETHICAL
E - ADMINISTRATIVE
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18.0n clinical examination, the tumor must be 5 cm or less in its greatest dimension.
A B c o E
19.Patients must consent to be in the study. The informed consent form must be
signed, witnessed, and dated prior to randomization.
A 8 c o E
2ü.Patients with palpable nodes in the axilla opposite the affected breast or with
palpable supraclavicular or infraclavicular nodes are considered ineligible unless there
is biopsy evideoce that these are oot involved with tumor.
A 8 c D E
21.The tumor must be movable in relation to the underlying muscle and chest wall 00
clinical examination, i.e., not attached to pectoral fascia or chest wall.
A B c o E
22.The breast must be ofsufficient size to permit a cosmetically acceptable resectioo.
A 8 c D E
23.(Exclude) Patients with any distant metastasis.
A B c D E
(
Please make only one choice for each criterion. If two categories seem equally good
descriptions, choose the one closes! to the beginning ofthe alphabet. Please make a choice
for every criterion even ifyou are not sure ofa given choice.
( A - DEFINITION OF DISEASEB - PRECISION (OF POPULATION AND MEASUREMENT)
C - SAFETY
D - LEGAL AND ETHICAL
E - ADMINISTRATIVE
100
24.(Exelude) Patients with diffuse tumors as demonstrated on xeroradiography or
mammography whieh would not be eonsidered surgically amenable to lumpeetomy.
A B c D E
25.(Exelude) Patients who are pregnant at the time of randomization.
A B c D E
26.The interval between the definitive operation and date of first treatment must be
no more than 35 days.
A B c o E
27.There must be evidence postoperatively of adequate hepatic functions (bilirubin
~ 1.5%, SGOT or SGPT ~60 lU/ml).
A 8 c o E
28.(Exclude) Patients with psychiatrie or addictive disorders that would prec1ude
obtaining infonned consent.
A B c D E
(
Please make only one choice for each criterion. If two categories seem equally good
descriptions, choose the one closest to the beginning ofthe alphabet. Please make a choice
for every criterion even ifyou are not sure ofa given choice.
( A - DEFINITION OF DI5EASE
B - PRECISION (OF POPULATION AND MEASUREMENT)
C - SAFETY
D - LEGAL AND ETHICAL
E - ADMINISTRATIVE
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29.(Exclude) Patients who have had prior therapy for their breast cancer, including
immunotherapy.
A B c D E
30.There must be no edema of the ann.
A B c o E
31.(Exclude) Patients with a concomitant malignancy, regardless of site, except
patients with squamous or basal cell carcinoma ofthe skin which has been effectively
treated or carcinoma in situ of the cervix or uterus which has been treated by
operation only.
A B c o E
32.(Exclude) Patients who have nonmalignant systemic disease (cardiovascular, renal,
hepatic, etc.), which would preclude their being subjected to any of the treatment
options or would prevent prolonged follow-up.
A B c o E
(
Please make only one choice for each criterion. If two categories seem equally good
descriptions, choose the one closest to the beginning ofthe alphabet. Please make a choice
for every criterion even ifyou are no! sure ofa given choice.
( A - DEFINITION OF DISEASEB - PRECISION (OF POPULATION AND MEASUREMENT)
C - SAFETY
D - LEGAL AND ETHICAL
E - ADMINISTRATIVE
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33.(Exclude) Patients who have had prior therapy for their breast cancer, including
irradiation or chemotherapy.
A B c D E
34.Patients with skeletal pain are eligible for inclusion in the study ifbone scan and/or
roentgenological examination fail to disclose metastatic disease.
A B c o E
35.(Exclude) Patients with breast tumors other than carcinoma.
A B c o E
36.Patients must be accessible geographically for follow-up.
A B c D E
37.At least one axillary lyrnph node must demonstrate evidenee of tumor on
histologie examination.
A B c D E
(
Please make only one choice for each criterion. If two categories seem equally good
descriptions, choose the one closest to the beginning ofthe alphabet. Please make a choice
(or every criterion even ifyou are not sure ofa given choice.
( A - DEFINITION OF DISEASEB - PRECISION (OF POPULATION AND MEASUREMENT)
C - SAFETY
D - LEGAL AND ETHICAL
E - ADMINISTRATIVE
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38.Patients with previous surgical oophorectomy are eligible for this study if the
oophorectomy was not performed for malignancy. (Radiation castration will render
the patient ineligible).
A B c o E
39.(Exclude) Patients with a previous malignancy, regardless of site, except patients
with squamous or basal cell carcinoma of the skin which has been effectively treated
or carcinoma in situ of the cervix or uterus which has been treated by operation only.
A B c o E
40.(Exclude) Patients with findings which relegate them to the category of more
advanced disease, such as peau d'orange or skin edema of any magnitude, satellite
breast nodules or parastemal nodules, and edema of the arm. (The term satellite
nodules refers to discrete foci of tumor involving the skin around the tumor. Should
these be suspected, they must be examined histologically, and, if confirmed, the
patient should be considered ineligible for this study).
A B c o E
(
Please make only one choice for each criterion. If two categories seem equally good
descriptions, choose the one closes! to the beginning ofthe alphabet. Please make a choice
for every criterion even ifyou are not sure ofa given choice.
( A - DEFINITION OF DISEASEB - PRECISION (OF POPULATION AND MEASUREMENT)
C - SAFETY
D - LEGAL AND ETHICAL
E - ADMINISTRATIVE
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41.A quantitative estrogen and progesterone receptor analysis must have been
perfonned in a laboratory which has complied with NSABP quality-control
prerequisites. Quantitative estrogen and progesterone receptor information must be
available prior to randomization. Estrogen and progesterone receptor data must be
reported quantitatively in frnoUmg cytosol protein. No other methodologies for
receptor determination will be accepted.
A 8 c o E
42.The margins of the resected specimen must be histologically free of invasive
and non-invasive tumor. In patients where pathologie examination demonstrates
tumor at the line of resection, one additional operative procedure may be
performed to obtain clear margins. This is permissible even ifaxillary dissection
has been performed. Patients in whom tumor is still present after the second
resection must undergo total mastectomy.
A B c D E
(
Please make onLy one choice for each criterion. If two categories seem equally good
descriptions, choose the one closest to the beginning ofthe alphabet. Please make a choice
for every criterion even ifyou are not sure ofa given choice.
( 105CLASSIFICATION KEY:
l. A 22. B
2. B 23. A
3. B 24. A
4. B 25. D
5. B 26. B
6. C 27. C
7. C 28. D
8. A 29. B
9. A 30. A
10. A 31. B
Il. A 32. B
12. A 33. B
13. B 34. A
14. A 35. A
15. A 36. E
16. B 37. A
17. C 38. B
18. A 39. B
19. D 40. A
20. A 41. B
( 21. A 42. B
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Bridging section
ln the second chapter, my coIIeagues and 1began the investigation into
selection procedures for research participation with an empirical examination of
two sets ofprotocols. Following on the work of Begg and Engstrom, we sought ta
answer three questions: How have numbers of eligibility criteria in comparable
trials changed over time? What is the nature of criteria that have been added or
dropped? How do these changes affect the generalizability of study results?
Despite the fact that both the NSABP and POG trials involved anti-cancer
chemotherapy, the NSABP trials contained many more eligibility criteria than the
POG trials. The number of eligibility criteria approximately doubled in bath sets of
clinical trials over the twenty-year study interval.
In order evaluate the nature of the added criteria, we developed (and
validated) a schema to classify eligibility criteria into five categories: definition of
disease, precision, safety, ethical and legal, and administrative. The classification
schema was designed with the applicability of study results (generalizability) in
mind. Definition ofdisease criteria are of little concem in this regard; by
definition, they represent factors taken into account in clinical practice. The
addition of precision criteria, as factors not taken into account in clinical practice,
may substantially hamper the applicability ofstudy results. Safety criteria do not
hamper generalizability insofar as they mimic prudent clinical decision making.
(c
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We found that the increase in eligibility criteria in the NSABP studies was
largely accounted for by additions to the definition ofdisease and precision
categories. Furthermore, the NSABP studies added precision criteria at a greater
rate than the POG studies. Finally, we were surprised to find that -- as opposed to
the NSABP studies -- the POG studies contained no safety criteria whatsoever.
The NSABP and POG clinical trials resulted in important contributions to
knowledge in the treatment of hreast cancer and acute lymphocytic leukemia. By
excluding from study participation groups of patients who would need similar
treatment in clinical practice, including aider patients, those with prior
malignancies, and those with minimal to moderate organ dysfiJnction, however,
the NSABP trials fail to prov"ide infonnation on how hest to treat these important
groups of patients. The absence of similar criteria in the POG trials suggests that
such criteria may not he necessary. This contrast led us to recommend, inter alia,
that eligibility criteria in phase III clinical trials should restrict the eligible patient
population as /iule as possible, consonant with the denzands ofscientific validity.
At the end of the chapter, we identified a number of areas for further study.
In the next chapter, we tum from the protocol to the investigator and address one
ofthese areas directly. We ask: Are subjective eligibility criteria associated with
more variable enrollment decisions? Are investigators less certain of their
decisions when using such criteria?
((
Chapter 3:
Measuring the interpretation of criteria for clinical trial eligibility:
a survey of 365 oncology investigators.
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Abstract
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) play an important role in ensuring that
new medical treatments are both safe and effective. A number of eligibility criteria
commonly used in ReTs have been criticized in the literature, including criteria
that exclude the elderly, persons with psychiatric disease, or persons with
substance abuse problems from trial participation. In this paper, we invoke a novel
critique against such criteria: they are subjective, i.e., open to a wide-range of
interpretation by RCT investigators. Subjective criteria are, we hypothesise, a
source of variability in enrollment decisions and investigator uncertainty. In order
to test our hypotheses, we surveyed 365 cancer investigators from the United
States and Canada. Investigators were presented with clinical vignettes from three
patient categories -- eligible, uncertain, and ineligible -- for each of five eligibility
criteria (three subjective and two objective) and asked whether they would enroll
the patient in a trial and how sure they are of this decision. Overall, 224 usable
questionnaires were returned (response rate = 61.4%). Subjective criteria were
associated with more variable enrollment decisions than objective criteria for each
of the patient scenarios (eligible scenario, p=O.07; uncertain and ineligible
scenarios, p=O.OOO 1). Clinical investigators were aIso more unsure of decisions
made for subjective criteria than objective criteria (all patient scenarios, p=O.OOI).
Demographie characteristics of investigators failed to explain the observed
((
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differences in enrollment decisions or certainty. Subjective eligibility criteria may
interfere with the conduet and interpretation of ReTs and their use ought,
therefore, to be justified explicitly in the study protocol. Trial designers, funding
agencies and Institutional Review Boards have an important role in reviewing
eligibility criteria for their necessity. (266 words)
((
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Introduction
In oncology, as in other areas of medicine, randomized clinical trials (RCT)
provide us with the most reliable information on the safety and efficacy of novel
medical interventions. RCTs provide an unbiased comparison of a new treatment
and control treatrnent (often standard therapy) by assigning patients by chance ta
the study's differing treatment groups. But ta whom do the results of such
carefully conducted studies apply? Few patients are actually treated in RCTs,
(Tate, 1979; Friedman, 1990) and those that are included represent a highly-select
group. In oncology (among the few areas in which good published studies are
available), the majority of patients for whom a RCT is available are ineligible for
study participation because they do not meet at least one of the (typically) lengthy
list of trial eligibility criteria. (Gotay, 1991; McCusker, 1982; Kotwall, 1992;
Begg, Zelen and Carbone, 1983; Lee, 1983)
Sorne specifie eligibility criteria have recently come under attack in the
literature. Notably, criteria that restrict study populations to men only or exclude
members of racial minority groups have been criticized on a number of grounds:
excluded individuals are denied the potential benefits associated with RCT
participation, the results of such studies may not be applicable to excluded groups,
and the resulting gaps in medical knowledge may lead to either inappropriate
treatment or under-treatment for women or racial nlinorities. (Dresser, 1992;
((
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Mastroianni, 1994) In response to these criticisms, the V.S. National Institutes of
Health (NIH) issued guidelines in 1994 requiring, in part, the representative
inclusion of women and racial minorities in aIl NIH-funded research.(NIH, 1994)
Similar concems have been raised regarding other eligibility criteria,
including criteria that exclude the elderly from clinical studies. Cancer RCTs
funded by the U.S. National Cancer Institute have excluded the elderly from RCTs
for years. (Begg and Carbone, 1983) Trials have excluded the elderly directly by
setting an age cut-off for trial eligibility (e.g., 70 years of age) and indirectly by
excluding persons with co-morbid diseases that are more common in the elderly.
Recent breast cancer ReTs of the National Surgical Adjuvant Breast and Bowel
Project (NSABP) have abandoned an age cut off in favor of a criterion requiring
that "patients must have a life expectancy of at least 10 years excluding their
diagnosis of cancer." But how do clinical investigators interpret such a criterion?
There is no evidence that more older persons are being enrolled in NSABP RCTs
(indeed their representation has declined since the introduction of the new
criterion).(Fuks, unpublished data) The exclusion of older persons from cancer
research studies has lead to a lack ofknowledge about how best to treat cancer in
the elderly. (Kennedy, 1991) At least two studies have attributed the systematic
under-treatment ofcancer in older persons to the exclusion of the elderly from
carefully conducted randomized controlled trials. (Mor, 1985; Samet, 1986)
((
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Eligihility criteria excluding persons with a history of psychiatrie illness or
drug or a1cohol abuse have been criticized on other grounds. RCTs often exclude
persons with a history of psychiatrie disease on the basis that such persons are al
risk ofbeing or becoming incompetent. Similarly, persons with a history ofdrug or
alcohol abuse are often ineligihle for study participation based upon the
presumption that they are less compliant than other research subjects. Putting aside
the obvious discriminatory tone ofsuch criteria, the associations between
psychiatrie disease and (ipso facto) incompetence and between a history of drug
and alcohol abuse and non-compliance can be challenged. Indeed, a patient may
have one of any number of psychiatrie diagnoses, including major depression,
bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia, and remain legally competent. (Michels, 1994;
Grisso, 1991) Ifcompetency is the issue, then it should be assessed directly. The
association between a history of drug and a1cohol abuse and non-compliance is
even more dubious. Indeed, finding no support for such an association in the
empiricalliterature, Hughes recommends that such eligibility criteria not he used
in RCTs. (Hughes, 1993) Again, if compliance is the issue, it is better assessed
directly.
We believe that another problem may exist with many of the eligibility
criteria mentioned above: they are open to a wide range of interpretation by ReT
investigators. Eligibility criteria that require investigators to assess prospective
((
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research subjects on the basis oflife expectancy, unacceptable co-morbid diseases,
or psychiatrie disease associated with incompetency are all examples of subjective
criteria that are likely ta be interpreted differently by different investigators. Put
another way, assessed by the same subjective criterion, a given patient may be
deemed eligible in one study centre and ineligible in another. If decisions
involving individual criteria are highly variable, such criteria may represent an
avoidable source of added variability ta the study and, hence, the study's internai
validity may be diminished by their presence. AIso, highly-subjective criteria may
make it more difficult for clinicians reading the published study ta decide if the
resuIts apply ta individual patients in their clinicaI practice. FinaIly, if subjective
eligibility criteria are a source of investigator uncertainty, the expense of a study
may be increased and study enrollment slowed by longer eligibiIity assessment
interviews and repeated caUs from investigators with questions regarding
eligibiIity ta the clinicaI trial coordinating centre.
In this study, which involved cancer ReT investigators from across North
America, we set out ta answer two questions: Are subjective eligibility criteria
associated with more variable enroIIment decisions? Are investigators less certain
of their decisions when using such criteria? The answers ta these questions may
have important implications for the design of future ReTs.
((
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Methods
Over a period of months, our multidisciplinary research group developed
the study instrument. Five common eligibility criteria, three subjective and two
objective, were selected from an important series ofNSABP breast cancer ReTs.
The subjective criteria chosen were as follows:
• "[Exclude] patients who have nonmalignant systemic disease
(cardiovascular, renal, hepatic etc.) which would preclude their being
subjected to any of the treatrnent options (adjuvant chemotherapy) or
prevent prolonged follow-up [criterion a, figures 1 and 2];"
• "Patients with psychiatric or addictive disorders which would
preclude obtaining informed consent are ineligible [criterion c,
figures 1 and 2];"
• "Patients must have a life expectancy of at least 10 years,
excluding their diagnosis of cancer, to be enrolled in the study
[criterion e, figures 1 and 2]."
In the set ofNSABP breast cancer studies from 1972 to 1992 (NSABP B-04 to
NSABP 8-25), the criteria were present in 100%, 91 % and 50% of the study
protocols, respectively. The objective criteria were:
• "Patients with a previous or concomitant malignancy [are
ineliwble], regardless of site, EXCEPT patients with squamous or
((
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basal cell carcinoma of the skin that has been effectively treated or
carcinoma in situ of the cervix that has been treated by operation
only [criterion b, figures 1 and 2];"
• "Ta be included in the study the patient must have a white blood
ceII count (WBC) greater than or equal to 4,000/mm3 and a platelet
count greater than or equal ta 100,000/mm3 [criterion cl, figures 1 and
2]."
Again, the criteria were present in the majority of the NSABP studies: 100% and
86%, respectively.
For each eligibility criterian, questionnaire recipients were presented with
clinical vignettes and asked whether they would enrall the patient in a breast
cancer treatment pratocol (yes or no) and ta indicate on a visual analogue scale
how sure they are of this decision (scored from 0.00 ta 1.00). (Aitken, 1969;
Folstein, 1973) Clearly, enrollment decisions will be a function, in part, of the
clinical vignette. In arder ta control for this in the study design (and later in the
analysis), three vignettes were gjven for each eligibility criterion: an eligible
patient, an ineligible patient, and one whose status was uncertain. The arder of the
vignettes was varied for each eligibility criterion in the questionnaire. Recipients
were asked if they had evaluated patients with any of the eligibility criteria in the
questionnaire in their own experience with ReTs. Recipients were also asked for
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demographic infonnation, including medical specialty, years ofmedical practice,
and number of ReTs in which they had participated. A pilot version of the
questionnaire was given to 10 experienced clinical investigators in the Faculty of
Medicine at McGill University to estimate the time required to complete the fonn,
identify any problems in the construction of the instrument, and check the face-
validity of the vignettes (i.e., face-validity as eligible, uncertain or ineligible).
Seven investigators retumed completed fonns and, based on their comments, a
three-page (plus instructions) final version of the questionnaire was prepared (see
appendix 1).
Three-hundred-and-sixty-five oncologist investigators whose primary
affiliation was with the U.S.-based NSABP or Canada-based National Cancer
Institute of Canada (NCrC) were identified in the Physician Data Query database
maintained by the National Library of Medicine (Bethesda, Maryland). After
ethics approval for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Board of the
S.M.B.D. Jewish General Hospital (Montreal), each of the oncologist investigators
in the sample was sent a card in October 1993 informing them of the study and that
they would reeeive a questionnaire in two weeks time. The questionnaire,
complete with instructions and a stamped and addressed return envelope, was
mailed at the end of Oetober 1993. With the tirst questionnaire mailing, reeipients
were told that they were free to not participate and refusai to participate should be
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indicated by sending back a blank questionnaire. Investigators who failed to send
back the questionnaire (either completed or blank) were sent up to two more
mailings at four week intervals. The study was closed in February 1994.
Retumed questionnaires were considered usable if the respondent filled in
aIl of the primary outcome variables, i.e., the enrollment decisions for each of the
vignettes. Data were entered into an electronic format, checked for transcription
errors, and analysed using SAS. The primary outcome variable was the difference
in enrollment decisions between subjective and objective criteria. Since we
hypothesized that objective criteria would be associated with less variable
enrollment decisions, i.e., decisions closer on average to one (enroll) or zero (not
enroIl), the difference had to be calculated in a different way for each of the three
scenarios. Scenario-specifie differences in enrollment decision were calculated in
such a way that the difference would be positive if subjective criteria are
associated with more variable enrol1ment decisions. Only if an analysis of variance
for repeated measures (using PROC ANOVA in SAS) failed ta conclude that the
mean scenario-specifie differences are different, would they he combined into a
single summary measure. At-test (using PROC MEANS in SAS) checks whether
the differences (either scenario-specifie or pooled) differ significantly from zero.
The secondary outcome is the certainty associated with each of the
enrollment decisions. Since we hypothesized that, in each scenario, enrol1ment
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decisions associated with subjective criteria would be less certain than those
associated with objective criteria, the analysis is straightforward. For each
scenario, the difference of interest was calculated as the mean certainty for the
objective criteria minus the mean certainty for the subjective criteria. Calculated in
this way, each of the differences would be positive if subjective criteria cause
investigators to be more uncertain. As for the primary outcome analysis, the
scenario-specifie differences would only be combined if the results of the analysis
ofvariance allow us. As above, t-tests will be used to test whether observed
differences are significantly different from zero.
Finally, for both the primary and secondary outcome variables (whether
scenario-specifie differences or pooled differences are eventually used), multiple
regression modelling (using PROC REG in SAS) explores the role of demographic
factors in explaining the observed differences in enrollment decision or certainty.
Results
Of the 365 questionnaires sent out, 224 (61.4%) usable questionnaires were
eventually retumed (table 1). Perhaps due to the fact that our research group is
based in Canada, the response rate was substantially higher for investigators
associated with the NCIC RCT cooperative group (retum rate = 78.1%,
p<O.OOOOI), aithough the V.S. retums compares favorably with similar
((
120
questionnaire surveys (response rate = 46.9%). Sixty-one percent of the
respondents were medical oncologists, 24% were surgeons, and 14% were
radiation oncologists (1 % other). The surveyed investigators were both
experienced physicians and clinical trialists: the investigators had practised
medicine for an average ofslightly more than 15 years and participated in roughly
28 ReTs. A large rnajority of the investigators (88.4%) had used at least one of the
eligibility criteria listed in our questionnaire in their own experience with enrol1ing
patients in ReTs.
Figure one shows the rnean enrollment decision and 95% confidence
interval for the five eligibility criteria under each of the three patient scenarios. ff
the scenario classification of the clinical vignettes is valid, we expect the mean
enrollment decisions for the eligible scenario to be, on the whole, closer to one
(i.e., enroll), for the ineligible scenario, closer to zero, and for the uncertain
scenario, somewhere in between. The results confirm the face-validity of the
patient scenarios.
Figure two shows the mean certainty associated with the enroUrnent
decisions and 95% confidence interval for, once again, the five eligibility criteria
under each of the three patient scenarios. As one might have expected, the mean
certainty is less dependent on the patient scenario than mean enrollment decision.
Overall, the enrollment decisions were associated with a fairly high degree of
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certainty across the board, with aIl mean values for certainty exceeding 0.70.
The mean differences in enrollment decision for each patient scenario are
listed in table 2. The analysis of variance indicates that the scenario-specifie means
are significantly different from one another (F=213 .51, df=2, 221, p=O.OOO 1) and,
hence, it would be inappropriate to combine the differences into a pooled-
difference measure. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals and p-values are,
therefore, provided for each of the patient scenarios. In each patient scenario, the
mean difference is positive, indicating that enrollment decisions for subjective
criteria are more variable; the observed difference is marginally significant in the
eligible-patient scenario (p=O.07), and highly statistically significant in the
uncertain and ineligible-patient scenarios (p=O.OOO 1 in each case). The magnitude
of the observed difference is dependent on the patient scenario (as evidenced by
the analysis ofvariance): the smallest difference was observed in the eligible-
patient scenario, the intermediate difference in the ineligible-patient scenario, and,
as one might have expected, the largest difference in the uncertain-patient
scenano.
The mean differences in certainty associated with the enrollment decisions
are also given in table 2. The analysis ofvariance indicates that the mean
differences differ significantly from one another (F=15.27, df=2, 221, p=O.OOOI)
and, hence, it would be inappropriate to combine them. For each of the patient
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scenarios, the mean difference is positive and statistically significantly different
from zero (p=O.OOO 1 in each case), indicating that subjective criteria cause
investigators to be more uncertain about enrollment decisions. The magnitude of
the observed difference was dependent on the patient scenario, and the pattern
mirrored that observed for the enrollment decisions: eligible-patient scenario,
smallest difference; ineligible-patient scenario, intermediate difference; and,
uncertain-patient scenario, largest difference.
The final stage of the analysis explored the explanatory value (if any) of the
demographic variables collected on each respondent. Six separate multiple
regression analyses using forward model selection were carried out: one for each
of the two outcome measures under each of the three patient scenarios. In the
analyses, the variables for years of medical practice and number of ReTs
participated in were treated as continuous variables, clinical trial cooperative group
affiliation was treated as a Bernoulli variable, and medical specialty was captured
bya fixed group ofthree dummy variables. The results of the analysis are given in
appendix 2. Clearly, in this sort of analysis multiple testing is an issue; we are,
therefore, looking for obvious patterns across the patient scenarios. Of the twenty-
four uncorrected p-values in the analysis, only two were statistically significant.
(Without correction for n1ultiple testing, we would expect one or two false-positive
results with twenty-four tests). Each of the two "positive" variables was associated
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with a very low partial r (i.e., the variables explained a very small proportion of
the variance in the outcome variable; roughly 4% in each case). Certainly, no
strong pattern emerged from the analysis, and we concluded that none of the
dernographic variables explained observed differences in enrollrnent decisions or
investigator certainty.
Discussion
The attitudes and behavior of RCT investigators has received sorne
attention in the ernpiricalliterature. (Gotay, 1991; Hunninghake, 1987) For
example, Taylor and colleagues examined the reasons physicians had for not
enrolling otherwise eligible patients in an international breast cancer treatrnent
study. (Taylor, 1984) Clinical vignettes have been used most cornmonly in studies
using investigators as "expert surrogates" for the evaluation of the risk-benefit
ratio ofparticular ReTs. (MacKilIop, 1992) We believe that our study represents
the first attempt to study enrollment decisions by investigators using clinical
vignettes. Others may find our approach of use: investigators may wish to study
other questions pertaining to physician behavior when enrolling patients in RCTs;
indeed, RCT designers themselves may wish to do pilot studies ofproposed
eligibility criteria before including them in the final study protocol.
Our study hypothesized that subjective eligibility criteria would be
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associated with more variable enrollment decisions and greater investigator
uncertainty than objective criteria. The study findings support both hypotheses. In
each of the three patient scenarios, enrollment decisions for subjective criteria
were more variable than those for objective criteria (for the eligible-patient
scenario, the difference was only of marginal statistical significance). The
magnitude of the observed difference, however, depended on the patient scenario.
Enrollment decisions for subjective criteria were associated with less investigator
certainty than those for objective criteria in aIl three patient scenarios. The
magnitude of the difference in certainty also varied with patient scenario, and the
pattern of differences was similar to that observed for enroUrnent decisions. None
of the observed differences were explained significantly by demographic
characteristics of the investigators. It is important to note that most respondents
were experienced physician-investigators, who had used these very same criteria in
their clinical trials practice. Thus, the variability and uncertainty associated with
subjective criteria cannat be explained by the respondents' unfamiliarity with
using these concepts.
In the paper's introduction we pointed out that eligibility criteria associated
with variable enrollment decisions and high investigator uncertainty may slow
patient enrollment in the study, diminish the study's internaI validity, and hamper
the interpretation of study findings in clinical practice. The subjective eligibility
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criteria that we chose for the study have been criticized as prejudicial. The results
of our survey then provide yet another reason why criteria that exclude the elderly
(either directly or indirectly), persans with psychiatrie disease, or persans with a
history of drug or aIcohol abuse should be questioned by RCT designers, funding
agencies, and Institutional Review Boards. Rather than aiding in resoIving a
scientific question, the presence of subjective criteria itself introduces an
uncontrolled variable, ofunknown significance, in delineating a trial's population.
These criteria are therefore probIematic on grounds of scientific validity as well as
ofethics.
The degree of subjectivity implicated in any given criterion of trial
eIigibiIity is for these reasons problematic, and, other things being equal, by
avoiding such criteria both ethical and scientific difficulties are avoided. It does
not follow that subjective criteria can or should be avoided altogether. Consider
the proposed criterion of exclusion: "subjects who, in the investigator's opinion,
are unduly vulnerable to the risks associated with study participation." (Weijer,
1993) Although a more subjective criterion can scarcely he imagined, research
ethics committees may feel constrained for moral and legal reasons to impose such
a criterion as a condition for approval of sorne trials.
Subjectivity is onIy one dimension of eligibility criteria, and cao be
tolerated if a sufficiently compelling case is made. The need for sound judgment in
((
126
balancing such considerations implies that trial designers should provide reasons
why they have chosen the specifie eligibility criteria they employ, a measure that
would aid in the evaluation ofstudies by peer review panels, granting agencies,
and research ethics committees alike. (Freedman, 1994)
~Table 1.
CLINICAL TRIAL COOPERATIVE GROUP
NelC NSABP P-value·
--
TOTAL
No. of questionnaires sent
No. of questionnaires retumed and usable in
analysis (and proportion of those sent out)
CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
169
132 (0.781)
196
92 (0.469) <0.0001
365
224 (0.614)
No. in each medical specialty (and
proportion of respondents)
Mean years of medical practice (and
standard deviation [SD))
Mean no. of trials participated in (and [SD])
No. responding to the question. "Have you
assessed patients for a clinical trial that has
used one of the study eligibility criteria?"
(And proportion of respondents)
Radiation oncology
Surgical oncology
Medical oncology
Other
<0.0001
13 (0.098) 18 (0.200) 31 (0.138)
20 (0.150) 33 (0.359) 53 (0.237)
99 (0.750) 38(0.413) 137 (0.612)
0(0.000) 3 (0.032) 3(0.013)
18.3 (7.8) 11.1 (9.0) <0.0001 15.4 (9.03)
31.4 (30.6) 23.3 (29.1) 0.05 28.1 (30.2)
0.006
Yes
No
Unsure
124 (0.939)
6 (0.046)
2 (0.015)
74 (0.804)
13(0.141)
5 (0.054)
198 (0.884)
19 (0.085)
7(0.031)
• - Unpaired t-test was used for continuous variables; Fisher's exact test was used for categorical variables.
~Table 1. Response rates and characteristics of respondents.
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Figure 1. Accrual decisions for the clinical vignettes. For each eligibility criterion under each of the three patient scenarios,
the mean proportion (and 95% confidence interval) of investigators who indicated they would enroll the patient in a trial is
given. Eligibility criteria a,c, and e are subjective criteria; eligibility criteria band d are objective criteria (see methods
section for full text of criteria).
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Figure 2. Investigator certainty associated with accrual decisions for the clinical vignettes. For each eligibility criterion
under each of the three patient scenarios, the mean investigator certainty (and 950/0 confidence interval) associated with
accrual decision is given. Eligibility criteria a,c, and e are subjective criteria; eligibility criteria band d are objective criteria
(see methods section for full text of criteria).
~Table 2.
ELIGIBLE
PATIENT SCENARIO
UNCERTAIN INELIGIBLE F
---
ANOVA
p-value
Mean difference in accrual 0.013 0.397 0.099 213.51 p=O.OOOI
decisions*
95°!c> confidence interval -0.0009, 0.026 0.369, 0.425 0.062, 0.136
p-value p=0.07 p=O.OOOI p=O.OOOI
Mean difference in investigator 0.046 0.120 0.088 15.27 p=O.OOOI
certaint)'**
95% confidence interval 0.035, 0.058 0.097, 0.142 0.065, 0.111
p-value p=O.OOOI p=O.OOOI p=O.OOOI
* -positive values indicate that accrual decisions for subjective criteria are more variable than those for objective criteria.
** -positive values indicate that accrual decisions for subjective criteria arc associated with less investigator certainty than those for objective
criteria.
~
--
Table 2. Differences in accrual decisions and investigator uncertainty between objective and subjective eligibility criteria.
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(INSTRUCTIONS:
The following eligibility criteria are taken from protocols for clinical
trials in breast cancer. We would like you to apply Ihem 10 scenarios thatfollow
each ofthem. For each scenario assume that the sub;ect is otherwise eLigihle for
the clinical trial.
There are Iwo questions for each scenario and we would like you to
answer both ofthem. Tire first one asks ifyou would enrol the subject in light of
the eligibility criterioll and should be answered witlr a ')(' corresponding to your
decision. The second one, has to do with how certain you are ofyour decision.
You should answer the second question by making a single verticalline across
the horizontal scale which corresponds to your certainty. (Ifyou are "very
unsure" or "very sure" do not circle the '1' at tire end ofthe Line, rather, drawa
line through it.) For example:
1. 1would enrol this patient ( )
1would not enrol this patient (X)
2. How certain are you ofthis decision?
very unsure 1-------------------------------------------------------------/-------1 very sure
Means that you feel tllat the patient is almost certainly ineligible.
((
Eligibility criterion: "[Exc1ude] patients who have nonmalignant systemic disease (cardiovascular.
renal, hepatic etc.) which wouId preclude their being subjected to any of the treatment options (adjuvant
chemotherapy) or prevent prolonged foIlow-up."
Scenario 1: A 58 year old woman with alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver and secondary esophageal varices.
She has no ascites or episodes ofhepatic encephalopathy. She is no longer drinking alcohol.
1. l would eorol this patient ( )
l would not eorol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you of this decision?
very unsure [-------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Scenario 2: A 50 year old woman who is an insulin dependent diabetic wilh recent onset peripheral
neuropathy.
1. 1would eorol this patient ( )
l wouId not eorol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you of titis decision?
very unsure 1-------------------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Scenario 3: A 60 year old woman with hypertension for 12 years, weIl controlled with medication
(diastolic blood pressure on therapy approximately 85 mmHg).
1. l would eorol this patient ( )
l would not eorol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you of this decision?
very unsure l--------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Eligibility criterion: "Patients with a previous or concomitant malignancy [are ineligible], regardless
of site, EXCEPT patients with squamous or basal celI carcinoma of the skin that has been effectively
treated or carcinoma in situ of the cervix that has been treated by operation only".
Scenario 1: A 51 year old woman who has had no previous malignancies. She has had three actinie
keratoses removed from her face over the last 2 years.
1. l wouId eorol this patient ( )
[ would not eorol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you of this decision?
very unsure l--------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Scenario 2: A fifty seven year old woman who is currently being investigated for a non- calcified
pulmonary nodule in the upper lobe of the left lung. She has a twenty-five pack year history of
smoking.
1. 1would eorol this patient ( )
1 wouId not eorol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you ofthis decision?
very unsure l----------------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Scenario 3: A 69 year old woman who had an adenocarcinoma of the upper lobe of the right lung resected
ten years aga followed by radiation therapy. She has been free of disease since that time.
1. 1would eorol this patient ( )
1would not eorol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you ofthis decision?
very unsure 1-------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
((
Eligibility c:riterion: "Patients with psychiatric or addictive disorders which would preclude obtaining
informed consent are ineligible."
Scenario 1: A 40 year old woman who had a single depressive episode five years ago which was
effectively treated with ECT. She bas had no subsequent symptoms.
1. 1would enro[ this patient ( )
1 would not enrol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you of this decision?
very unsure 1--------------------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Scenario 2: A 45 year old woman with a long history ofparanoid schizophrenia. poorly controlled by
medication.
1. 1 would enrol this patient ( )
1 would not enrol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you of this decision?
very unsure 1---- ------------------------------------------1 very sure
Scenario 3: A 50 year old woman with bipolar affective disorder reasonably well controUed on lithium.
There is no active symptomatology.
1. 1 would enrol this patient ( )
1 would not enrol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you ofthis decision?
very unsure 1--------------------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Eligibility c:riterion: "To be included in the study the patient must have a white blood cell count
(WBC) greater than or egual to 4.000/mmJ and a platelet count greater than or egual to 1OO,OOO/mmJ ."
Scenario 1: A patient with a WBC of 4,5OO/nunJ and platelet count of 130,OOO/nunJ .
1. 1 would enrol this patient ( )
1 would not enrol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you ofthis decision?
very unsure 1-----------------------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Scenario 2: A patient with a WBC of 4,OOO/mmJ and a platelet COllOt of 1OO,OOO/mmJ •
1. 1 would enrol this patient ( )
1 would not enrol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you ofthis decision?
very unsure 1-----------.------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Scenario 3: A patient with a WBC of 1,600/mmJ and a platelet count of 110,OOO/mmJ .
1. 1 would enrol this patient ( )
1 would not enrol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you of this decision?
very unsure 1-------------------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
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Eligibility criterion: "Patients must have a life expectancy of at least 10 years. excluding their
diagnosis of cancer, to be enrolled in the study."
Scenario 1: A 60 year old woman who had coronary angioplasty 18 months aga and is currently
asymptomatic.
1. [ wouId enrol this patient ( )
[ would not enrol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you of this decision?
very unsure 1--------------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Scenario 2: A 62 year old woman with no significant past medical history.
1. 1 would enrol this patient ( )
[ would not enrol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you of this decision?
very unsure 1-----------------------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Scenario 3: A 78 year old woman with no significant past medical history except for a twenty-two pack
year smoking history.
1. [ would enrol this patient ( )
1would not enrol this patient ( )
2. How certain are you of this decision?
very unsure 1--------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 very sure
Please answer these questions:
1. What is your medical specialty?
2. How many years have you practised medicine?
3. Approximately how many clinical trials have you participated in ?
4. Have you ever assessed patients for a clinical trial that has used one of the above eligibility
criteria?
yes ( )
no ( )
unsure ( )
5. Do you have any comments on the eligibility criteria given in this questionnaire?
(use the back ofthis page ifyou need more space)
( Appendix 2.
PATIENT SCENARIO
ELIGmLE UNCERTAIN INELIGmLE
ACCRUAL DECISION
Medical specialty
order of entry into model 1 2 3
p-value at entry into model NS·· NS NS
proportion of variance explained* 0.020 0.005 0.029
Clinical trial cooperative group affiliation
order of entry ioto model 2 1 2
p-value at eotry iota model NS NS NS
proportion of variance explained 0.005 0.002 0.007
Years of medical praetice
arder ofentry into model 3 4 4
p-value at eotry into model NS NS NS
proportion of variance explained 0.009 0.0001 0.0007
No. of trials participated in
order of entry ioto model 4 3 1
p-value at eotry iota model NS NS p=O.0041
proportion of variance explained 0.002 0.0001 0.038
INVESTIGATOR CERTAINTY
Medical specialty
order of entry ioto model 2 1 1
p-value at entry iota model NS P=0.0310 NS
proportion ofvariance explained 0.020 0.042 0.029
Clinical trial cooperative group affiliation
order of entry ioto model 4 2 4
p-value at entry into model NS NS NS
proportion of variance explained 0.0005 0.006 0.002
Years of medical practice
order of entry into model 3 4 2
p-value at entry into model NS NS NS
proportion of variance explained 0.004 0.0001 0.009
No. of trials participated in
arder of entry ioto model 1 3 3
p-value at entry into model NS NS NS
proportion of variance explained 0.011 0.0008 0.003
• - partial r .
•• - p-value greater than 0.05.
e
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Appendix 2. Demographie eharacteristies of questionnaire respondents as potential
explanatory factors for observed differenees in acerual deeisions and investigator
uncertainty. (Multiple regression models using open forward selection procedure).
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Bridging section
[n the third chapter, my colleagues and l examined another step in the
implenlentation of research subject selection procedures, namely, the interpretation
of eligibility criteria by investigators. We hypothesized that subjectively-phrased
criteria are a source of enroIlment-decision variability and investigator uncertainty.
Iftrue, these factors may impact on the internaI validity afa study, the study's
efficient conduct, and even its eventual interpretation by clinicians in practice. We
sought, therefore, to answer two questions: Are subjective eligibility criteria
associated with more variable enrollment decisions? Are investigators less certain
of their decisions when using such criteria?
In arder to answer these questions, we developed a questionnaire which
presents investigators with three hypothetical (but clinically relevant) patient
scenarios for each of five common eligibility criteria, three subjective and two
objective. For each scenario, investigators are asked whether they would enroll the
patient in a study and how certain they are ofthis decision. 365 oncologist-
investigators from the United States and Canada were invited to participate in the
study, and 61.4% ofthose approached retumed a usable questionnaire - a very
good response rate for a study involving physicians.
We found that subjectively-phrased criteria were indeed associated with
more variable enrollment decisions. The magnitude of the difference depended,
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however, on the sort of patient the investigator was presented with: the effect was
smallest when the patient was eligible, intermediate when the patient was
ineligible, and largest when the patient's eligibility status was uncertain.
Investigators were also more uncertain ofenrollment decisions made for subjective
eligibility criteria. Again, the magnitude of the effect varied with the patient
scenario, as above.
Given the negative effects that subjective criteria may have on the validity,
conduct and interpretation ofclinical trial results, such criteria must be carefully
justified. We suspect that in many, ifnot most, cases subjective criteria can be
dropped in their entirety. In other cases, an important individual criterion may he
rephrased in a more objective manner. A number ofgroups, including Institutional
Review Boards, have an important role in reviewing eligibility criteria for their
necessity.
In the next chapter, we tum from the implementation of eligibility criteria to
their reporting in communications regarding study results. The faithfulness of
reporting of criteria was identified at the end of chapter 2 as another important area
for further empirical work. Thus, in chapter 4, we ask: Are eligibility criteria
accurately reported in communications regarding the results ofclinical trials? If
reporting is not complete, what is the nature of infonnation loss (what types of
criteria are not reported)?
cc
Chapter 4:
Reporting the study populations of clinical trials:
clear transmission or static on the line?
149
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Abstract
Background. In contrast to attempts that have been made to measure the clarity of
reporting of the methods of clinical trials in journal articles, we report here an
attempt to measure the accuracy ofmethods reporting. As an exemptar of the
reporting ofclinical trial methods, we focus on eligibility criteria.
Methods. We examined the reporting of eligibility criteria in the protocol, methods
paper (if applicable), journal article, and Clinical Alert for articles appearing in
print between 1988 and September 1994 for which a Clinica1 Alert had been
issued. Eligibility criteria were further classified into five categories in order ta
examine the content of information loss, if any.
Results. On average 82% of protocol eligibility criteria were reported in methods
papers. Journal articles and Clinical Alerts fared somewhat worse: 63% of criteria
were reported in journal articles; 19% in Clinical Alerts. In aIl three categories of
medical communication, the reporting of criteria that defined the study disease
tended to be complete; reporting of criteria relating to trial precision, patient
safety, legal and ethical concerns, and administrative considerations, was not.
Conclusion. Criteria for clinical trial eligibility are frequently underreported in
medical communications. Many of the criteria omitted were of clinical importance.
Two courses of action are suggested: when clinical trials are designed, the need for
individual eligibility criteria ought to be scrutinized; when trials are reported, care
((
should be taken to ensure that criteria are fully and accurately disclosed.
(238 words)
Keywords: clinical trials (methods), clinical trials (standards), eligibility
determination, periodicaIs (standards).
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Introduction
The game Broken Telephone is played with children seated in a circle. One
child starts, whispering a message to the next child on the right; each child in tum
passes along the whisper.' By the time it has come full circle, the message is
distorted, sometimes beyond recognition. Medical information, too, gets
channelled through a variety of sources before reaching the ears of medical
practitioners, who will interpret the information and attempt to apply it to the care
oftheir patients. Just as in the children's garne, the information may becorne
degraded in a stepwise fashion. In this article, we discuss and demonstrate this
effect with respect to an important aspect of clinical trials: the definition of the
study population that emerges from a trial's criteria of eligibility.
The primary methodological advantage of the randomized clinical trial lies
in the accuracy it affords. It provides a mechanisrn for control of selection bias and
potentially confounding variables via the use of randomization and the advance
definition of the trial's parameters. Trial designers typically go to great lengths to
precisely define the population and the condition under study. In determining
subject eligibility, special attention is given to characteristics of the disease (for
example, in early stage breast cancer trials, estrogen and progesterone receptors
are quantified), as weIl as of the patient (for example, excluding patients with
intercurrent illnesses, those refractory to previous treatment, etc.) Unless these trial
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characteristics are clearly defined and rigorously applied, neither the relevance of
the trial's results for resolving the question it had originally posed (internaI
validity), nor the triars implications for treatment recommendations (external
validity or generalizahility), may be relied upon.
Proper design and conduet of a trial is not, however, suffieient. Its methods
and results need to he aecurately and comprehensively eommunieated. From a
scientific point ofview, such reporting is necessary for a study's proper evaluation
and, potentially, replication or refutation. From a clinical perspective, gaps and
errors in the conduet and reporting ofa trial may direetly lead to inappropriate
treatment decisions. From an ethical point of view, moreover, society expects
trialists to satisfy the highest standards of candour and accuracy, as has been
codified, for example, within the World Medical Association's Helsinki declaration
on the ethics of human researeh.2
Recently, a great deal of attention has focused on scientific fraud, the
deliberate misrepresentation and/or falsification of data. Reports ofputative
misconduct are dramatie, and quickly capture the attention of the professional and
lay community.3 A less sensational concern, but one which very prohably poses a
greater challenge to the scientific literature, is the underreporting ofnegative
research findings, and the attendant bias that this can produce in the published
literature.4.5.6
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Several sources assert that there exists an obligation to accurately report ail
aspects of a trial, including the eligibility criteria proposed (and actually
empIoyed).2.7.8.9 The authoritative Unifonn Requirements for Manuscripts
Submitted ta Biomedical Journals instructs authors to "[d]escribe your selection of
observationaI or experimental subjects...clearly".7 In reporting the subject selection
process, sufficient detail must be provided to allow "other workers to reproduce
the results".7 In their published commentary on the Unifonn Requirements (1988
edition), Bailar and MostellerlO describe two basic goals that mandate a precise
description of subject selection: tirst, to allow other investigators attempting to
replicate the study ta "make nearly the same decisions about including patients in
the study"; and, second, to provide readers interpreting the published report "with a
solid link between the patients or cases studied and the population for which the
inferences will be made". But do published reports of clinical trials live up ta this
requirement?
Chalmers et al. 11 developed an instrument to measure the quality of clinical
trials which includes an assessment of the adequacy of the description of subject
selection procedures. This research tool has subsequently been used by a number
ofauthors to measure the quality of pubIished reports of trials. Zola et al. used
Chalmer's methodology in a review of 152 pubIished reports on the treatment of
early cervical cancer. They found that information on patient characteristics was
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adequately reported in only 7% of the studies. 12 Liberati et al. studied published
reports ofclinical trials of the treatment of early stage breast cancer. 13 They found
that the description ofpatient selection criteria was sufficient in only 46% of the
studies.
DerSimonian et al. 14 devised an Il-point instrument specifically for rating
published reports of clinical trials. As in Chalmers' research tool, one aspect
examines the adequacy of disclosure of criteria for clinical trial eligibility. In their
review of 67 clinical trials reported in 4 major medical journals, DerSimonian et
al. reported that only 37% of articles adequately reported study criteria. 14 Emerson
et a1. 1S, using DerSimonian's method, found that trials reported in surgical journals
followed the same pattern: only 43% of articles reported selection criteria
adequately. ft seems clear from these published studies that, despite the obligation
to report the study selection process of a trial fuIly, many trial reports faH short of
meeting the requirement.
The focus of prior studies has taken the published journal article as the unit
of investigation. For example, DerSimonian et aI.14 examined the quality of
reporting of trial methods by a subjective assessment of the c1arity of the reporting.
A journal article is not however a self-contained text, to be judged by literary
standards (such as clarity) alone. To measure accuracy ofreporting, we need to
compare the contents ofjournal articles with the original and controlling scientific
c(
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protocol.
For that matter, articles in general medical joumals are not the only means
that exist for communicating the results of clinical trials. A practitioner may attend
more closely ta a brief clinical recommendation that has been issued folIowing a
trial's conclusion; a researcher may instead focus upon the methodological
description of a trial that appears in a more specialized literature. In this study,
therefore, we have directly compared the eligibility criteria that are found in the
study's protocol with those criteria that appear in a series of subsequent
communications: the triaI's methodology paper (hereafter, the 'methods paper'); the
trial's final report (hereafter, the 'journal article'); and the advisories issued by the
National Institutes of Health (hereafter, the 'Clinical Alert') under their Clinical
Alert system.
The Clinical Alert system provided a useful focus for this initial
examination of the problem ofdissemination of information about trials. Since
their inception in 1988, Clinical Alerts, have been issued by NIH to notify the
medical community of important new information gathered from clinical trials. 16,17
The trials that have resuIted in Clinical Alerts are therefore an elite group that meet
high standards of scientific rigor and clinical relevance. Reports of these trials
appear in the leading medical journals. Thus by studying trials that have resulted in
the NIH issuance ofa Clinical Alert, we may focus more directly on the issue of
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dissemination itself: The problems we describe below cannot plausibly he said to
be the artifactual result of slipshod trial design or substandard practices of medical
publication. Finally, few trials have been seen by NIH to be ofsuch immediate
importance as to merit a Clinical Alert; the set of these studies therefore yields a
manageable number for investigation.
Methods
We selected for study aIl of the trials that served as the subject ofa single
study Clinical Alert for which the journal article was published between 1988 and
September of 1994. (Our methodology precluded the inclusion of Clinical Alerts
that were based upon the results of several studies, such as the first Clinical Alert
regarding the treatment ofnode-negative breast cancer. 18) We then collected the
corresponding methods paper, if available, and journal article. The corresponding
author listed on the final journal article was contacted for a full-text copy of the
clinical trial protocol.
For each clinical trial, eligibility criteria in the protocol, methods paper (if
available), journal article and clinical alert were counted by at least two of the
three authors. Differences were discussed at the time of counting and reconciled
through discussion and group consensus. In counting the criteria, an attempt was
made to minimize artifactual difference between the different reports of any
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specific trial. For example, the exclusion criterion "patients with severe heart
disease" reported in ajournai article was counted as three criteria in that it replaced
the exclusion criteria "patients with severe cardiac valvular disease", "patients with
an MI within the last six months" and "patients with angina requiring chronic
medication" present in the protocoI. We have standardized our results by
expressing them as a proportion of criteria reported in the original clinical trial
protocoI.
We then attempted to characterize qualitative aspects of the information
10ss by classifying each of the clinicaI trial protocol eligibility criteria according to
a schema developed by us previously.19 In brief, the schema partitions eligibility
criteria into five mutually-exclusive categories (aIl examples are taken from the
Studies of Left Ventricular Dysfunction (SOLVD) Prevention and Treatment
Trials protocol):
• Definition of disease -- criteria that define clinical parameters of the disease
being studied, e.g., "left ventricular ejection fraction of less than or equal to 35%";
• Precision -- criteria that render the study population more homogeneous for the
purposes of the trial, e.g., "[exclude patients with] malignancies, except for
surgically cured skin cancer, carcinoma-in-situ, or 5 years free ofdisease";
• Safety -- criteria that exclude persons thought to he unduly vulnerable to harm
from the study therapy, e.g., "[patients with] cerebrovascular disease...that could
•(
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potentially be complicated or rendered unstable by the administration ofan ACE
inhibitor [are excluded]";
• Legal and ethicaI-- criteria needed to ensure that research satisfies legal and
ethical norms of human experimentation, e.g., "failure to give consent" (exclusion
criterion); and,
• Administrative -- criteria that ensure the smooth functioning of the trial, e.g.,
"likelihood ofprospective participant being nonadherent due to chronic
alcoholism..." (exclusion criterion).
As before, counts in each category were expressed as a proportion of the
number of criteria per category in the trial protocol. The number of trials available
for study is small, and we present our results descriptively, without formaI
attempts at inference.
Results
In aIl, eight single-trial Clinical Alerts were released by the NIH for trials
with corresponding journal articles appearing between 1988 and September of
1994. We were successful in obtaining protocols for aIl eight clinical trials
corresponding to the Alerts.2o•2I ,22.23.24.25.26,27 A methods paper was published for 5
of the trials28•29,3o.3I,32 and a final report was published for each of the eight
studies.33•34,35.36.37.38.39,40 The clinical trials included in our analysis are listed in
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Table 1.
Tracking down the journal article for each Clinical Alert, as a practitioner
who received the Alert might have attempted to do, proved to be far from a simple
or speedy task. Obtaining the journal article was hindered by two factors. First, as
indicated in Table l, many of the Clinical Alerts were published substantially in
advance of the journal article. Indeed, the median Alert-to-article publication delay
was four months (120 days). Second, only three of the seven Clinical Alerts
provided a reference (journal and issue) for the final-report articles.
Counts and proportions of eligibility criteria reported for each of the clinical
trials are detailed in Table 1 and graphically displayed in Figure 1. Counts and
proportions for each category of eligibility criteria are listed in Table 2. (We have
not listed the precise counts by category for each individual trial in the interest of
conserving space.)
Overall the reporting of eligibility criteria in the methods papers was quite
complete (1t = 0.82)(Figure 1). The information loss in the methods papers was
characterized by an underreporting of those criteria dealing with administrative
aspects of the trial (Table 2). As these criteria are directed at such issues as subject
proximity to the study centre, they are not key to the generalizability assessment
made by practitioners.
The reporting of eligibility criteria in journal articles was, however, quite
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incomplete. On average, only 63% ofprotocol eligibility criteria were reported in
the corresponding journal article. Part of the eligibility criteria information loss in
joumals may be due to a reliance on the disclosure in methods papers. Indeed,
referring to Figure l, 4/4 of the lowest reporting journal articles were preceded by
methods papers whereas only 114 of the highest reporting articles were.
Few criteria addressing 'legal and ethical' and 'administrative' aspects were
reported, but these are of little relevance to the practising clinician. Of greater
concem, only 66% of'precision criteria' were reported. In that precision criteria
restrict the study population by excluding, for example, patients with concomitant
medical conditions, failure to report them can interfere with the clinician's ability
to assess the applicability of the trial to her own patients.
Then too, the fact that only 57% of the safety criteria were reported is
disconcerting. The failure ta report which subgroups of patients have been
excluded out of concem for undue toxicity may lead the practitioner ta believe that
an intervention is safe in these particular subgroups. Certainly, the inclusion ofa
potentially vulnerable subgroup in a "positive" trial does not ipso facto
demonstrate the safety of the study treatment in that subgroup. Nonetheless, if trial
designers were sufficiently concemed about undue toxicity in a given subgroup of
patients as to choose ta exclude them from the trial, this concem ought to be
relayed to practitioners.
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The reporting of eligibility criteria was poorest in the Clinical Alerts. On
average, only 19% of the criteria present in the protocol were disclosed in the
Clinical Alert. Qualitatively, the pattern of information loss corresponded to that
seen in the journal articles (Table 2). Despite the scant information presented in
Alerts, only 2/8 of the Clinical Alerts included any statements which cautioned
physicians regarding the interpretation of the clinical triaI's results.
The omissions ofeligibility criteria in the Clinical Alerts spanned the
spectrum from trivial to serious. Most of the Alerts failed to mention that informed
consent was obtained from research subjects. Consent itself is, of course,
important; failure to disclose that it had been sought and obtained, less 50.
However, sorne Clinical Alerts, more seriously, failed to mention groups that were
excluded for safety reasons. For example, the Clinical Alert for the Secondary
Prophylaxis of Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia trial failed to mention the
exclusion of patients with abnormal liver function, abnormal renal function,
leukopenia or thrombocytopenia.23 Sorne Alerts failed ta report that a new
treatment had not been evaluated in a subset of patients. For example, the Clinical
Alert for the Studies of Left Ventricular Dysfunction (SOLVD) trial failed to
mention that patients with serious coronary artery disease had been excluded from
the trial and thus that the henefit ofenalapril for this subgroup of patients remained
unproven.25 The most disconcerting case involved the Clinical Alert reporting the
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results of the Optic Neuritis Treatment Trial. This trial found oral prednisone to be
ineffective in the treatment ofoptic neuritis. 26 The Alert failed to mention,
however, that the study was restricted to cases of idiopathic optic neuritis. The
reader of the Alert may not realize that this finding is inapplicable to the
approximately 50% ofneuritis patients who suffer from its non-idiopathic form. 41
It seems clear from the literature on Clinical Alerts that they provide
physicians with infonnation in a manner which invites them ta consider altering
their practice.42•43 It is telling that the publication of the tirst Clinical Alert l8
(which, as a multi-trial Alert, was not included in our sample) caused 75% of
clinicians surveyed to change their practice as a result.44.45 Given that Clinical
Alerts seem ta exert a substantial influence on medical practice, they should
present a more complete picture of the study population.
Discussion
A crucial factor in the improvement of medical care derives from the
transfer of research to clinical practice. Clinical trials represent an essential step in
this process. The number of patients enrolled in any single trial or even a
collection ofrelated trials usually represents a smaIl proportion of the prospective
patient population for the treatment under study. A pivotai issue in the successful
diffusion of findings is not the size of this proportion, but its representativeness
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and relevance. The complete and accurate reporting of eligibility criteria is an
essential prerequisite to physician assessment of the generalizability of the results
ofa clinical trial.
Progress in medical knowledge commonly occurs in a slow and measured
fashion. Advances build upon the successes and failures of previous efforts in a
way that underlines the etymology of the word 're-search' -- rechercher, to search
again. Given this incrementaI pattern of progress, full and accurate reporting of
both the methodology and results of previous research is necessary.
We had chosen to study eligibility criteria as a test case for dissemination.
In their review of the reporting ofclinical trial results, DerSimonian et al. found
eligibiIity criteria to be amongst the paorest reported categories of trial
information. 14 Other researchers have suggested that eligibility criteria escape the
kind of scrutiny that is expected of such an important component ofclinical trials,
noting very substantial disparity between the criteria employed by different trial
groups working on parallel investigations (adjuvant chemotherapy for breast
cancer).46 It seemed to us probable that if inadequate dissemination were to be
found regarding any aspect of clinical trials, it wouId be found in eligibility
criteria.
Further study is needed conceming the dissemination ofother important
elements of trials. What we have shown about eligibility criteria is however
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enough to state that there exists a serious gap in scientific communication, that can
result in inappropriate extrapolation (or, inappropriate failure ofextrapolation) of
trial results to clinical practice. Using our findings as a test case, Glass has argued
that this failure could ground legal liability, on the part of reporting investigators
or editors ofjoumals:H However, even without the spur of potentialliability the
biomedical research and publication community should act to rectify this
communicative distortion.
What kind of responses should be considered, and on whose part? The
following is a partial list:
-The Clinical Alert system has been criticized for prematurely extracting advice
for clinical practice from just-completed clinical trials; in sorne cases, it was
clairned, the trial results had not yet undergone an adequate peer-review process.48
These charges have elicited a spirited defence of the system. 16•17 Underlying the
empirical dispute over whether the Clinical Alerts issued reflected a complete and
mature scientific consensus, there appears as weil to be sorne underlying
philosophicai and policy dispute as to who should point out the clinical relevance
ofmedical trials, and what professional and peer mechanisms should be utilized
towards that end.
Our own work has no direct bearing upon this empirical controversy.
Philosophically, we are sympathetic to the underlying effort on the part of the
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authors of the Clinical Alert system to bring scientitic results to the attention of
clinicians in a prompt manner, reducing the distance between the 'bench' and the
'bedside'. For that to be done responsibly, however, the Alert must contain more
information about the trial that serves as its basis than did those Alerts we had
studied. A clinician acting in good faith may be said to be in an impossible
position: On the one hand, decisions about patient care should reflect the kind of
up-to-date information the Alert affords; on the other hand, knowing that important
details conceming the population have not been revealed, the prudent practitioner
must wait until he or she can determine whether a new treatment seems to be
indicated for this patient. The cautious practitioner may feel the need to await the
more complete presentation to be found in medical journals, but this of course
defeats the original purpose of the Alert system, as this delay will on average
amount to 4 months (as noted above).
-Journal publication raises sorne knotty problems. As discussed, methods papers
do a relatively good job at describing eligibility criteria, but the main results papers
appearing in joumals of general medical interest are incomplete in this respect. We
are not in a position to address the etiology of the problem. Authors may he
choosing to not fully report the criteria that have been used in the trial, or
reviewers and editors, as the guardians of readers' interests, may be choosing to
tilter criteria, presumably to avoid having a report's message obscured by what is
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judged to be excessive detaiI. In either case, the decision may be motivated by the
belief that the concerned reader of the medical journal can always tum ta the
methods paper for a more complete account.
There are however several problems with this approach. First, even within
our small and highly select sample, not aIl studies produced a methods paper; we
wouId expect that a more representative sample of the published medical literature
would have been substantially less likely to have a parallel methodology
publication. Within our sample, those studies that had no accompanying methods
paper did a relatively good job at describing their eligibility criteria in their results
paper; it remains to be seen whether this would continue to hold true for studies
with a lower profile than ours. Second, not all of the readers of the general medical
literature will have ready access ta the methods papers that are published. This is
particularly true of the isolated practitioner, but it is arguable how often any
practitioner without an active academic interest in a particular disease accesses the
methodology literature. In numerous discussions with colleagues about our interest
in the question of dissemination, we often encountered a general, albeit
unexamined, heliefthat a medical journal's report of a clinical trial is basically
self-contained, at least as concerns eligibility issues. Third, to allow methods
papers to fi11 the gap left by a results paper, the latter must be flagging that fact, by
a comment to the effect that "A complete listing of eligibility criteria can be found
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in ...", the responsibility for complete reporting had been appropriately
discharged. However, none of the reports we reviewed for this study contained
such an indication.
• ElilDbility criteria themselves deserve further attention, on the part of trial
designers and granting agencies. The rationale for each eligihility criterion used in
a trial is usually not availahle to the practitioner deciding whether to apply the
treatment in question to a particular patient. Often the rationale is not even
available in the trial protocol. Although the rationale for sorne criteria May be self-
evident, there are usually Many criteria whose motivation is not transparent and
requires documentation. The process of doing so may he illuminating at times and
trial designers Inay find that certain proposed criteria do not have a very
compelling underlying rationale.
What we have found in our study speaks to an even more basic point.
Whether or not the rationale for eligibility criteria are presented, the criteria
themselves are often not communicated as part of the results obtained. It would
seem that either these criteria were important to the conduct of the trial-- in which
case they must be communicated; or, they were of at most marginal importance --
in which case, trialists may he better advised to leave them out, resulting in a
simpler trial, and one more true to the clinical reality of the patient population.49
On a broader scale, the results ofour study suggest the need to reexamine
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the concept and mechanics of the ethicaI review of the conduct of research, in
particular the issues of its scope and timing. At present, research review is done in
advance of its perfonnance. A committee (IRB) examines the research plans,
including the protocol and suggested consent forms. These plans are evaluated
according to the common ethical principles of respect for persons, beneficence,
and justice.50
This modei ofprior approval assumes that for the most part, the important
ethicai issues posed by research arise, and can be resolved, before the research has
begun -- even before the first patient has been enrolled. By contrast, we suggest
that research be viewed not as a proposaI, but as a process, that exists within a
context of scientific investigation and clinicai progress. Ethical issues of a study
can arise at any point throughout its conception, conduct and communication,51
and it would therefore he strange to confine organized ethicai evaluation, on the
part of an investigator or of an institution within which a study is conducted, to a
study's prologue.
Although the current attention to the institutionai duty to monitor the
conduct of research is a step in this direction,52 a compelling case can he made that
the joumey is a longer one. There is a duty on the part of scientists ta communicate
the results they have obtained honestly, accurately, and completely. We do not
believe that any of the participants in the dissemination ofresearch dispute the
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importance of this obligation ta the scientific and clinical communities, any more
than they dispute the obligation to treat the subjects of their research with respect
(the principle of respect for persans) and with concem for their well-being
(beneficence).
~ ~
Table 1.
Study Clinical trial Alert-joumal interval Reporting of eligibility criteria
-
days Methods Journal Clinical
Protocol paper article Alert
-- --
number proportion
North American Symptomatic Carotid Endarterectomy 171 25 0.96 0.88 0.52
TriaPO,lB.ll
2 Efficacy of IVIG in Treatment of Symptomatic HIV- 176 13 1.00 0.38
infected Children21.14
3 CMV Retinitis TriaI12.29.l' 69 17 0.82 0.35 0.18
4 Secondary Prophylaxis of Pneumocystis Carinii 430 20 0.85 0.15
Pneumonia21•36
5 ddl versus ddC in HIV-infected Patients Who Are Intolerant 402 22 0.95 0.09
of or Who Have Failed ZDV Therapy24.17
6 Studies of Left Ventricular Dysfunction Prevention and 1 32 1.00 0.41 0.09
Treatment2'.lo.n
7 Systolic Hypertension in the Elderly Program2b,ll,.l9 0 22 0.55 0.32 0.09
8 Optic Neuritis Treatment TriaP7,l2,40 37 31 0.77 0.29 0.03
Mean (Median = 120) 0.82 0.63 0.19
(Standard deviation) (0.18) (0.31) (0.17)
~Table 1. Reporting of eligibility criteria in c1inical trial communications.
"
-- --
Table 2.
Methods Journal Clinical
Category of eligibility criteria Protocol paper article Alert
Number Proportion
Definition of disease 22 1.00 1.00 0.71
Precision 95 0.86 0.66 0.17
Safety 42 0.80 0.57 0.03
Legal and ethical 15 0.83 0.52 0.14
Administrative 9 0.20 0.17 0.00
~Table 2. Reporting of eligibility criteria in clinical trial communications by category of eligibility criteria.
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Bridging section
In the preceding chapter, my colleagues and l studied a further step in the
genesis and dissemination of medical knowledge, the reporting of eligibility
criteria in clinical trial communications. Subject selection procedures must be
accurately reported in order to allow for replication (or refutation) of research
results, and, perhaps even more importantly, to allow clinicians in practice to
determine to whom study results apply. We, therefore, sought to answer two
questions: Are eligibility criteria accurately reported in communications regarding
the results of clinical trials? If reporting is not complete, what is the nature of
information loss (i.e., what types of criteria are not reported)?
We examined the reporting of eight clinical trials deemed important enough
by the V.S. NIH to issue a Clinical Alert. For each clinical trial, we counted and
classified (according to the schema developed in chapter 2) eligibility criteria in
the protocol, methods paper (if applicable), journal article, and Clinical Alert. We
observed a step-wise decline in the amount of information present at each stage of
reporting: on average, methods papers contained 82% of the criteria listed in the
protocol; journal articles, 63%; and Clinical Alerts, 19%. Reporting of 'definition
of disease' criteria tended to be complete, whereas 'precision' and 'safety' criteria
- categories of criteria relevant to clinicians - were reported incompletely.
Clearly, journal editors and persons responsible for issuing Clinical Alerts
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need to ensure that clinicians receive aIl necessary infonnation regarding clinical
trial methods, including a complete list ofeligibility criteria. If eligibility criteria
are important they must be reported; if individual criteria are ofquestionable
significance, they ought to be cut when the trial is designed, not when it is
reported. Removing criteria of dubious necessity at the early stage will speed trial
enrollment and help the trial mirror the range ofpatient in clinical practice (i.e.,
improve the study's generalizability).
In the preceding three chapters, we have examined clinical trial selection
procedures at three different points: study protocol, interpretation by investigators,
and reporting in trial communications. In the next chapter 1stand back from these
fine-grained empirical examinations and engage in a broad philosophical analysis
ofjustice and the selection of subjects for clinical research. In particular, 1ask:
What are the implications of Walzer' s political philosophy for the just selection of
subjects for research participation?
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Selecting subjects for participation in clinical research:
one sphere ofjustice
186
( 187
Abstract
NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion ofWomen and Minorities as Subjects in
Clinical Research (1994) prohibit the unjust exclusion of such groups from clinical
research. But the requirement begs the question: What is a just selection procedure
for participation in clinical research? In this paper, 1oudine an approach to this
question based on the view of the complex egalitarian society articulated by
Michael Walzer in Spheres ofJustice.
I argue that a just selection procedure for participation in research is
govemed by the role: eligibility criteria must select subjects solely in accord with
the exigencies of medical care and science. Since the knowledge gained from
research furthers the social good of medical care, such knowledge must be
applicable to aIl members of the community. If the community is to be served,
eligibility criteria ought to be minimized and necessary exclusions ought to be
explicitly justified.
Ultimately, current policy is too narrowly construed. Once injustice is seen
as (what Walzer caBs) domination, it is clear that many groups are potentially
affected: not only women and minorities, but also the elderly, the impoverished,
the undereducated and the politically disempowered. AlI of these groups must be
our concem. So too, the approach taken by current NIH regulations are unduly
limited in their focus on publically-funded research. If the provision ofmedical
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care is recognized as a social good, then al! research in support of this good,
including that which is privately funded, is subject to the justice considerations as
outlined in this paper.
(251 words)
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Introduction
Clinical research is the keystone in the provision ofmedical care. Clinical
trials -- carefully designed studies ofnew treatments in human subjects -- are
essential to ensure that therapeutic interventions are both safe and effective. But,
important as it is, such knowledge cannot be gained legitimately at any cast.
Research involving human subjects is govemed by ethical principles laid out in the
Belmont Report: respect for persons (the autonomy of individuals must be
respected; those who are unable ta make autonomous choices must be protected),
beneficence (do no harm; maximize potential benefits and minimize potential
hanns), and justice (distribute the burdens and benefits ofresearch fairly).t
One set ofethical issues involves the selection of subjects for participation
in medical research. Selection procedures for research are determined by criteria
for trial eligibility -- a check list of requirements set out in the study protocol that
each prospective research subject must satisfy. For at least the last three decades,
justice-related issues have surrounded subject selection for medical research.
Rooted in conventional views ofdistributive justice, concems, until recently, have
focussed on the unequal allocation of the burdens and henefits of research
participation. The exact nature ofthese concerns, however, has changed over time.
In the 1970s, the principle that the burdens of research participation should
equitably distributed was dominant.2 If "vulnerable" subjects ought to be protected
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from research, the safest strategy was to exclude them from study participation. A
number of factors contributed to this concem. Adverse events in trials to test new
drugs, including the thalidomide disaster in the late 1950s (and early 1960s),
engendered the perception that taking part in research was a risky endeavour.
Furthennore, between 1965 and 1972, a number of research scandais came to the
public's attention, each ofwhich involved illicit experimentation on vulnerable
groupS.3
In the 1980s, a new primary concem emerged: the benefits of research
participation ought to be equitably distributed. As a result of this shift, the
presumption in the selection of subjects for research swung from one of exclusion
to inclusion. What set this change into motion? Contra the perception that
research participation involved substantiaI risk, studies published in the late 1970s
and early 1980s revealed that earlier risk estimates were substantially
exaggerated.4 Undoubtedly, though, the main catalyst for the change was the
advent of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s. Given the absence of effective treatment
for the disease in the first years of the epidemic, experimental treatments were seen
as potentially life saving. Robert J. Levine observed that
what was once seen as threatening -- a burden from which people
would wish to be protected -- is DOW seen as a benefit. People are
clamouring for access to clinical trials and to experimental drugs.
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People are demanding that they, and others who are like them, are
owed such as a matter ofjustice.5
In the 1990s, while issues of the equitable distribution ofboth the burdens
and benefits of research remain important, a new object of ethical focus has
emerged: knowledge gained from medical research must he fairly distributed, i.e.,
the results of research studies ought ta he widely applicable. As Levine has pointed
out, this new concem should not be confused with the above (1980s) issue:
equitable distribution of benefit demands that "individuals ought not to be
excluded from research and its associated direct benefits [emphasis added]."6 The
new ethical dictum requires that "[classes oD persans ought not to he deprived of
the henefits of research, generalizable kllowledge, and the development of new
therapies [emphasis added]."7
Originally the concem evolved out of the fact that classes of individuals,
including women, children and intravenous drug users, were barred access by
study eligibility criteria to clinical trials oftreatments for HIV/AIDS. The
exclusion of these groups, according to Macklin and Friedland, led to
a lack of information on the efficacy of AZT on a wider group of
AIDS patients, stemming from the fact that the demography of
patients studied did not replicate the entire population of individuals
with AIDS.8
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The issue expanded rapidly beyond the confines of HIV/AIDS research. In 1992,
Rebecca Dresser made the controversial claim that ~~the failure to include women
[and minorities] in research populations is ubiquitous."q As the issue has picked up
speed in the political arena, a number of changes in federai research policy have
been made. In 1993, the V.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) removed
barriers to the enroUment of women "of reproductive potential" in early studies
evaluating new drugs. 'O In 1994, the V.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH)
released the NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion ofWomen and Minorities as Subjects
in Clinicat Research. 11 In part, these guidelines require the representative inclusion
of women and minorities in aIl NIH-funded research.
v.s. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), local eomrnittees that review
human subjeets research for ethieai aeceptability, have been given part of the
responsibility to enforee these recent poliey ehanges. 12 When reviewing a study for
ethical aceeptability, IRBs must ensure that adequate representation ofwomen and
minorities is likeIy. In part, this involves scrutinizing eligibility criteria to ensure
that groups have not been exeluded inappropriately. AIso, IRBs rnay: review
procedures for study enroUrnent, require the development of programs to ensure
continued participation ofwomen and minorities in studies, and review
dernographie infonnation on study enroUrnent on an annual basis.
In order ta implement these mies optimally, however, a comprehensive
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theoretical construct is required. Several feminist theorists haven broken sharply
with conventional approaches to justice-related issues and provide useful insights
into justice and subject selection for research. Rather than focussing on the equal
distribution of goods (e.g., research benefits and risks -- a "negative" good), these
theorists take the elimination ofoppression to be the key issue in discussions of
justice. Sherwin points out that feminist discussions ofjustice in research share the
concem that the exclusion of certain groups from research is a manifestation of
societal oppression. 13 DeBruin argues that oppression of women manifests itself in
at least two general ways: the male experience is taken to be the nonn (and thus
women, and female physiology, are seen as abnormal), and women as a group, and
health issues particular to women, have been subordinated to the dominant group
(men and male health concerns).14 Ajust approach to the allocation ofknowledge
derived from research must, according to this view, aim towards eliminating
oppression. With regard to subject selection, this entails enrolling sufficient
numbers ofwomen in studies so that the results can he meaningfully applied to
women. But Sherwin and DeBruin believe that more than this is required:
preferential attention to women's health problems must be given in order to make
up for the "history of gender-based oppression" in health research.
The introduction of the concept of'oppression' ioto discussions ofjustice
is, 1think, a productive step, but it seems to take us only part way to a
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comprehensive approach to the just selection of subjects for research participation.
A number of key questions have not, to date, been addressed. What counts as an
oppressed group? Oppression is a tenn that is, at best, vaguely defined. Children
were excluded from early studies of the treatment ofHIV/AIDS, but are children
an oppressed group in society? (Perhaps so, perhaps not.) How to account for the
problematic exclusion of non-oppressed groups? An oppression-based theory
seems unable to address the exclusion ofgroups that are not oppressed. What if a
highly-idiosyncratic investigator decided to exclude aIl members of the
Conservative Party from a research study? Clearly, this seems unjust, but on what
basis is it so? Furthermore, if members of oppressed groups may be excluded
legitimately from a study, what counts as an adequate justification? Finally, and
most important, "What does a just eligibility criterion look like?" In order to
evaluate comprehensively criteria for trial eligibility, we need a "big-picture"
account ofwhat ajust selection procedure involves.
Without rejecting a feminist approach to the problem, in this paper 1want to
provide an alternative (and possibly complementary) approach using Michael
Walzer's theory ofjustice as articulated in Spheres ofJustice. IS Walzer's view of
injustice as domination may allow for a more comprehensive account ofjustice in
subject selection than is currently available. Since 1focus on justice and the
selection of subjects for medical research, 1 will not discuss the impact ofWalzer's
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views on larger health policy issues, including the prioritization of research
initiatives.
Spheres ofJustice
Michael Walzer's approach to questions of distributive justice is, 1think it
fair to say, a radical departure from conventional theories ofjustice. Equality, says
Walzer, is not about ensuring that everyone has an equal number ofthings (i.e.,
simple equality); rather, its aim is to free society from domination. At root, the
driving motivation for equality is the experience of subordination:
What is at stake is the ability of a group of people to dominate their
fellows. It's not the fact that there are rich and poor that generates
egalitarian politics but the fact that the rich 'grind the faces of the
poor', impose their poverty upon thern, command their deferential
behavior. 16
For Walzer, ajust society is not one in which simple equality exists, but rather one
in which the means of domination has been eliminated. Although the specifies may
vary from one time and place to another, domination is always rnediated by sorne
social good, e.g., rooney, political office or birth and blood.
Walzer sets hirnself the task of describing a society that has been freed of
domination, a complex egalitarian society. The construction of such a society
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cannot be detached from historical and cultural particularities:
[T]he question most likely to arise in the minds of the members of a
political community is not, What would rational individuals choose
under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort? But rather,
What would individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are,
who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it? And this
is a question that is readily transfonned into, What choices have we
already made in the course of our common life? What
understandings do we (really) share?17
In order to understand how particular goods ought to be distributed in a particular
society, we must understand what those goods mean to members of that society. A
bit of food may represent sustenance or a religious offering; and what is to be done
with it depends on which of these meanings it is given. Shorter: goods ~~come into
people's minds before they come into their hands."18
How shaH we understand goods? Walzer offers us six propositions
regarding goodS. 19 First, goods are irreducibly social in nature; they cannot be held
idiosyncratically. Second, the distribution of goods cannat he understood in the
abstract; the actors in distributive transactions behave the way they do because of
how they conceive certain goods. Third, there is no single set of primary goods
across aIl moral and material worlds; the range of even necessities and their rank
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orderings differ too widely to define usefully a universal basis for distribution.
Fourth, just distributions are determined by the meaning ofgoods in a particular
comrnunity. Fifth, the meaning ofgoods within particular communities is historical
in character and, thus, is subject to change over time. Sixth, and most irnportantly,
when meanings are distinct, distributions are autonomous; the distribution ofa
particular social good operates within "a distributive sphere within which only
certain criteria and arrangements are appropriate."20
Thus, for Walzer, the just distribution ofsocial goods cannot be understood
by a mIe universal in application, goveming aIl transactions. Each of the social
goods -- community membership, security and welfare, money and commodities,
office, hard work (a "negative" good), free time, education, kinship and love,
divine grace, recognition, and political power -- operates within its own
autonomous sphere. Each sphere is govemed by separate roles ofjust distribution.
Given this understanding, Walzer defines domination as a transgression of the
boundaries between (or among) spheres ofjustice. Domination exists when one
good is converted into another when there exists no intrinsic connection between
the two. Complex equality, then, establishes social relationships within a
cornmunity such that "no citizen's standing in one sphere or with regard to one
social good can be undercut by his standing in sorne other sphere, with regard to
sorne other social goOd."21 More fonnally: "No social good x should be distributed
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to men and women who possess sorne other good y rnerely because they possess y
and without regard to the meaning ofx. "22
Walzer distinguishes dominance from monopoly. Dominance, as we have
seen, exists when one good commands control of other goods or a wide range of
goods. Monopoly exists when a single individual, or group of individuals, owns or
controis that good. Thus,
[d]ominance describes a way ofusing social goods that isn't limited
by their intrinsic meanings or that shapes those meanings in its own
image. Monopoly describes a way of owning or controlling social
goods in order to exploit their dominance.23
Conventional approaches to distributive justice have focussed on eliminating
monopoly but not dominance: they ask, How can this good be distributed more
fairly (usually meaning more equally)? Money is a dominant good within our
society (it can buy education, health care, political office, and, yes, even respect --
none of which, according to Walzer, are legitimate transactions), and one that is
monopolized by a relatively small group ofindividuals. Merely redistributing
wealth would be a false, or at best a temporary, solution. Sorne people would save
their money, others would spend it, still others wouid by their own
entrepreneurship accumulate wealth; and so, the distribution would very soon be
unequal again. Ifgovemment intervened repeatedly to ensure an equai distribution,
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money would no longer be a dominant good, politicaI power would be.
As opposed to conventional approaches to distributive justice, Walzer's
solution is to address dominance directly. Walzer's approach is to narrow the
range of legitimate operation of social goods such that they are only convertible
within their own individuaI spheres of operation. But this cannot be derived from
the abstract, one must examine the meanings ofvarious social goods and their just
distribution for a particular community.
It will yield not an ideal map or a master plan but, rather, a map and
a plan appropriate to the people for whom it is drawn, whose
common life it retlects. The goal, of course, is a reflection of a
special kind, which picks up those deeper understandings of social
goods which are not necessarily mirrored in the everyday practice of
dominance and monopoly.24
The complex egalitarian community will bar so-called "boundary crossings"
(converting goods between spheres), but will not prevent unequal distributions of
individual goods. The point is, though, that in such a society:
Though there will be many small inequalities, inequaIity will not be
muItiplied through the conversion process. Nor will it be summed
across different goods, because the autonomy ofdistributions will
tend to produce a variety of local monopolies, held by different
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groups of men and women.25
Medical care
How does Walzer approachjustice and medical care? In Walzer's typology,
medical care is classified in the sphere ofsecurity and welfare, which aIso includes
provision for the poor, public works projects, defence, and securing a supply of
food and trade generally. The mutual provision of needs is undoubtedly the most
basic requirement of the community. Members of a community have obligations to
participate in the provision of such needs to one another, and, as such, they have
obligations to fel10w members which go above and beyond obligations to
strangers. Walzer explains that
[C]ommunal provision is important because it teaches us the value of
membership. Ifwe did not provide for one another, ifwe recognized
no distinction between members and strangers, we would have no
reason to fonu and maintain political communities...Political
community for the sake of provision, provision for the sake of
community: the process works both ways, and that is perhaps its
crucial feature. 26
But which needs must the community provide for? Separate communities at
different times have answered this question in disparate ways: for sorne common
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defence is a priority and caring for the poor and the sick is not, for others, the
reverse is true. Priorities can change over time as weIl. In Europe in the middle
ages, salvation was an aIl-important public good, and one that was communally
provided for: churches were huilt in every parish, regular services were held,
communion was compulsory and so on. The desire for eternallife, in Europe and
North America at least, has come to be replaced with the more profane need for
long (earthly) life -- longevity.
Among modem citizens, longevity is a socially recognized neecl; and
increasingly every effort is made to see that it is widely and equally
distributed, that every citizen has an equal chance at a long and
healthy life: hence doctors and hospitals in every district, regular
check-ups, health education for the young, compulsory vaccination,
and so on.27
The point is that the priority of needs is determined by the community itself and is
based on the community's conception of the common life. The decision hy the
community as to which goods are required by the common life is the essence of
the social contract. Once these needs are defined, the community must ensure that
the needs are attended to; "that the goods that are distributed must be distrihuted in
proportion to neecl; and that the distribution must recognize and uphold the
underlying equality of membership."28
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In contemporary Canada and the United States, medical care is seen as an
important social good. But providing medical care and conducting medical
research is expensive and, therefore, communal effort is required. The community
has stepped in to pay for basic medicaI care (via Medicare and Medicaid in the
United States; via provincial health care plans in Canada). But
once communal provision begins, it is subject to further moral
constraints: it must provide what is 'wanted' equally to aIl members
of the community; and it must do 50 in ways that respect their
membership.29
Given that medical care is an important social good, providing such care on the
basis ofwealth (the sphere ofmoney and commodities) involves "boundary
crossing" and is therefore unjust. The distributive principle of health care is,
Medical care must be proportionate to illness.
But an interesting problem arises from the fact that the provision of medical
care may lead to a number of goods, and these goods may originate from a number
of"competing spheres." Medical care will, as described above, provide aid to the
ill, but it will also provide other benefits. Health cafe workers will derive incornes
from their work; skillful practitioners will derive prestige from their work and eam
the respect of others; and, in tum, this prestige may translate into ather goods such
as political office. How are we to determine the sphere which properly determines
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the just distribution of health care?
This difficult question is not one that Walzer addresses directly. But, 1 think
it safe ta say, that if we acknowledge that the distribution of a good is determined
by its meaning ta a community and if that meaning can change over time, then a
given good may fall into different spheres in different communities, or in the same
community at different times. For example, when medical care, as described
above, was not a priority, and was, therefore, not communally provided for, its just
distribution was govemed by the mies set for commodities rather than elements of
the sphere of security and welfare.
When several spheres seem to compete for a single good, we must
scrutinize the meaning of that good for this community to determine its primary
meaning and thus its primary distributive mIes. Within our society, health care is
communally provided for because health and longevity itself -- not the income,
prestige, or career advancement of, for example, physicians -- is a communal
priority. We can imagine communities in which these other goods might be key,
but it seems unlikely that health care would be provided communally in them.
Medical research
Walzer say relatively little about medical research specifically: he identifies
it as a part of the sphere ofsecurity and welfare and he indicates that it is a part of
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the common effort required to provide medical care.JO As we have indicated,
medical research is necessary to progress in the fight against disease. Basic
research helps us understand basic physiological processes that are disturbed by
disease states, dissect the workings of the agents of disease, and develop and test
new treatments in (non-human) model systems. Clinical research, resting on the
foundation ofbasic research, tests new treatments in human subjects in arder to
ensure that novel interventions are both safe and effective. Without medical
research we could neither be sure that current treatments actually work nor develop
effective treatments for (currently) untreatable disease. Medical research is perhaps
viewed best as a necessary means to the provision of medical care, rather than a
good in itself.
But it need not he so and, indeed, it has not always been 50. Our society's
changing perceptions of cancer treatment and research provides an instructive
example. Patterson, in his scholarly social history ofcancer research and treatment,
The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture, points out that cancer,
until the early part ofthis century, was largely viewed as an untreatable
disease.31 Skepticism regarding the worth of seeking treatment from physicians in
general was wide spread at the time; physicians, in North America at least, were
often poorly trained and had few effective treatments to offer patients. Medical
science too seemed to have little to contribute:
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With medical science in such an uncertain and defensive state, the
topic of cancer was riddled with controversy and bewildennent in the
1880s and 1890s. At the root of the bewilderment was one
intractable reality - scientists did not know how or why cancer cells
broke loose on their destructive paths.32
Perhaps not surprisingly, biological research was not publicly funded at the time.
Skepticism about medical treatment was such that even if cancer research had been
publicly funded, one can well imagine the end ofsuch funding being to further
knowledge as an end separate from improving treatment for the disease. In a
medically fatalistic society, as was 19lh century America, research into disease
could remain unconnected from medicaI treatment -- if the outcome of a disease is
fated, science can only describe, not alter the inevitable. In such a society, research
would be viewed in a sphere of operation -- namely, that ofknowledge and
education -- apart from that of medicaI care.
After the tum of the century, a number of striking medical advances,
including Erhlich's discovery of Salvarsan, the tirst effective treatment for
syphilis, began ta change the public' s perception of medical treatment. The
medical profession too changed: important refonns to medicaI education at the
tum of the century helped standardize the training that physicians received. As
these changes took root, Americans came ta accept the ~~medicalization" of
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diseases like cancer, and came to invest in science their hopes for progress in the
fight against disease:
The growing prestige of physicians reflected significant social
differences in the way that Americans perceived organized medicine
and diseases, cancer included. These differences may indeed have
grown as a result of the new claims for scientific medicine...[M]any
Americans of means came to believe the claim of the experts. They
could afford ta see physicians and to pay for hospital rooms, and
they agreed to be treated there. They accepted the modem medical
culture.)3
As cancer became medicalized, the connection between improvements in
medical treatment and medical science became solidified: cancer was seen as
"both a looming threat to civilization and a disease that brilliant scientists were
beginning to conquer."34 But if it was to be conquered, concerted government
action was required. In July 1937, legislation was passed creating the V.S.
National Cancer Institute. The new Institute would
conduct researches, investigations, experiments, and studies relating
to the cause, diagnosis, and treatrnent of cancer...with a view to the
development and prompt widespread use of the most effective
methods ofprevention, diagnosis, and treatment of cancer...35
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Cancer research was publicly supported to the end of improving treatment for the
disease and subsequent funding measures, including President Nixon's 1971
declaration ofa war against cancer, have been solely justified and accepted on this
basis.36 Thus, in our society, publicly-funded cancer research -- and, 1believe, a
similar story may be told for other categories of medical research -- is subservient
to the goal of the communal provision ofeffective medical care.
If medical research is necessary to the communal provision ofeffective
medical care, what steps should be taken by the community to ensure an adequate
supply of research subjects? Enrolling sufficient numbers of human subjects in a
timely fashion into clinical research has been identified as a major problem in, for
example, cancer research.37 Part of the problem is that a relatively small proportion
of cancer patients is actually enrolled in research studies. Indeed, in the United
States only 1.6% of cancer patients are treated in trials funded by the National
Cancer Institute.38 Enrolling adequate numbers of human subjects in trials is
essential to an3wering study questions efficiently, and, therefore, it is key to
progress in the fight against disease. How ought a just society ensure that adequate
numbers ofresearch subjects are available for study? Three approa()hes suggest
themselves: conscription, payment, and volunteering.39
Conscription (or perhaps a "research-participation taXon) seems like an
obvious solution to the problem. In order to further the communal provision of
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medical care, each member of the community might be required to participate in a
certain number ofhours ofresearch per year. Since sorne research is more
demanding (more tests or invasive procedures, greater risk), the time commitment
required might be weighted accordingly. But conscription goes too far: paying
taxes to support medical research is one thing, being required to undergo biopsies
or be exposed to potentially hazardous drugs, quite another. In short, the proposaI
goes against our common understanding of the importance ofbodily integrity.
Paying research subjects salaries for their participation represents another
possibility. Various public projects, including the building ofroads, dams and
public buildings, require labor from the community to ensure their completion.
While in the past the state may have employed conscription or forced labor to
complete such projects, in contemporary society labor is secured by paying people
for their work. Why not pay people to participate in research studies? Given
sufficient remuneration, even the riskiest study is likely to attract sufficient
participants to ensure speedy completion.
There are at least three problems with this suggestion. First, the lure of rich
reward may cause potential subjects to withhold critical medical information that
would make them ineligible for study participation. In several cases, deaths of
"healthy" volunteers in phase 1studies have resulted from the fact that subjects
have withheld such information, seemingly because they needed (or wanted) the
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money offered for participation.40 Second, the poor (and unskilled) may be lured
disproportionately by the money offered in research. If the provision of medical
care on the basis of ability to pay is "boundary crossing" (i.e., unjust), then 50 too
is the disproportionate enrollment of the poor in research studies. Finally, payment,
particularly if the amount is substantiaI, conflicts with a basic tenet of ethicaI
experimentation: the voluntary consent of the research subject is required.
According to the Belmont Report,
An agreement to participate in research constitutes a valid consent
only if voluntarily given. This element of infonned consent requires
conditions free of coercion and undue influence. Coercion occurs
when an overt threat of harm is intentionally presented by one person
to another in order to obtain compliance. Undue influence, by
contrast, occurs through an offer ofan excessive. unwarranted,
inappropriate or improper reward or other overture in order to
obtain compliance [emphasis added].41
Ultimately, clinical research must depend upon the altruism of individuaIs
who volunteer for research participation. Steps can and indeed ought to he taken ta
encourage research participation: expenses, such as transportation, incurred by
research volunteers should be reimbursed, and the community should acknowledge
the important contribution made by volunteers. Altruism is something that the
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community ought to encourage. As Walzer points out, the act ofgiving is a good
in itself: it fosters a closer connection between the individual and her community.-l2
One might think of the gift relationship as a kind ofpolitics: like the
vote, the petition, and the demonstration, the gift is a way of giving
concrete meaning to the union of citizens. And as welfare generally
aims at overcoming the dominance of money in the sphere of need,
so the active participation of citizens in the business ofwelfare (and
security, too) aims at making sure that the dominance ofmoney is
not simply replaced by the dominance of political power.43
The distributive logic of medical research
We have argued that medical research is necessary to the provision of high-
quality medical care and that it is funded to this end in our society. If the
distribution ofknowledge generated from medical research is to "recognize and
uphold the underlying equality ofmembership",44 the results ofmedical research
must be applicable to the breadth of community members afflicted with a
particular illness. If the results of phase III clinical trials (final-stage studies aimed
at changing medical practice) are to he generalizable, i.e., applicable to the
community at large, then the population studied within that trial ought to be
representative of the community (of affected individuals) at large. Thus, an
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inclusive stance ta subject selection must he adopted and the exclusion of
particular groups or types of patients from studies must be carefully justified.
But sorne eligibility criteria are required. If a phase III clinical trial has no
criteria defining patient eligibility, meaningful results can not be generated: one
cannat know ta whom the results of the trial apply. Just eligibility criteria will be
those that are essential ta further the end of the trial, namely, to produce results
that advance medical care in the community at large. The distributive logic of the
selection of subjects for trials is this: eligibility criteria must select subjects so/ely
in accord with the exigencies ofmedical care and science. If an eligibility criterion
selects (or excludes) subjects because of their standing in another sphere, without
reference to the requirements of medical care or science, the criterion involves
"boundary crossing'" and is unjust. Clearly, if the justification for individual
eligibility criteria are ta be open to scrutiny, they must he made explicit hy trial
designers in study protocols.
What are sorne examples ofjust eligibility criteria? Our recent study of
eligibility criteria in two sets of important clinical trials is a good source of
examples.45 In the study we developed a schema for the classification ofeligibility
criteria that divided criteria into five categories:
• definition ofdisease: eligibility criteria that define the Medical condition of
interest and represent factors that would be taken into account in clinical practice;
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• precision: eligibility criteria concerned with the scientific validity of the study.
These criteria attempt to diminish variahility in the study by either making the
patient population more homogeneous or reducing measurement error. Precision
criteria involve factors that would not ordinarily he taken inta account in clinical
practice;
• safety: eligibility criteria that exclude persons thought to he unduly vulnerable to
treatment in general or one of the study treatments in particular;
• ethical and legal: eligibility criteria that are required in order to ensure
conformity with Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulations
goveming the conduct of human experimentation;
• administrative: eligibility criteria which attempt to ensure the smooth
functioning of the study. Administrative criteria such as measures aimed at
ensuring compliance with treatment and follow-up faH into this category.
Let us consider sorne examples of eligihility criteria from the clinical trials of the
National Surgical Adjuvant Breast and Bowel Project (NSABP) examining the
treatment of stage II, node positive (locally advanced) breast cancer.
In the NSABP breast cancer trials, eligibility criteria feH into the five
categories as follows: definition of disease, 41 %; precision, 36%; safety, Il %;
ethical and legal, 9%; and administrative criteria, 3%. In so far as definition of
disease eligibility criteria formalize clinical decision making, they are both
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necessary andjustified restrictions of the study population. For example, criteria
that require that "the tumor is confined to the breast or axiIla", the patient have
"one or more positive axillary nodes proven histologïcaIly" and not have
"inflammatory carcinoma" reflect the exigencies of medical care. Other categories
of criteria clearly ref1ect the exigencies of science. Administrative criteria, for
example, "patient is accessible (geographically) for follow-up," mirror the fact that
the study must accrue data on subjects in order to reach a successful conclusion.
Still, these criteria must be justified: it is not enough to suppose that one group of
patients is non-compliant (this view may be the result ofwidely-held, but false,
belief about a group), evidence must be marshalled to support such a claim.
Criteria that fulfill ethical and legal requirements are also required by science; they
define the proper conduct of science. For example, each of the breast cancer
studies required that the "patient consents to be included in the study."
Other categories of criteria do not hold up so weIl to the presumption of
inclusiveness (and generalizability). In our previous paper we operationalized the
inclusiveness requirement as follows, "[e]Iigibility criteria in phase III clinical
trials should restrict the eligible patient population as little as possible, consonant
with the demands of scientific validity." The NSABP studies contained numerous
precision criteria that excluded patients with "previous malignancy," with
"concomitant disease," with serious "non-malignant systemic disease," who
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received prior "irradiation...[or] chemotherapy," or who received "prior hormonal
therapy." While each of the criteria may serve the narrow "scientific" goal of
making the study population more homogeneous (i.e., less variable), it is at the
expense of the applicability of study results to the community at large. Similarly,
safety criteria in the series of trials seemed to exclude sorne groups ofpatients who
would indeed require treatment in clinical practice with agents similar to those in
the clinical trials. Studies routinely excluded patients with abnormal renal,
hematological or hepatic indices. Patients with mild or moderate disturbances in
these indices certainly require treatrnent. In our prior paper we point out
Exclusion of these groups leaves the clinician with no information on
the risks and benefits of investigational treatrnents in such groups.
The clinician may weIl wonder: 18 a woman with breast cancer who
has received prior cancer treatment more susceptible ta hannful
effects from treatment? Do the benefits of the proposed treatment
outweigh these risks? Unfortunately, no information can be
forthcoming from trials that exclude such groupS.46
Issues within the sphere in which medical research operates must pass the
test of the distributive logic particular to research: eligibility criteria must select
subjects solely in accord with the exigencies ofmedical care and science. But
medical research does not operate within a vacuum: it serves the social good of
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medical care and thus the community as a whole. Thus, justice issues within the
sphere predominantly involve the issue of generalizability: to whom do the results
of research apply?
A natural tension exists between research studies that are widely
generalizable and those that are scientifically fastidious. A research protocol with a
highly-restrictive set of eligibility criteria may, indeed, lead to a study population
that is relatively homogenous. As a result, it is at least conceivable that a more
precise estimate of the outcome measure will result from a fastidious study than
one that is widely inclusive. A fastidious approach is likely to appeal to clinician-
scientists who embrace the ethos (and, indeed, the aesthetic) of the controlled
laboratory experiment: control for alI factors except the independent variable in
question.47 But such narrowly-focussed studies produce results that are only
applicable to a narrow segment of the patient population (i.e., those few who
would have been eligible for study participation).
A Walzerian analysis forces us to acknowledge that the prime purpose, the
te/os if you will, of clinical research is to further the medical care ofaIl afflicted
community members. Clinical researchers who wish to unduly restrict study entry
may be motivated by a variety of factors. As we have said, they may be moved by
the aesthetic of the highly-restrictive trial. Indirectly, a career based on such trials,
perceived by many to be elegant, may bring the investigator prestige and
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recognition. A career built on restrictive trials may also lead to academic
advancement and greater political influence among funding agencies and other
clinician-scientists with similar trial aesthetics. Finally, the investigator may
believe that narrowly-conceived trials produce "higher-quality knowledge," even
though the knowledge gained is less clinically applicable. But each of these
considerations originates from spheres separate from that of security and welfare
(medical care): concems over aesthetics and recognition originate from the sphere
of recognition; career advancement and influence, from the sphere of political
office; and knowledge simpliciter (i.e., knowledge apart from clinically-relevant
knowledge) as an end, from the sphere ofeducation. Allowing these concems to
reign in clinical research is domination, and hence the factors must be rejected as
primary motivators for selecting subjects for research. Eligibility criteria that heed
the distributive mIes of the sphere of security and welfare will minimize
restrictions to the study populations, and will justify necessary restrictions
carefully and in a manner open to public scrutiny (e.g., review by IRBs).
Unjust inclusion as domination
Until this point we have focussed on defining the mIe for the just
distribution ofknowiedge resulting from clinical research within the sphere of
welfare and security. Another category ofjustice relevant to human
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experimentation exists: justice as the absence ofdomination. Walzer, as we have
seen, characterizes domination as boundary crossing. In the context of medical
research, domination occurs when an eligibility criterion selects (or excludes)
subjects because of their standing in another sphere, without reference to the
requirements ofmedicaI care or science. To take the example from the
introduction, a study that bars Conservatives from participation excludes subjects
on the basis of their standing in the sphere of political power (and without
reference to the exigencies of medical care or science). Such a requirement
involves domination and is therefore unjust. So too, mutatis mutandis, medical
research is unjust if it (without regard to medical or scientific requirements) selects
subjects of the basis ofwealth (sphere ofmoney and commodities), education
(sphere ofeducations), political empowennent (sphere of political power), gender
(sphere ofkinship and love), citizenship (sphere ofmembership), employment
(sphere ofhard work) or religious belief(sphere of divine grace).
As indicated in the introduction, a number of prominent research scandaIs
in the last fifty years have involved the exploitation of vulnerable groups in
society. The ethical violations in many of these cases were so all-encompassing as
to breech aIl the basic principles of research: respect for persons, beneficence and
justice.48 In these studies, meaningfuI informed consent was often not obtained,
and the research presented an inordinate amount ofrisk in relation to benefit (if
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any). In so far as these experiments were unjust, though, they can be usefully
characterized as instances of domination.
Perhaps the best known example of unethical research is the
experimentation carried out by the Nazis on captive populations during the Second
World War.49 Many of the Nazi experiments were motivated by the exigencies of
war: they examined the treatment of hypothermia, battle wounds and infectious
disease. No infonned consent was obtained trom research participants (or consent
was obtained on false grounds), the experiments often resulted in the death of the
research subject (approximately 25°/ti of the subjects in the hypothennia
experiments at Dachau died as a direct result of the research), and even basic
principles of scientific design and validity were violated. 50 The subjects for these
experiments were largely political prisoners deemed expendable by the state. For
example, the hypothennia experiments at Dachau "recruited" Polish and Russian
political prisoners for the various studies that were carried out. The selection of
subjects is, in this case, a clear example ofdomination: persons were included in
research by virtue of their status as political prisoner (or poiitically disempowered
persons) -- that is, by virtue oftheir standing in the sphere ofpolitical power -- and
without reference to the exigencies ofmedicine or science.
The Tuskegee syphilis study is another weIl known example of unethical
research. Perhaps the longest running study funded by the U.S. Public Health
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Service (it was active between 1932 and 1972), the Tuskegee syphilis study
enrolled roughly 400 Afro-American males from rural Alabama in ta order study
the effects ofuntreated syphilis. s1 While therapy for syphilis was toxic and
relatively ineffective when the study began, study participants were not given
access (and in sorne cases were denied access) to penicil1in -- a non-toxic and
highly effective treatment for the disease -- when it became available in the early
1950s. As a result, it is estimated that 20% of the participants died from the
complications of syphilis. AIso, proper informed consent was not obtained in many
cases: subjects were not informed that they had syphilis, they were told they had
"bad blood"; procedures done purely for research, such as spinal taps, were
described to subjects as "treatments". The study was unjust because it exclusively
enrolled subjects who were poor, uneducated and Afro-American. Subjects were
selected (at least in part) by virtue oftheir standing in the spheres ofmoney and
commodities, education, and political power. It is, therefore, a clear example of
injustice as domination.
Unjust exclusion as domination
But domination can cut bath ways: subjects can be unjustly included in
research, or they can be unjustly excluded. Recent interest has focussed on the
latter rather than the former. When domination takes the fonn ofunjust inclusion
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in studies, subjects are exposed to the risks associated with the research; when
domination takes the fonn of unjust exclusion, other "hanns" may be incurred.
Insufficient infonnation may exist to ensure that such groups within society
receive effective medical care: Inembers of excluded groups may be exposed to
ineffective treatments, unexpected side-effects may occur, or, more generally, a
Jack of infonnation may lead ta delays in the diagnosis and treatInent of disease.52
Two groups in society, women and the elderly, allow us ta examine both ofthese
components: Have they been excluded from research? Has the lack of medical
research affected the medical care provided?
Women. The claim has been made that women are excluded from a wide
range of clinical research. Women have been excluded from research studies for a
variety of reasons: male physiology is taken to be the norm and menstrual cycles
are a "complicating factor", women may be harder to enroll and retain in research
studies, and, if a women becomes pregnant, harm to the fetus may ensue.53
Evidence for the ubiquitOliS exclusion of women from research is, however,
lacking. According ta 1977 V.S. Food and Drug Administration Policy (rescinded
in 1993), alI women of reproductive potential must be excluded from early stage
testing ofnew drugS.54 This exclusion does not seem to have carried over into later
stage clinical research. In 1992, the V.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
reviewed the phase II and III clinical research supporting New Drug Approvals
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issued between January 1988 and June 1991.55 Defining inadequate gender
representation as <40% of the study population, aIl classes ofdrugs, except new
cardiovascular drugs, were supported by studies with adequate gender
representation. Even women between 15 and 49 years of age (women of so-called
"reproductive potential) were not generally underrepresented. Bird reviewed
research articles published in JAMA in 1990 and 1992.56 Defining gender
underrepresentation as blanket exclusion or less than one-third of the study sample
(for disease that affect bath genders), women were underrepresented in 2.7 times
as many studies as men. Once again, though, the strongest evidence came from
cardiovascular research studies (only research in cardiovascular disease and
substance abuse underrepresented women in the majority of studies).
In other areas of research it seems quite clear that women have not been
excluded from research participation. Ungerleider and colleague reviewed 1989
accrual data to cancer studies funded by the Clinical Trials Cooperative Group
Program of the V.S. National Cancer Institute.57 Of the 18411 subjects enrolled in
cancer clinical trials, 57% were women. (When pediatrie cooperative groups were
excluded, 60% were women; when cooperative groups that predominantly study
cancers specifie to women were excluded, 45% were women). In an extensive
review of the literature, the Committee on the Ethical and Legal Issues Relating to
the Inclusion ofWomen in Clinical Studies identify the "lack ofreliahle,
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comprehensive information on the actual participation of women.. .in clinical
studies."S8 Indeed, the Committee was only able to find evidence that women were
excluded from studies ofheart disease and (perhaps) HIV/AIDS.
Ifwomen have been largely excluded from research on heart disease, has
this had a negative impact on the medical care that women with heart disease
receive? It seems the answer may be yeso Ayanian and colleague studied the
medical records of men and women hospitalized with coronary artery disease in
1987 in Massachusetts and Maryland.59 Despite the fact that gender is not (in
itselt) a predictive factor of heart disease, women underwent fewer major
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures than men. Steingart and colleagues looked at
the care of 1842 men and 389 women after an acute myocardial infarction (and
before enrollment in the Survival and Ventricular Enlargement Trial).60 Despite
greater reported functional disability from coronary artery disease in study women,
they were roughly half as likely to have undergone cardiac catheterization or
coronary bypass surgery. Finally, the American Medical Association's Council on
Ethical and ludicial Affairs concluded that heart disease is more advanced in
women by the time they receive surgery and women have a higher operative
mortality rate for coronary artery bypass.61
It is clear then that, at least with regard to heart disease and early-stage
clinical trials, women have been excluded from participation in medical research.
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Why have they been excluded? Two reasons have been given: female reproductive
physiology is a "complicating factor" in scientific studies, and concem for toxicity
of experimental treatments to (actual or potential) fetuses.62 While exclusions rnay
be legitimate in particular cases (for example, when pregnant women are excluded
from a study of a drug known to be teratogenic), the wide-spread exclusion of
women from studies on these grounds is, as we shaH see, domination.
Walzer recognizes that the family is an important unit within contemporary
society. Particular mies of distributive justice apply in what Walzer
interchangeably caUs the sphere of 'kinship and love' and that of 'personal
relations, domestic life, reproduction and child rearing.' Women have an important
role to play within the family, one that involves, inter alia, carrying a child to
term, giving birth to it, and playing an important role in caring for it after birth.
While this reproductive role has an undoubtedly central place in the family,
women have been illegitimately excluded from other social roles on the basis of
this familial role, on the basis of their standing within the sphere of kinship and
love. This exclusion, according to Walzer, is domination and, therefore, unjust:
Alongside nepotism - an expression ofkinship preferences where
preference has no proper place - there has long existed something
like its opposite: a kind of political and economic misogyny - an
expression of kinship constraints where constraint has no proper
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place. Thus the denial to women of the right to vote, or to hold
office, or to own property, or to sue in court, and sa on. In each case,
the reasons given when anyone bothers to give reasons, have to do
with woman's place within the family. So kinship patterns are
dominant outside their sphere. And liberation begins outside, with a
succession of claims that this or that social good should be
distributed for its own, not for familial, reasons.63
The boilerplate exclusion of women of reproductive age and women in
general from many scientific studies is based on the reproductive role that women
fulfil within the family. As we have said, studies have excluded women because of
the fact that the reproductive physiology of \vomen is vie\ved as a "complicating
factor."
Male nonn refers to the tendency to conceive of men gender
neutrally, as persons, rather than to conceive of men in terms oftheir
sex. Thus, men's identity and experience becomes the
characterization or standard of what it is ta be a human being. An
example is the argument that men make more appropriate research
subjects for drug studies because, for exampIe, women have
menstruaI cycles that produce deviations from the 'nonnaI' pattern
of drug disposition observable in males.64
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Although men and women share many more physiological similarities than
differences, differences nonetheless do exist. The point here, though, is not
whether differences exist, but rather that one gender be taken as the norm and the
other excluded on the basis of 'reproductive standing.' This characterization of
women -- and, importantly, no! men - in terms of their reproductive role and their
exclusion on this basis from scientific studies is an instance ofdomination and is
unjust.
Women, more specifically wornen of reproductive age, have also been
excluded from studies on the grounds that experimental drugs may be harmful to
(potential or actual) fetuses. Toxicity to the fetus is certainly a legitimate concem
in sorne cases. When a given drug is known to he teratogenic, excluding pregnant
women from participation in the study (including requiring a pregnancy test at the
beginning of the study and the use of effective contraception throughout the study)
seems like a reasonable -- and even necessary -- precaution. But, even in such
cases of clear risk to the fetus, the exclusion of all women ofreproductive age
from a study seems, as above, to characterize women solely on the basis of their
reproductive role. Patterson and Emanuel describe two studies at the Dana-Farber
Cancer Institute both of which involved drugs with the potential to harm the
developing fetus: 13-cis retinoic acid (for the prevention of secondary lung
cancers) in one trial, and finasteride (for prostate cancer) in the other.65 [n the 13-
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cis retinoic acid study, aIl women of reproductive age were excluded; in the
finasteride study, men were merely required to use an effective contraceptive
method. Moreno, quoted in the discussion of the two cases, concludes that
it seems fairly obvious that ifwe are going to trust men to use
contraception even when their semen is contaminated with
finasteride and might pose a risk to a developing male, then we
certainly should trust women to use contraception when taking
retinoic acid. 1can see no substantive difference between these two
situations which should lead to a difference in policies regarding the
eligibility of patients for the trials.66
In both trials it was reasonable to take steps to protect fetuses from harm. The
exclusion ofal! women on reproductive age in the one trial, however, clearly
characterizes and excludes women on the basis of their reproductive role, on the
basis oftheir standing within the sphere ofkinship and love, and is therefore an
instance of domination. If the exclusion of aIl women of reproductive potential is
unjust in the case of a clearly teratogenic drug then, afortiori, it is unjust when
evidence for teratogenicity is less clear or lacking.
As we have seen, the exclusion of women from sorne areas of medical
research, particularly research into cardiovascular disease, has affected their
medical care. Healy comments that
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Decades ofsex-exclusive research have reinforced the myth that
coronary artery disease is a uniquely male affliction and have
generated data sets in which men are the nonnative standard. The
extrapolation of these male-generated findings to women has led in
sorne cases to biased standards ofcare and has prevented the full
consideration of several important aspects of coronary disease in
women.67
If women are to receive an allocation of medical care which upholds "the
underlying equality ofmembership" in the community,68 they must be included in
medical research. Criteria that exclude women for "scientific reasons" are often
baseless exclusions and instances ofdomination. Clinical trial designers must
provide clear justifications for any exclusion and evidencc ta support such
exclusions ought to be carefully examined.
Even when strong evidence exists that, for example, women may respond
differently than men to a particular treatment (1 take this to be the exception), the
equality provision does not seem to allow them to be excluded. In such a case, a
larger, more comprehensive study ought to be mounted to address, in part, any
gender differences that may be present. Ultimately, the inclusion ofwomen in
medical research is a recognition that "[women's] liberation begins outside, with a
succession of claims that this or that social good should be distributed for its OWO,
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not for familial, reasons."69
The eider/y. Until recently, the exclusion of older persons from clinical
research was not seen as an ethical issue. (lndeed, it is rarely acknowledged that
the exclusion of women from cardiovascular clinical trials may largely be due ta
the exclusion of aIder persons from those trials -- women develop heart disease
later than men.70) Particularly within oncology, there is a growing recognition that
older patients have tao long been excluded from research participation.71 Older
persons are typically excluded from oncology research because they are thought ta
be more vulnerable to taxie effects from treatment.
Cancer clinical trials funded by the V.S. National Cancer Institute have
excluded aider patients for years.72 For example, NSABP clinical trials examining
chemotherapy in the treatment of stage II, node positive breast cancer excluded
persons over the age of 70 from participation until 1981 (NSABP B-12 was the last
protocol to have such an exclusion). In NSABP 8-15 and subsequent protocols, the
age exclusion was replaced with the criterion, "Patients must have a lire
expectancy of at least 10 years exc1uding their diagnosis of cancer." But there is no
evidence that more aIder persans are being accrued ta NSABP clinical trials.
Indeed, since the change in the age criterion, the proportion of persons over age 60
years in the NSABP trials actually dropped.73 Trimble and colleagues compared
1992 enrollment data for U.S. National Cancer Institute sponsored cooperative
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group treatments trials with 1990 SEER incidence data by sex and cancer site.74
For men and women over the age ofsixty- five years, the differences between
accrual and incidence -- direction in favor of underrepresentation in aIl groups --
were statistically significant for aIl cancer sites except prostate cancer. For persons
over seventy-five years, accrual was significantly less than incidence in aIl groups.
The exclusion of aider patients from medical research has led to a lack of
information on proper treatment ofa group of patients who carry the majority of
the burden of the disease (age is the largest risk factor for the development of
cancer). This Iack of infonnation, in tum, puts older patients at risk of
undertreatment for their disease. Mor and coIleagues reviewed the records of 1891
deceased cancer patients who had been associated with the National Hospice
Study.75 Controlling for stage and co-morbid disease, older patients were less
likely to receive either chemotherapy or radiation therapy than younger cancer
patients. Samet and colleagues reviewed data in the New Mexico Tumor registry
on 22,899 cancer cases diagnosed between 1969 and 1982.76 For most cancer
types, the proportion of cases who received potentially curative therapy declined
with patient age.
Studies that specifically looked at the treatrnent of older persons with breast
cancer show similar findings. Allen and colleagues report on the treatment
received by 1795 women with breast cancer referred to the Duke University
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Medical Center hetween 1970 and 1984.77 They found that aider patients were
more likely to receive surgery as the sole therapy for their disease. Furthermore,
aIder women with nodal involvement were less likely to receive adjuvant
chemotherapy than younger women (27% versus 60%). Chu and colleagues
studied the care of 1680 women with hreast cancer treated in 1982 at one of 17
hospitals associated with the Community Hospital Oncology Program.78 Older
women with breast cancer seemed ta he broadly disadvantaged in the care they
received. ülder women received fewer diagnostic tests (biopsy, mammography),
they were less likely to he seen by consultants, and they were (for ail stages of
disease) less likely to receive chemotherapy.
Sa then, aider persons with cancer have heen excluded from many cancer
studies and treatment disparities exist between aider and younger cancer patients.
As persans get older they come ta be more dependent on other family members,
but this does not necessarily mean that they are less likely ta benefit from cancer
treatments; "dependency" and "vulnerability to toxic effects of chemotherapy" are
not equivalent. üIder patients have been excluded from trials for years on the
presumption that they are more susceptible to the taxie effects of therapy,
presumptions which may have been fueled by their often dependent raIe within the
family, and yet "the assumptions upon which those policies were based have not
been substantiated by empirical scrutiny."79 Indeed, recent studies seem to indicate
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that, at least with regard to sorne chemotherapy regimens used in breast cancer,
older patients are not more vulnerable to toxic effects.80 One rnight productively
ask why such presumptions went unchallenged for 50 long.
New areas for ethical attention
The unjust inclusion ofgroups in research is driven by widely-held beliefs
about the worth of members of such groups; the unjust exclusion of groups is
driven by socially-constructed notions ofdeviation from the noon or vulnerability.
Women are excluded from medical research because their reproductive physiology
is a "complicating factor" and the potential for toxicity to fetuses. The elderly are
blocked from participation because they are though to he more vulnerable to harm
than younger people. In both of the cases we examined, the exclusion ofthese
groups went unchallenged despite the lack of a convincing scientific justification.
One worthy path of inquiry might examine other groups that are routinely
excluded from studies and ask: Why is the group excluded? Is there any evidence
to support such a claim?
For example, persons with a history ofdrug or alcohol abuse are often
excluded from clinical trials. Presumably (specifie reasons for individual
exclusions are rarely given in clinical trial protocols), such persans are barred from
participation because they are thought to be unreliable: they are unlikely to comply
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with treatments and required follow-up visits. When Hughes reviewed the
available literature to substantiate this claim, however, he found that there was no
empirical basis for it whatsoever.81 Indeed, compliance may be adequate even in
persans with active drug abuse (let alone in those with a mere history of abuse).
Harrison and colleagues report on comprehension and compliance in active
intravenous drug users (lDUs; n=39) and non-IDUs (n=32) in a phase II trial of an
HIV vaccine.82 Both groups demonstrated satisfactory comprehension of consent
infonnation (out ofa total possible score of 18 [mean ± SD]: IDUs scored 15.1 ±
2.0; non-IDUs scored 15.4 ± 1.8) and compliance in the two groups was similar
(proportion receiving the fourth injection in series: IDUs, 67%; non-IDUs, 72%).
Other groups are (perhaps) also unjustly excluded from medical research.
Otherwise healthy persons who are sero-positive for HIV are often excluded from
studies. But are HIV-positive individuals really more likely to suffer adverse
events or intercurrent illnesses during the course of a research study? Persans with
a history of mental illness are sometimes excluded from research participation. Are
they, as a group, any more likely to be incompetent to give infonned consent? My
guess is that further research will answer these questions in the negative.
Privately-funded research
One final question must be addressed, "Do these considerations only apply
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to publicly-funded research and is privately-funded research exempt?" The
question itself stems from the fact that the community neither has an obligation to
provide for all needs nor is there a requirement ta provide for each need ta an
unIimited extent. As we have indicated, needs must be prioritized by the
community and only those which the community believes to be essentiaI ta its
conception of the common life must be provided for. 83 Even the degree ta which
essential needs must be provided is subject to political limitation: labelling health
care as an essential need does not imply that community members must be
provided an unlimited amaunt of this good; the community has a right to set limits
to its provision. The point is, says Walzer, that "[0]nce the community undertakes
to provide sorne needed gaod, it must provide it to aIl the members who need it in
proportion ta their needs.,,84 But ifresearch is privately funded, i.e., not
communally provided for, isn't it immune ta such considerations?
Interestinglyenough, recent changes ta V.S. research guidelines might be
construed as being in accord with an affinnative answer to this question. The
recent NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects of
Clinical Research only apply to NIH-funded (i.e., pubIicly-funded) research.
While 1993 changes ta FDA regulations (1argely goveming privately-funded
research) removed barriers ta the enrollment ofwomen of"reproductive potentiaI"
in clinical trials, the reguIations stop short of requiring (as the NIH Guidelines do)
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adequate representation ofwomen in studies.
One line of argumentation against an exemption for privately-funded
research might go as fol1ows: Even ifprivately-funded research is exempt from the
considerations ofjustice which we have outlined, little, if any, research today is
wholly privately-funded. Pharmaceutical companies are given subsidies by the
community to support medical research. For example, expenditures for research
and development are not taxed; thereby, phannaceutical companies are both
encouraged to invest in the development of new medical treatments and pay
substantially less tax on profits than they otherwise would. Indirect1y,
phannaceutical companies depend on communal structures in order to do business.
The drug licensure process is established by the community in order ta ensure that
new treatments are both safe and effective. While private companies bear the cost
of research in support of new drug applications, the community bears the cost of
the drug-approval bureaucracy itself. Thus, the line of argument goes, no (or little)
current research in Canada or the U.S. is truly privately funded and, hence, no (or
few) research studies are exempt from the considerations ofjustice as outlined.
While such an argument may appear to be functional, it is without elegance:
it would still exempt truly private research. More importantly, though, 1believe it
misconstrues the problem. The argument proceeds as if research itself were the
good to be distributed. It is not. Medical research, in our society at least, is
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subservient to the social good of medical care. Research must, therefore, further
the provision ofmedical care in accord with need and upholding the underlying
equality of community membership. Once medical care is provided for
communaIly, research in support of such care must ensure that results ofclinicaI
studies are applicable across the breadth of the affected community. The source of
funding for such research is not relevant to considerations ofjustice.
But what of medicaI care for which the community does not provide? How
shall we understand such care and the research that supports it? In sorne cases,
treatments are not provided for because the community does not recognize the
conditions which they ameliorate as diseases: for example, certain types of
cosmetic surgery. In other cases, a community may sets Iimits on the amount of
care to which an individual is entitled: for example, heart-Iung transplantation may
be deemed, given the scarcity of communal resources, an unacceptable expense.
These two categories of non-communally provided treatments are best understood
not as medical care, but rather as commodities.
If such treatments are commodities, it follows that community members do
not have a right ta them. Walzer says, "Beyond whatever is communally provided,
no one is entitled ta this or that useful or pleasing abject."85 People with enough
money to pay for a facelift are entitled to it, those who can't pay for it, are not.
[T]here is no such thing as a maldistribution of consumer goods. Itjust
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doesn't matter, from the standpoint of eomplex equality, that you have a
yaeht and 1don't, or that the sound system ofher hi-fi set is greatly superior
ta his, or that we buy our rugs from Sears Roebuek and they get theirs from
the Orient. People will foeus on such matters, or not: that is a question of
culture, not of distributive justice. So long as yachts and hi-fi sets and rugs
have only use value and individualized symbolic value, their unequal
distribution doesn't matter.86
Private companies doing research on such commodity-treatments wouId
indeed have different rules to foIIow. Since sueh research operates within the
sphere of money and commodities, and not in the sphere of security and welfare,
economic justifications for the exclusion of subjects from research studies are
allowed. A company may exclude righteously, for example, women from research
studies examining a commodity-treatment if it can prove that it is cost-effective to
do so. But issues of domination apply to the sphere of money and commodities, as
to any sphere. Companies may not exclude persons from such research (or, for that
matter, may not include them) by virtue oftheir standing in another sphere (and
without appeal to cost-effectiveness).
Thus, when research supports medical care which is communally provided
for, it must, irrespective of the source of funding, obey the justice considerations
particular to the sphere of security and welfare. Treatments that the community has
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decided not to provide for are not medical care but commodities. Research
furthering such cornmodity-treatments must follow the mIes particular to the
sphere ofmoney and commodities. Domination is, of course, not allowed in either
sphere. Walzer says of medical care: "Needed goods are not commodities."87 Our
argument acknowledges this fact and adds: Neither are commodities needed goods.
Conclusion
Walzer's account of the moral world can be characterized by two premises.
First, no meaningful or useful account ofjustice can be derived from abstract
considerations. Ideas about justice flow from communally shared understandings,
an understanding of the common life. Second, mIes ofjustice are not universal in
their application, they operate within spheres ofjustice, circumscribed domains of
legitimate operation. The approach we take to justice issues must, therefore, be
sensitive to history and context. Furthermore, and mast important here, two types
of injustice follow: violations ofdistributive mIes within the relevant sphere of
justice, and violations of the boundaries of the sphere (domination). In our account
ofjustice in subject selection for medical research we have encauntered both
categories of injustice.
To date, accounts ofjustice and the selection of subjects for medical
research have not provided us with an account ofa just selection procedure. We
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have argued that a just selection procedure is govemed by the mie: eligibility
criteria must select subjects solely in accord with the exigencies ofmedical care
and science. Since the knowledge gained from research furthers the social good of
medical care, such knowledge must be applicable to ail members of the
community. Thus, within the sphere of medical research the issue of
generalizability is predominant. We have argued that if the community is to be
served, eligibility criteria ought to be minimized and necessary exclusions ought to
be explicitly justified.
Ultimately, current policy regarding the inclusion of women and memhers
ofminority groups in medical research are too narrowly construed. Once the unjust
inclusion and exclusion of subjects from research is seen as houndary crossing, as
domination, it is clear that many groups are potentially affected: not only women
and minorities, but also the elderly, the impoverished, the undereducated and the
politically disempowered. Ifjustice is to be achieved, aIl of these groups must be
our concem. Fundamentally, justice in medical research will not be achieved by
"bean counting;" rather our goal must be to eliminate the selection of subjects for
research on the basis of their standing in other spheres, be it education, political
power, or kinship and love. In short, our goal must he to eliminate domination.
So too, the current NIH regulations are unduly limited in their focus on
publicly-funded research. If the provision of medical care is recognized as a social
239
good, then aIl research in support ofthis good, including that which is privately
funded, is subject to the justice considerations as outlined in this paper. To be sure,
research which relates to commodity-treatments that are not communally provided
for, e.g., certain types of cosmetic surgery, are subject to different distributive
mIes. But, even within the realm ofcommodity-treatment research, domination,
i.e., selecting suhjects solely because oftheir standing in other spheres, is
prohibited.
A recognition of these moral facts will, 1 think, take us a little closer to the
complex egalitarian society envisioned by Walzer.
This is the lively hope named by the word equality: no more bowing
and scraping, fawning and toadying; no more fearful trembling; no
more high-and-mightiness; no more masters, no more slaves. It is not
a hope for the elimination of differences; we don't ail have to he the
same or have the same amounts of the same things. Men and women
are one another's equals (for aIl important moral and poiitical
purposes) when no one possesses or contraIs the means of
domination.88
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Chapter 6:
Discussion:
Explanatory versus pragmatic approaches ta
selecting subjects for research participation.
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Introduction
As stated in the introductory chapter, the purpose of this thesis is to
examine aspects ofone area of overlap between science and ethics, namely,
selection procedures for participation in clinical research. Such procedures,
formalized in eligibility criteria, were examined at a number of points in the
genesis and dissemination of medical knowledge: clinical trial protocol.,
interpretation by researchers, and communication of study results. This final
chapter has several purposes. First, ta examine critically the overlapping scientific
and ethical concems that arise in the selection of subjects for clinical research
participation. Second, ta explain the methodology employed in the thesis and
suggest further avenues for research. Third, and finally, to point out which aspects
of the thesis represent original contributions to the literature.
Explanatory and pragmatic clinical trials
Our examination of NSABP and POG clinical trials in chapter 2 revealed
two substantially different approaches to the selection of subjects for research
participation. Following Schwarz and Lellouch's classic paper, we referred to the
strategy illustrated by the NSABP trials as 'explanatory' and that followed by the
POG trials as 'pragmatic.' 1 These two philosophies of clinical trials carry broad
implications for the design, conduct and interpretation of clinical studies.
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Explanatory clinical trials attempt to "discover whether a difference exists
hetween two treatments which are specified by strict...definitions."2 The aim of
such trials is to deepen our understanding ofa medical intervention under tightly
controlled circumstances akin ta those found in the laboratory. Pragmatic trials, on
the other hand, "compare two treatments under the conditions in which they wouId
he applied in practice...[they seek] to answer the question - which of the two
treatments should we prefer?") Pragmatic trials are oriented towards making a
decision as to which treatment is to be preferred under clinical circumstances.
These two approaches ta trial design imply different research questions and
different methods to answer these questions. Schwarz and Lellouch give the
example of a new drug which may sensitize tumor ta the effeets of radiotherapy.
Nonnally the drug would he administered for thirty days prior to the tirst course of
radiotherapy. An explanatory approach asks, Does the drug have the biological
effect claimed? In other words, Is treatment with the drug followed by radiation
therapy superior to no treatment for thirty days foI1owed by radiation therapy (i.e.,
delayed therapy). The design for this explanatory study is illustrated in figure 1. A
pragmatic approach is less eoncerned with biological effeet than which treatment
is to be preferred in the clinic, drug followed by radiotherapy or immediate
radiotherapy. The design for this pragrnatic study is also seen in figure 1.
ExpIanatory and pragmatic approaches have implications for aspects of trials other
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than design, including dosage of study drugs (equirnolecular doses for comparison
[explanatory] versus optimal doses for cornparison [pragmatic]), choice of study
endpoint (tumor regression versus survival), dealing with patients who withdraw
frorn the study (excluding them from the analysis versus including them, i.e., an
intention-to-treat analysis), and, the selection of subjects (carefully restricted set of
participants versus an aIl-corners approach).
Selection procedures for study participation define who is suitable ta
participate in the study (and who is needed ta answer the question at hand). Since
an explanatory trial seeks to establish whether a biological effect exists, it will "be
done on a relatively arbitrary population which is weIl adapted to the problem at
hand, homogeneous and with low withdrawal rate.,,4 Such studies will often
include only patients who are deemed most likely ta respond to the treatment and
exclude patients who are thought likely to experience adverse effects. The
proportion of the patient population eligible for such a study may be very Iow
indeed. A pragmatic trial, aiming to decide which treatment ought to be used in
practice, takes an alI-corners stance with regard to subject selection.
To enable the results to be extrapolated to a defined population of
patients, the trial shouId be carried out on a properly representative
sample of this population. This counsel of perfection is rarely
followed, but the patients chasen for the trial must represent as far as
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possible the population to which the results are to he extrapolated.
Extrapolation will be the more justifiable if the trial can rest on a
broad range of sampling - this is one reason for undertaking
collaborative trials at several centers.5
What are the consequences of explanatory and fastidious approaches for the
interpretation of trial results? Explanatory trials only have immediate pragmatic
implications when the new treatment is proved no better than the control treatment
(this assumes, of course, that the study had adequate power "to detect" a clinically
important effect). For example, consider the study conducted on a highly select
group ofpatients: If the new treatment is proven effective, one still has no
infonnation on the therapeutic index of the treatment in the broader patient
population. If the treatment is proven ineffective, it has failed under the most
favorable conditions, and afortiori it will he ineffective if tested in the patient
population as a whole (i.e., under less favorable conditions). In short, only
"negative" explanatory trials have immediate pragmatic implications.
Pragmatic trials have explanatory value only when the new treatment is
proven superior ta the control treatment. Consider the study performed on a
heterogeneous population ofpatients: If the treatment is not found to he effective
under such circumstances, it may yet he found to be effective for a more favorahly
defined subgroup of patients. Only if the treatment is found to he superior to the
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comparison treatment, has the biological question been answered. Thus, only
"positive" pragmatic trials have explanatory value.
In sorne circumstances, there is agreement as to whether an expIanatory or
pragmatic approach to trial design is appropriate. For example, phase II cancer
trials attempt to establish whether a new anti-cancer treatment has an effect in a
particuIar disease setting, and therefore, such trials utilize explanatory designs.
Disagreement exists as to the preferred approach for phase III clinical trials. The
disagreement occurs on a fundamentaI, even phiIosophicaI Ievei. Feinstein
characterizes the two camps of trial designers as follows:
The proponents ofone viewpoint [pragmatic] usually want the trials
to answer pragrnatic questions in cIinicaI management. For this
purpose, the plans would incorporate the heterogeneity, occasional or
frequent ambiguity, and other 'messy' aspects of ordinary clinical
practice. The advocates of the opposing viewpoint [explanatory] fear
that this strategy will yieId a 'messy' answer. They prefer a 'clean'
arrangement, using homogeneous groups, reducing or eIiminating
ambiguity, and avoiding the spectre ofbiased resuIts.6
As suggested above, this controversy resuIts in two distinct approaches to defining
patient populations for randomized cIinicaI trials.
A fastidious [explanatory] designer will want to test a relativeIy
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homogeneous group of patients and may therefore 'purify' the
eligible candidates by including only people ofone gender and race,
within a limited age span, with no coexisting other diseases or
treatments with medications, who have been checked for their
willingness to cooperate weIl with the requirements of the
experimental protocol...The pragmatic designer, however, will
complain that the 'pure' results are often useless for practical
application to the heterogeneous spectrurn ofcases and the many
'impurities' that are encountered in clinical reality.7
How can we account for such deep divisions in the approach to the design
of phase III clinicaI trials? Only an incomplete answer can be given ta this
intriguing question. It seems that expIanatory trials may be more common in North
America and pragmatic trials more common on the other side of the Atlantic
Ocean. In the comprehensive review ofempiricalliterature of trial enrollment
presented in my Master' s thesis, a substantial discrepancy was observed between
North-American trials and European studies.8 North American studies (n=9)
excluded 55% ofpotential subjects (patients with the appropriate type and stage of
disease) whereas European studies (n=9) excluded only 36°11> ofsubjects. Sorne of
the European clinical trials used very few eligibility criteria indeed. Anderson
reports on three trials of the Danish Breast Cancer Cooperative Group that used
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only three selection criteria: "operable breast cancer with no metastises," "no
medical contraindication to the study treatments," and "age less than 70."9 (Recall
that the most recent NSABP study we reported on contained 44 eligibility criteria).
One cao only speculate as to how the trans-Atlantic difference in trialing
came about. Influential authors (and teachers) like England's Richard Peto lO and
America's Richard SimonIl likely had sorne influence on the development of trial
philosophies in the two continents. Payer has described substantial differences in
the practice of medicine in the United States and a number of European countries
which seem to be culturally driven. 12 It is conceivable that the acceptance of one
trial philosophy versus another may similarly have roots in cultural factors. One's
affinity for explanatory or pragmatic trials may even be viewed as containing an
aesthetic component: What counts as an elegant experiment?
Against this backdrop, let us consider the scientific arguments made in
favor ofexplanatory or pragmatic approaches to subject selection for clinical trials.
What motivates the "explanatory trialist?" Can the "pragmatic trialist" respond
adequately to the explanatory position?
Arguments for an explanatory approach to subject selection
...f:îr it was realized that no two patients have an identical fonn of
the disease and it was desired to eliminate as Many of the obvions
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variations as possible. This planning...is a fundamental feature of the
successful trial. To start out upon a trial with ail and sundry included,
and with the hope that the results can he sorted out statistically in the
end is ta court disaster. 13
Including patients ofdifJering prognosis (i.e., a heterogeneous study
population) will increase variability in a study and, hence, decrease its power.
(The arguments in favor of explanatory criteria for trial eligibility are summarized
in table 1.) The randomized clinical trial originated relatively recently, within the
last half century, and represents a major scientific advance in medicine: the
relative safety and efficacy of novel medical treatments can be reliably assessed.
The methodology for cIinical trials was developed in other areas of science,
primarily agriculture, and many of the features of "wet-bench experiments" were
preserved with its introduction into medicine. A fundamental principle of the "wet-
bench experiment" is to control every variable except the variable of interest, i.e.,
treatment. With regard ta subject selection, then, a homogeneous study population,
that is one in which prognosis is uniform, is regarded as ideal.
It is only when extraneous variables are tightly controlIed, and thus, in part,
when the patient population in a study is highly select, that we give a new
treatment the best chance ofbeing proven effective. Ifpatients with differing
prognoses are included into a clinical trial, the variability - statistical "noise" -
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in the study is increased. The true effect of the study intervention - the Usignal"
- will tend to be lost as "noise" in a study increases. Gail argues that these facts
demand that eligibility criteria select as homogeneous a group as possible:
These restrictions tend to produce a fairly homogeneous study population so
that the effects of treatrnent are more easily discernable against the
background variability in response. If no such restrictions were imposed,
the effect of treatment could be lost in the tremendous variability of
response arising from rnixed stages ofdisease and cell types, which are
often more powerful determinants of outcome that is the treatment. 14
In statistical parlance, if the variability in a study is increased, given the
intervention has sorne actual effect, the probability of the study concluding that the
treatment is effective (power) diminishes. 15 In short, without a carefully selected
patient population, the chance of a study coming to a falsely negative conclusion is
increased.
Studies involving homogeneous groups ofpatients are more efficient (in
terms of "residual sample size requirements ''J. The second argument is derivable
from the first. Two patient-related factors which contribute to the power of a study
are (1) risk of the event ofinterest (death, recurrence, etc.) and (2) response to
treatment. If the number ofevents is high and the treatment effect is large, then the
power of the study will be high. It follows, then, that, for a fixed sample size, high-
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risk, high-responder patients will contribute relatively more infonnation ta a trial
than low-risk, low-responder patients. Thus, (again, for a fixed sample size) it is
more efficient to add high-risk, high-responder patients - a highly selective
population - to a clinical trial than members ofother patient subgroups.
Sackett makes this point, and his comments are worth quoting in extenso:
There is a definite advantage in admitting study patients who are
both at high risk of an event (to pull event rates away from zero,
where it requires very large numbers of study patients to show risk
reductions even down to zero) and are highly responsive to the test
therapy (thereby producing the largest differences in event rates
between experimental and control patients). Similarly, we would like
to exclude patients from our trial who are both at low risk ofan event
and unlikely to respond to the test therapy; indeed, the addition of
such patients increases rather than decreases the residual sample size
requirement for demonstrating a statistically significant between-
group difference...The foregoing considerations suggest that
investigators should, in the design stages of their trials, estimate the
likely risk and responsiveness of various subgroups ofpotential
study patients and establish inclusion/exclusion criteria that willlimit
entry to the high-risk, high-response subset...In summary, several
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limitations to the generalizability of the results ofa trial are
inevitabIe and, indeed, essentiaI to the efficient and unambiguous
demonstration ofefficacy. 16
Clear1y, Sackett's argument begins with the premise that sample size is
fixed, or at least trial resources are limited. (An assumption that many will find
reasonable in this day and age). Given this, How to maximize the chance that an
effective treatment will be found to be 50 by a study? Sackett's answer: study a
select group of patients. Given the origins of the randomized clinical trial, an
agricultural example may be appropriate. If one has a batch of seed that May or
May not be too old to genninate, an efficient approach to answer the question is ta
plant it in the most fertile soil under optimal growing conditions. Why? If the seed
will grow anywhere, it will grow there.
Within a heterogeneous study population. qualitative difJerences among
subgroups may cancel one another out, thus obscuring the treatment's "true"
effect. Both of the arguments cited above are linked by the concem that when
patients with varying prognoses are included in a study, variance increases. In a
broad patient population, not aIl of the patients will be high-responders; there is
diversity with regard to treatment response. When differing groups of patients
experience varying degrees of response to a treatment, but the treatment effect is
all in the same direction, this is referred to as ~~quantitative interaction."
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Quantitative interaction is a source of error within a study, but one that can be
compensated for by increasing the study sample size.
More problematic is ~'qualitative interaction": suhgroups ofpatients in
whom the direction of treatment effect is different. Consider a study testing a new
anti-cancer treatment in which half of the patients, on average, do better with the
treatment, but the other haif - perhaps due to age or sorne other factor - do
substantially worse. Despite the fact that the treatment is effective in one large
subgroup, in the overall analysis, the two groups will tend to cancel one another
out leading to an overall conclusion of"no difference." Increasing the sample size
will not necessarily compensate for this source oferror. Simon makes this point
repeatedly: 17 "In a study with broad eligibility requirements, a conclusion of no
difference between the treatments may result from a positive effect in one subset
being canceled by a negative effect in another..."18
Of course, if it was known ab initio that a subgroup of patients was likely
to be harmed by a treatment (i.e., experience a negative outcome), these patients
would be excluded by any responsible trialist - whatever the trial philosophy he
or she ernbraces - from study participation. The above argument refers to
unidentified suhgroups embedded within the patient population. The assertion is
that qualitative interactions will he less cornmon when the patient population for a
study is homogeneous rather than heterogeneous.
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ln a heterogeneous study population, there are insufficient numbers in
individual subgroups to do a meaningful statistical analysis. But if subgroups of
patients may vary in their response to treatment, couldn't we figure that out with
subgroup analyses? In theory at least, the statistical analysis could examine
treatment effect in the study according to various prognostic factors (age,
comorbidity, etc.), thereby arriving at more precise estimates of treatment effect.
The problem with this approach is that individual subgroups within the study may
contain too few subjects to allow for a meaningful (read: adequate power)
subgroup analysis. Sylvester articulates the problem as follows:
[T]he patient population should be reasonably homogeneous so that
aIl patients have a similar type ofdisease and prognosis. One should
avoid inc1uding in the trial small subgroups of patients who have a
potentially different prognosis fram the others. There will not be
enough of these patients to analyze them separately and including
them in the analysis may weaken the overall treatment comparison. 19
Once again, assuming a fixed sample size, only a homogeneous study sample
seems to get around this problem.
Studies with broad inclusion criteria (and, hence. numerous subgroups of
potential interest) may lead to misleading multiple subgroup analyses. This point
is related to the previous concem. If a study includes a heterogeneous group of
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patients, multiple subgroup analyses may be required. If the sample size in each
group tested is inadequate, or ifmultiple tests are done but multiple testing is not
corrected for, misleading results may result. Simon:
Sorne statisticians advise that the eligibility criteria can be very
broad because subset analyses can always be perfonned later. This
approach has certain risks, however: misleading conclusions may
result from multiple subset analyses, and one must be careful to plan
the study so that adequate numbers ofpatients within each major
subset are available for separate analysis.20
As with sorne of the above arguments, this argument suggests a preference for
strict eligibility criteria if the sample size of the trial is fixed.
In summary, a variety of concerns have been put fOIVIard in the literature
regarding the hazards and impracticality associated with heterogeneous groups of
patients in randomized clinical trials. Including patients of differing prognosis may
increase variability and decrease power; including only very select patients may,
therefore, be more efficient; qualitative differences between patient subgroups may
obscure beneficial effects ofa treatment; subgroup analyses in many cases cannot
be done without many more patients in the study; and, if they are done, they may
be misleading. These arguments have convinced many that despite whatever
drawbacks an explanatory approach to trial design may have, it is to be preferred
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to a pragmatic approach.
Arguments for a pragmatic approach to subject selection
The criteria for a good trial are fairly straightforward: ask an
important question and answer it reliably. The importance of the
question depends to a large extent on its clinical relevance. It is
obvious that the more widely applicable are the results of a clinical
trial, the more relevant and valuable are those results.21
A tnlly homogeneous patient population cannot be defined; patient-to-
patient variability is the larges! source ofvariation. (A summary ofarguments for
pragmatic approaches to patient selection is found in table 1.) Trial designers who
advocate an explanatory approach to patient selection argue that restrictive
eligibility criteria are necessary to define a homogeneous patient population. Trial
pragmatists doubt whether added criteria actually define a population that is
substantially more homogeneous. Once patients have been selected for
participation in a clinical trial according to the most minimal criteria - type and
stage ofdisease, no absolute contraindication to study treatment - few important
prognostic factors remain. Whether or not one tries to further restrict the study
population, patients in a clinical trial are a heterogeneous group - they vary in
their response to medicaI treatments. Two patients - matched for age, cancer
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type, stage of disease, other comorbid conditions, and treatment - may have
substantially different outcomes: one may be cured while the other dies of rapidly
progressive disease. Without good additional predictive factors, identified and
implemented a priori, added criteria will not make a study population substantially
more homogeneous. According to Begg and Engstrom
[H]omogeneity is an ideal that is not even closely approximated in
the clinical setting where patient heterogeneity is substantial even in
narrowly restricted studies, especially with regard to prognosis, so
that the between-patient variation is always large relative to the
anticipated treatment effect.22
If we accept that patient-to-patient variation is large in studies (i.e., there
are no good additional predictive factors), what follows? Yusuf concludes that
patients need neither be screened intensively with restrictive eligibility criteria,
nor, for that matter, precisely characterized at the beginning of a trial. 23 The
variation in response to treatment can, according to the trial pragmatists, only be
compensated for by enrolling large numbers of patients into trials, so that studies
have adequate precision. Yusuf, Collins and Peto explain the necessity ofthis as
follows:
Clinicians are used to dealing with individual patients, and may feel
that the results of large trials somehow deny the individuality of each
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patient. This is almost the opposite of the truth, for one of the main
reasons why trials have to he large is just hecause patients are so
different from one another. Two apparently similar patients may run
entirely different clinical courses, one remaining stable and the other
progressing rapidly to severe disability or early death. Consequently,
it is only when really large groups of patients are compared that the
proportions oftruly good and bad prognosis patients in each can he
relied on to be reasonahly similar.24
A study 's power is maximized by removing eligibi/ity criteria and making
the sample size /arger. not further restricting the study population. Proponents of
explanatory-trial philosophy argue that restricting the criteria for trial eligibility
will increase the study's power. This would only be true if one could truly define a
homogeneous study population, a notion cast into doubt by the ahove argument.
Peto argues that even ifa more homogeneous study population couId be defined,
one would he better off with a large, simple tria1.25 Sample size, according ta Peta,
is a more important determinant of a study' s power than the efficiency
contributions of individual patients. "The larger the size of the trial, the smalIer the
random error. Consequently, reliable overall results are more likely ta emerge."26
It seems that very large trials may he necessary in arder "to detect" reliably
the effects ofnew treatments in cardiology and oncology (and, possibly, other
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areas ofmedicine). Yusuf observes that medical advances most commonly come in
small steps: the magnitude of treatment effects are, at best moderate - a 15% to
25% risk reduction in death or serious outcome.27 Peto points out that the detection
of moderate differences requires the stringent control of random and systematic
error that only a large, randomized trial (or systematic overviews ofa number of
trials) can provide:
If moderate differences in outcome are to be detected or refuted
reliably, then the errors in comparative assessments of the effects of
treatment must obviously be much less than the difference between a
moderate but worthwhile effect, and an effect that is too small to
bother with. This in tum implies that moderate biases cannot be
tolerated, and moderate random errors cannot be tolerated: in
practice, this implies the need for methods that involve negligible
biases and very smaIl random errors. The only way to guarantee very
small random errors is to study really large numbers, and these can
be achieved in two main ways: make individuaI studies large, and
combine infonnation from as many studies as possible. But it is not
much use having very srnall random errors if there may weB he
moderate biases, sa even the very large sizes of sorne non-
randomized analyses ofmedical records cannot guarantee
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statistically reliable results. 28
In order for a study to have sufficient power, 10 000 to 20 000 average-risk
patients or 3 000 ta 5 000 high-risk patients are often required.
Trials with highly restrictive eligibility criteria may have difficulty accnling
adequate numbers ofpatients. If trials need to be very large in order to detect
reliably moderate treatment effects, then they also need to be simple. Unnecessary
eligibility criteria unduly restrict the pool ofpatients available for study and,
thereby, diminish enrollment rates. A great deal more might be gained by
eliminating such criteria than by retaining them. Peto:
Any obstacle ta simplicity is an obstacle to large size, so it is worth
making efforts to simplify the process of entering, treating and
assessing patients. It is particularly necessary to simplify the entry of
patients, for if this is made complicated then recruitment may be
very seriously darnaged.29
His concluding statement is, if somewhat an overstatement, though-provoking:
"Most trials would he of much greater scientific value if they collected ten times
less data, both at entry and during folIow-up, and were therefore much larger."3o
Of course, eligibility criteria are not merely a barrier to accrual in very large
trials. We pointed out earlier that ofeligibility criteria, physician factors and
patient factors, eligibility criteria were the most important barrier to trial accrual.
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Since many trials in oncology take longer to enroll their target population than
planned, George urges that selection criteria be minimized in aIl randomized
clinical trials:
An ohvious implication of restrictive eligibility criteria is that each
criterion will reduce accrual. Since a major irnpediment to
completing Many trials successfully is a low accrual rate,
impediments to accrual should be removed if at all possible.31
Added eligibility criteria increase trial complexity and costs; minimizing
criteria reduce complexity and cost. As suggested in Peto's cornrnents ahove, the
costs of unduly restrictive eligibility criteria are not Iimited to trial enrollment.
Unnecessary criteria burden trial personnel and resources.32 Clinical investigators
must spend more time with prospective subjects, additional tests must he ordered
and interpreted, and added time must be spent fil1ing out complex enrollment
forms. Data managers must collect and store greater amounts of information on
each trial participant. Trial resources are taxed by the fact that the cost per patient
is increased by added tests and physician rime.
We concluded above that minimizing selection procedures would enhance
trial enrollment. We see here that this benefit stems from more than a larger pool
of eligible patients, simplifying criteria makes it easierfor investigators (less rime,
less tests, shorter forms) to enroll patients as weIl. Additionally, the cost per
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patient is reduced and, therefore, even with fixed resourees, trials can afford ta be
larger. Yusuf: "in general, wide eligibility criteria substantially simplifies
screening and increases recruitment. This in tum reduees the effort and the cast per
patient enrolled, thereby making large trials more affordahle and feasible."33
Studies involving heterogeneous groups ofpatients are more efficient (in
lerms ofaccrual rate and time to completion). Explanatory trialists make the claim
that narrowly-focused trials are more efficient: a homogeneous patient population
minimizes the number of patients needed to answer a question reliably. But
"residual sample size requirements" are not the only way ofunderstanding
efficiency. It asks: What is gained by adding to the trial this particular subject
eompared with adding another from the range of potential subjects? Rather than
approaching efficieney on a per subject basis, we might ask instead, How long will
it take to complete a trial with one policy of patient selection versus another?
Buyse asks precisely this question. He considers a hypothetical- but
plausible - example in which a poliey of including poor prognosis patients is
compared with a policy of restricting trial entry to good prognosis patients. A
broader patient selection policy is preferred (i.e., the trial is completed faster) as
the proportion ofpoor prognosis patients in the population inereases and as their
rate of treatment response approaches that of the good prognosis group. Buyse
concludes that over a broad range of assumptions, a more pragmatic trial will
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answer the study question more quickly than an explanatory trial:
[T]he model shows that broad trials are preferable to restricted trials
in many situations ('preferable' being taken in the limited sense of
'shorter in duration'). One such situation is when there is no a priori
reason to believe that the magnitude of the treatment effect is
different in different subgroups of patients. In such a case, the best
strategy (from a statistical standpoint) is to include aIl available
patients in the clinical trial, whatever the prognosis. This situation
occurs quite commonly...34
George also considers the problem from a theoretical perspective.35 He
points out that even if a larger sample size is required by a trial with a
heterogeneous patient population, that requirement is likely ta be more than offset
by the increase in the rate of enrollment to the study. A broadly-inclusive trial will
come to completion more quick1y than a narrowly-focused study, particularly
when added patients have a similar response to treatment and result in a substantial
increase in study accrual.
Qualitative differences among subgroups are, generally speaking,
uncommon. As pointed out above, unexpected qualitative differences can have
serious ramifications for a clinical trial: differences in the direction oftreatment
effect between subgroups will tend to cancel one another out. But are such
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interactions likely? Are they cornmon? Not ail patients are eligible for even the
most pragmatic trial. Even selection procedures advocated by trial pragmatists
require that subjects have the type and stage of disease of interest and no major
contraindications to the study treatments. These criteria mirror factors used in
clinical practice and, thus, do not limit the generalizability of trial results to
clinical practice. The real question here is once patients with known
contraindications have been excluded, are qualitative interactions likely? It seems
the answer is, "No."
Yusufbelieves that "the probability is low of reliably finding an
unanticipated qualitative interaction (that is, differences in the direction of effect)
in a trial that has already excluded those in whom treatment is clearly indicated or
contraindicated."36 In his paper, Yusuf reviews a studies of treatments for vascular
disease which involves a wide variety of study populations (refer to table 2).
Despite the heterogeneity of patients across studies, no evidence of qualitative
interaction is found. (Indeed, for the most part, even the magnitude oftreatment
effect is similar across groups.) Surprisingly, even when large quantitative
interactions or qualitative interactions were predicted on the basis of prior work -
e.g., thrombolysis more than six hours post-myocardial infarction, beta-blockers in
patients with heart failure - these interactions did not materialize in weIl done
clinical trials. Peto reviews the experience with a number ofvery large trials and
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meta-analyses with similar findings. Peta concludes that "for specifie outcomes,
the directions of the effect oftreatment may be similar in many different categories
ofpatient."37
Statistical techniques exist to adjustfor important known covariates. What
if important prognostic factors are known to exist? Must patients be excluded in
these situations? Not necessarily. If the prognostic factors identify patients who
will be treated with the same or similar treatments in clinical practice, then they
probably ought ta he included in a clinical study. The presence of important
predictive factors can be accommodated in the study's design (e.g., stratified
randomization) or analysis. Begg and Engstrom point out that:
[W]e have available a wide range of statisticaI techniques that deal
effectively with patient heterogeneity, bath in the design of the study
and at the analysis stage, although the selection of an adjustment
technique, i.e., fully or partially stratified analysis v. covariate
adjustment by regression-type model (e.g., Cox proportional hazards
model), is a matter for informed judgement.38
The results ofnarrowly-focused studies may not be applicable to the patient
population at large; trials with heterogeneous patient populations are more likely
to he widely applicable in clinical practice. Perhaps the most important critique of
explanatory trials is the fact that the results of such trials may not be widely
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applicable in clinical practice. Leventhal observes that
The results ofclinical trials are most useful when their results can be
generalized with reasonable confidence to the disease population at
large. To know how generalizable results are likely to be, one must
know how representative the patients studied are of ail patients with
the disease. One important indication of this is a numerical measure
of how highly selected they are, i.e., how many of the patients seen
with that diagnosis during the study periad were entered in the trial.
In addition it is important tO know how representative the study
group is in terms of patient characteristics.. .If the patients in a
clinical trial are not representative of the entire patient population...
the generalizability of the results to the entire patient population may
be compromised.39
Indeed, the results ofclinicaI trials are often criticized on the grounds that the
study was too restrictive to be widely applicable in practice.40
We saw in chapter 2 that cancer clinical trials routinely exclude persons on
the basis of age (or expected survival aside from the cancer diagnosis) or
laboratory values. Such exclusions lead to uncertainties regarding the proper
treatment of excluded groups in clinical practice. Ultimately, George believes, the
presence of numerous criteria may diminish the overall impact of the study:
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An important goal of a clinical trial is to change clinical practice.
However, if the eligihility criteria do not reasonably reflect the type
ofpatient likely to be treated in general cIinical practice, the result
will he unpredictable. Clinicians are unlikely to go through a long
eligihility checklist of duhious relevance and will have difficulty
assessing whether the result obtained in relevant to their patients.41
The fact is that many persons currently excluded from cancer clinical trials
require and often will receive treatnlent with similar agents in practice. The failure
to include such groups in trial may lead to one of two equally undesirable
outcomes. First, patients may not receive possibly effective treatments. In chapter
5 we argued that the exclusion of the elderly from cancer clinical trials predisposes
oider persons with cancer to under-treatment. Stenning agrees that the inclusion of
oider persons in trials is important:
[M]any trials oftherapy for colorectal cancer will include upper age
limits. In trying to conduct a 'clean' trial, and to this end setting the
limit such that it will preclude entry to patients with too great a
chance of dying from an intercurrent condition, it would be easy to
eliminate a large proportion of patients with colorectal cancer. An
upper age limit of 70 years would exclude over a third of patients
with the disease, and would give no infonnation on treatment
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tolerance in the older patient. ..42
Second, patients May receive treatment outside of trials which is of unproven
value. Stenning discusses a clinical trial of chemotherapy for locally advanced
cancer of the bladder in which subjects, in order to he eligible for participation,
had to have a glomerular filtration rate (GFR; a measure of renal function) of at
least 60 milliliters per minute.
Sorne time after the launch of the trial, it was found that Many
patients were being excluded hecause of renal function requirements
not being fulfilled. However, Many of the patients were actually
receiving chemotherapy outside of the trial, albeit at lower doses
than those specified in the protocol, for example cisplatin doses of 70
mg/m2 [compared with 100 mg/m2 in the trial]. An alternative trial
design might include the option of allowing patients with reduced
renal function to he randomized, hut receiving lower drug doses,
rather than excluding them altogether.43
Including these patients in the trial would allow the risks and henefits of
chemotherapy in this group to be evaluated.
Again, an agricultural example May be appropriate here. Recall our batch of
seed which May or May not he too oid to germinate. Let us imagine that the above
suggested experiment has been carried out and the seed had an acceptable
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gennination rate under optimal conditions. A fanner considering a large purchase
of such seed (perhaps it cornes at a diseounted priee) is likely to refuse the
purchase without further evidence. Before an infonned and responsible decision
can be made, she must know, uWill the seed germinate under the varied conditions
that are found in my several fields?" The answer to this question requires that
gennination be assessed under heterogeneous soil conditions: in fields that have
grown crops for years, in fields that remain fallow; in fields that receive ample
rainfall, in those that are dry; in soil that is alkaline, in soil that is not. Only when
assessed under this multiplicity ofconditions (and only if it performs under these
conditions) can the seed be said to be a good buy.
In summary, a variety ofpowerful arguments have eontradicted elaims
made in favor of explanatory trials and extolled the virtues of pragmatic trials,
studies with heterogeneous patient populations. These arguments included the
following elaims: beyond that achieved by minimal criteria, a homogeneous
population is an unattainable ideal; very large trials are necessary '~to detect"
moderate but important treatment effects; in order for trials ta be very large, they
must be simple (i.e., minimize eligibility criteria); eliminating eligibility criteria
not only improves enrollment rates, it reduces complexity and cost; simple trials
(with heterogeneous populations) accrue patients faster thereby answering the
study question more efficiently (faster); qualitative interactions are uncommon;
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even if important covariates are known ta exist, they can be adjusted for by design
or analysis; and, most important, only the results ofbroad-based, inclusive studies
are likely to be widely applicable in clinical practice. The weight of these
arguments has convinced many that pragrnatic approaches to the design of phase
III clinical trials are to be preferred.
Where science and ethics meet
The choice of an explanatory or pragrnatic approach to the design of a
clinical trial has implications not only for science, but aIso for ethics. What is the
basis for ethical concems regarding the selection of subjects for research
participation? What are the implications for the preference of an explanatory
versus pragmatic approach ta trial design?
In the tirst chapter, we discussed the ethical framework presented in the
Belmont Report. In this document, the members of the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research
articulate three principles ta guide the conduct of research: respect for persans,
beneficence, and justice. As Freedman and Shapiro observe, the principles provide
a potentially comprehensive way ofdividing up moral questions related to
research.44 Respect for persans can be viewed as covering issues related to the
rights ofresearch subjects. Beneficence embraces concems related to the welfare
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ofresearch subjects. Finally, justice may be viewed as a catch-aIl category,
particularly of issues with broad social implications.
In practice, however, research ethicists have focused on a narrow range of
issues in clinical research. In large part, this phenomenon is historically rooted. l
have argued elsewhere that ethical interest and effort was largely shaped by a
succession ofresearch scandais in Europe and North America.45 Reacting to the
particular issue (or issues) highlighted by each of these scandaIs, ethicists focused
their efforts on only a few areas, e.g., informed consent, confidentiality,
assessment of risk-benefit. This selective interest is evident from the literature.
Freedman and Shapiro review articles cited in the cumulative index (1979-1990)
of the only peer-review journal devoted to research ethics, [RB: A Reviewof
Human Subjects Research.46 The largest number of articles relate to news items
and federal regulations (n=100); articles on informed consent (99), confidentiality
(43) and risk-benefit assessment (40) make up the next largest groups. Only a very
few deal with research design in general (20) and subject selection procedures in
particular (5).
The analysis of ethical issues in research need not be at the mercy of the
scandaI du jour. An alternative is a comprehensive ethical analysis of issues in
clinical research. Freedman and Shapiro explain:
Principles crafted in reaction to scandaI respond to the question:
c 282
How can this evil be avoided? What is needed instead is to ask, How
can our conduct of research be more ethically sensitive, be, in fact,
improved? This alternative approach must begin by acknowledging
that each important choice taken in the design and conduct of human
research is of potential ethical interest. Ethics, as practical
philosophy, deals with the evaluation ofhuman choice: What option
is required by moral duty; what action should be taken? And
research with human subjects is replete with clinical, biological, and
statistical choices: What will be tested? How will it be tested? Who
will be tested? And how will they be recruited? When will the test be
complete? Each of these choices is as susceptible to ethical reflection
and critique as is any aspect ofa clinical trial. From the point of view
of ethics as the evaluation ofchoice, there is no inherent distinction
between sorne aspects of trials that raise ethical questions (like the
consent form or payments to subjects or investigators) and ethically
neutral elements.47
This thesis undertakes a part of this comprehensive approach to the ethical
analysis ofclinical research. Not motivated by scandaI (or fashion) we undertake
an examination of a little-studied part of the clinical trial, criteria for trial
eligibility. We do so motivated by the believe that al! parts ofthe clinicat trial
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protocol present ethical issues (in so far as they represent the end product of
human choice). We ask: How can the conduct of clinicaI research be improved?
We could have focused on any one of the above questions, but we chose to
restrict our enquiry to the query, "Who will be tested?" It is surely a question with
scientific implications: explanatory trialists argue that good science demands a
homogeneous patient population, trial pragmatists argue -- more convincingly, 1
think -- that a heterogeneous patient population is, for a variety of reasons,
preferred scientifically. But, it is also a question with ethical implications. In
chapter 1 we argued that clinical research should not prey upon the vulnerable, nor
should it exclude without good reason those who may benefit from research
participation. Recently, the applicability of the results of research findings has
recently received considerable ethical (and political) attention. In chapter 5, 1
presented a comprehensive discussion ofWalzer's political philosophy and the just
allocation of the knowledge arising from clinical research.
While each of the above ethical issues is important, the question, l'l'Who will
be tested?" and what difference that makes ethical1y, gets at the fundamental
ethical justification for clinical research. Under what circumstances maya
randomized trial he properly initiated? And most important to us here, what is the
purpose ofsuch a randomized clinical trial? What are the implications of this for
the selection ofsubjects for clinical research? Freedman's concept ofclinical
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equipoise addresses aIl of these questions.
When can a trial be legitimately initiated? There is a consensus that at the
beginning of a randomized clinical trial comparing two (or more) treatments an
honest null hypothesis must existe48 In other words, uncertainty must exist as to the
relative merits of the treatments being tested in the trial:~9 Sorne have argued that
this means that the evidence on behalf of the two treatments must be precisely
balanced - a notion referred to as 'theoretical equipoise. '50 Freedman has
correctly pointed out that this understanding of equipoise is too fragile to be of any
practical value:
Theoretical equipoise is overwhelmingly fragile; that is, it is
disturbed by a slight accretion of evidence favoring one ann of the
trial. .. [It] is also highly sensitive to the vagaries of the investigator's
attention and perceptions. Because of its fragility, theoretical
equipoise is disturbed as soon as the investigator perceives a
difference between the alternatives - whether or not any genuine
difference exists...Finally...[it] is personal and idiosyncratic. It is
disturbed when the clinician has...what 'might even be labeled a bias
or a hunch,' a preference of a 'merely intuitive nature. "'51
Freedman argues persuasively for different understanding of equipoise termed
'clinical equipoise.'
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In order for a trial to he initiated ethically, a state ofclinical equipoise must
exist at the trial' s inception; that is, there must be honest, professional
disagreement among expert medical practitioners as to the preferred treatment.52
This disagreement can arise in a numher of different ways. For example, two
different yet standard treatments may be advocated by separate groups ofexpert
practitioners. Memhers ofeach group may weIl recognize that there is evidence to
support bath treatments; however, they find the studies supporting their treatment
of choice to be the most convincing. Another exampIe: if a single standard
treatment exists, evidence may come to light that a new treatment may be
preferable, for exampIe, it may he more effective, or equally effective but
associated with less side effects.
Whatever the cause of the state of cIinical equipoise, a trial is initiated to
resolve the real (or potential, in the case of a very new treatrnent) disagreement
among expert medical practitioners. In short, the purpose of a clinical trial is to
change medical practice. The second ethicaI prerequisite for a randomized clinical
trial is that
the trial must be designed in such a way as to make it reasonable ta
expect that, if it is successfully concluded, clinical equipoise will be
disturbed. In other words, the results ofa successful trial should be
convincing enough to resolve the dispute among clinicians.S3
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The impetus for the trial arises out of uncertainty as the preferred treatment; the
trial is conducted to decide which of the treatments is to be preferred in clinicaI
practice.
Given that cIinical equipoise supports the notion of the randomized clinical
trial as an instrument to change clinical practice, equipoise supports a pragmatic
approach to trial design. Recall from our discussion of explanatory and pragmatic
trial designs that pragmatic trials, studies which include heterogenous groups of
patients are designed to "compare two treatments under the conditions in which
they wouId he applied in practice...[they seek] to answer the question - which of
the two treatments should we prefer?"S4 Explanatory trials, trials with narrow
selection criteria and homogeneous study populations, bear little direct reIevance
to clinical reality. Freedman:
This 'fastidious' [explanatory] approach purchases scientific
manageability at the expense ofan inability to apply the results ta the
'messy' conditions of clinical practice... Overly 'fastidious'
[explanatory] trials, designed to resolve sorne theoretical question,
fail to satisfy the second ethical requirement ofclinicaI research,
since the special conditions of the trial will render it useless for
inf1uencing clinical decisions, even ifit is successfully compIeted."ss
ClinicaI equipoise offers us an explanation of the preconditions for an
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ethical clinical trial - disagreement among expert practitioners - and the
purpose of a clinical trial - to resolve that disagreement; to change clinical
practice. If a cIinical trial is to accomplish this task optimally the patients incIuded
in that study must he reasonably representative of patients in clinical practice.
Thus, a pragmatic approach to the selection of subjects for clinical research is
preferred.
The applicability of the results of clinical trials to clinical practice is a point
of overlap hetween scientific and ethical issues in clinical trials. Clinical trial
pragmatists object to highly restrictive eligihility criteria on the basis that "[i]f the
patients in a clinical trial are not representative of the entire patient population...the
generalizahility of the results to the entire patient population may be
compromised."56 The trial' s impact on clinical practice may be harmed hy an
unduly homogeneous study population and, certainly, information on the proper
treatment of important patient subgroups will not he forthcoming. Equipoise
requires that a trial, if successful, resolve disagreement among expert practitioners
- change practice. Thus, the ethicist has precisely the same concems. Clinical
scientists and ethicists are united by the vision ofthe phase III clinical trial as an
instrnment ofchanging medical practice.
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Methodology used in this thesis and suggestions for further research
Clinical equipoise tells us not only when it is ethical to initiate a clinical
trial it also tell us what the purpose of that trial ought to be - to resolve
disagreement among expert practitioners; to change clinical practice. Thus,
equipoise provides us with a teleology of the randomized clinical trial; it tells us
the end - 't'a npoç 'ta 'tEÀOÇ - that an ethically and scientifically sound trial
ought to achieve. An agricultural analogy: as the acom is to the oak tree, so too the
clinical trial to its end, altering clinical practice. The implications of this are both
profound and far reaching for the design, conduct and reporting ofclinical trials.
We said before that a comprehensive approach to the ethical analysis of clinical
research sees aIl aspects of the planning, conduct and reporting of research as
having ethical elements (in so far as human choice is involved in those aspects of
trials). Clinical equipoise provides us with a tool ta systematically examine the
ethics ofclinicat research.
Clinical equipoise was the lens through which we viewed the problems
presented in this thesis. When asking about changes in eligibility criteria in clinical
trial protocols, equipoise caused us to focus on the implication for those changes
on the generalizability of trial results. When examining the interpretation of
criteria by investigators, equipoise directed our attention to the ramifications for
the interpretation of trial results when ambiguous criteria were used to pick the
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study population. Finally, when studying the reporting ofcriteria, it was equipoise
that lead us to be criticaI of trials that failed to fully disclose criteria (how can
cIinicians properly assess the impact of the results on their own practice?) or
contain unnecessary criteria (the applicability of study results may be restricted
unduly). Thus, the approach in this thesis is an application of the principle of
clinical equipoise to one aspect ofclinical research, namely, the selection of
subjects for research participation. Methodologically it is, therefore, systematic.
insofar as it analyses a range of ethical problems in accord with a single principle,
clinical equipoise, and a part of a larger comprehensive approach that sees the need
for ethical analysis in ail aspects of the conduct ofclinical research.
The analysis in chapters two through four is characterized by a combined
theoretical and empirical approach to ethical analysis. Our theoretical
understanding of the problem, infonned by clinical equipoise, gives us a sense of
how things ought ta be; an empirical examination informs us ofhow they are; the
empirical facts then feedhack to inform the theoretical understanding. Moral
theory informs our analysis ofpractice; and the observed phenomena infonn our
theoretical understanding. For example, in the second chapter, a priori clinical
equipoise tells us that criteria for trial eligibility ought ta be minimized. But how
far may criteria be minimized and still allow for meaningful interpretation of trial
results? Examining the phenomena, we were surprised by the fact that the POG
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trials contained no safety criteria whatsoever. Given the high quality of the POG
trials and the important influence that these trial have had on c1inical practice, we
conclude that such criteria are not necessary for high quality research. Theory
infonns practice; practice infonns theory.
Given this understanding of the methodology utilized in this thesis, a wide
variety ofquestions for further practice are suggested. 1willlist but a few.
• In chapters two through four subject selection procedures were examined at three
stages in the genesis and dissemination ofmedical research: clinical trial protocol,
interpretation by investigators, and reporting in study communications. Selection
procedures ought to be studied at yet another important point: the interpretation by
clinicians in practice. As we have seen, many clinical trials in oncology use large
numbers of restrictive criteria. How do physicians in practice interpret the results
ofthese trials? Do they only apply the study results (i.e., the treatment in question)
to patients in their practice who would have been eligihle for the trial? Or, as we
suspect, do they disregard sorne of the trial 's eligibility criteria in their inference?
What kinds of criteria do they ignore? What are the implications for the design of
clinical trials? This study would likely involve a questionnaire using clinical
vignettes (not unlike that used in chapter 3) to oncologists in clinical practice.
Clinicians could he presented with trial results (either very recent or hypothetical)
and asked ifthey would apply the treatment in various clinical situations
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constructed around representative eligibility criteria from each of the categories in
the schema (chapter 2).
• Another important question stems from our study of the reporting of eligibility
criteria in study communications. As we indicated in chapter 4, previous studies of
the reporting of study methods in study communications have focused on the
clarity of reporting in journal articles. Our innovation was to look at the accuracy
of reporting of methods by comparing the infonnation found within the clinical
trial protocol with that found in the journal article. Furthermore, we recognize that
the journal article is not the sole medium for the reporting ofclinical trial methods.
Accordingly we examine methods papers and Clinical Alerts issued by the V.S.
National Institutes of Health. The study presented in chapter four could he
broadened to look at the reporting of other aspects of trial methods, including
study hypotheses, study power, minimally important clinical effect, study
interventions and analytic techniques. Ifwe were to document a similar loss of
information as documented in the study on the reporting ofeligibility criteria,
important consequences would follow for the reporting of study results.
Clinical equipoise -- as the instrument for the systematic analysis of the
ethics of clinical research - has broad implications for the conduet ofresearch.
Two of these areas - many ather could he suggested here - for further
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exarnination are as follows:
• Framing ofstudy hypotheses. TraditionaIly, hypotheses in clinical research are
framed around a null hypothesis of zero difference. A given treatment is concluded
to be superior to a comparison treatment if the lower bound of the 95% confidence
interval for the difference between the two treatments excludes zero. Thus,
typicaIly, a new treatment is said to be superior to another if there is strong
evidence (i.e., statistical significance) of a non-zero difference between the two
treatments. In sorne cases, evidence ofa non-zero difference between treatments
may indeed be sufficient to change clinical practice.
In other cases, particularly when the experimental treatment is toxic,
cornplicated to administer or expensive, evidence of a non-zero difference between
treatments is unlikely to sway the practice of expert clinicians. In these cases
clinical trials must take the difference necessary ta sway practice into account in
the study hypotheses. A successful clinical trial then will provide strong evidence
to mie in or mie out a treatrnent difference greater than this minimal value. Thus,
the null hypothesis ofno-treatment difference ought to be replaced with a nuIl
hypothesis that the treatment difference is equal ta or less than minimal difference
to shift clinical practice. How to define this minimal difference? How will this
difference affect the size and practicality of clinical trials? Clinical equipoise, as
defined above, seems to only allow for the inclusion of the heliefs ofphysicians, is
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there an appropriate role for patients and patient communities in these
detenninations?
• Interim analysis. Clinical trials that involve death or serious morbidity as the
primary outcome often plan for one or more interim analyses prior to the planned
conclusion of the study. If the observed difference between the treatments positive
(or negative) is unexpectedly large, an interim analysis allows trial investigators ta
stop the trial early sa that subjects are not unnecessarily exposed to inferior
treatment (he it the experimental or the control treatment). A variety of statistical
methods have been developed to (1) ensure that the interim analysis does not alter
the type 1 error rate for the study and (2) ta ensure that more conservative stopping
mIes are employed earlier in the study to protect from prematurely stopping the
trial. Despite the importance ofthese contributions, statistical 'stopping mIes' fail
to capture aIl of the concems that ought ta enter inta the decision to terminate a
trial prematurely. Other factors, including the degree of skepticism of clinicians ta
the trial result, the quality of the data, the amount of data in the "pipeline"
(collected but not included in the analysis), must be considered. How might
clinical equipoise help ta shape this decision making process? What impact will
non-zero null hypotheses have on statistical 'stopping mIes'?
Given these few examples of further projects stemming from the work presented in
this thesis, it is clear that the student of the systematic and comprehensive ethical
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analysis of clinical research has much with which to occupy herself.
Claims to originality
Each of the four experimental chapters (chapters two through five) contains
elements which represent an original contribution to the literature. The original
contributions are as follows:
• The examination and characterization ofchanges in eligibility criteria in two
diachronous samples ofcancer clinical trials (chapter 2).
• The development and validation ofa schema to classify eligibility criteria
(chapter 2).
• The survey of the interpretation ofeligibility criteria by clinical trial
investigators (chapter 3).
• The development and validation of the study instrument for this study (chapter
3).
• The examination of the accuracy of the reporting of eligibility criteria in
methods papers, journal articles, and Clinical Alert issued by the U.S. National
Institutes of Health (chapter 4) and the characterization of information loss with
the schema developed in chapter 2.
• The application of Walzer's political philosophy to define the just distribution of
knowledge resulting from clinical research, including the classification of unjust
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inclusion in and exclusion from research as two instances of the same phenomenon
-- domination (chapter 5).
Conclusion
In this thesis we have addressed only one aspect of the range of questions
suggested hy a comprehensive approach to ethical analysis of clinical research. We
limited our scope to the question, "Who will be tested?" In chapter 1 we provided
the reader with a historical overview of the ethical issues seen to he of importance
in the selection of subjects for clinicaI research. In chapter 2 we examined change
in eligibility criteria over time in two important sets of protocols. In chapter 3 we
examined the interpretation of study criteria by clinical investigators. In chapter 4
we looked at the accuracy of reporting of criteria in study communications. In
chapter 5 we tried to provide one possible comprehensive philosophical account of
just selection procedures for research participation. Finally, in the last chapter, we
have seen that the question, "Who will be tested?," has both scientific and ethical
components. Components that at points seem inextricably entangled.
The most important aspect of this thesis is, 1helieve, that it is, self-
consciously, an instantiation of a comprehensive and systematic approach to the
ethical analysis of clinical research. Implicitly, it is a rejection of the notion that
the legitimate domain of ethical analysis of research is restricted only to certain
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aspects of the research protocoi (e.g., the consent form). It is aise a rejection of the
idea that ethical analysis of research ought to be Iimited to the research protocol
itself and not extend to the conduct and dissemination of research. Finally, it is
rejection of the notion that ethicai analysis is wholly separate from scientific
methodology. We have mapped out but one area of overlapping concern between
science and ethics -- subject selection and the applicability ofresearch results. In
toto, these three realizations open a world of possibility for ethical analysis in
clinical research. The work presented here is, therefore, but the beginning of a
beginning.
~
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Figure 1. Explanatory and pragmatic c1inical trial designs. In the explanatory design, treatment with a radiosensitizing drug
followed by radiotherapy is compared with a thirty day no-treatment period followed by radiotherapy (i.e., delayed
radiotherapy). In the pragmatic design, treatment with a radiosensitizing drug followed by radiotherapy is compared with
immediate radiotherapy. (Figure taken from Schwartz D, Lellouch J. Explanatory and pragmatic attitudes in therapeutic
trials. Journal ofChronic Disease 1967; 20: 637-648.)
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Arguments for explanatory selection procedures Arguments for pragmatic selection procedures
• Inc1uding patients ofdiffering prognosis (i.e., a • A truly homogeneous patient population cannot heheterogeneous study population) will increase defined; patient-to-patient variability is the largest
variability in a study and, hence, decrease its power. source of variation.
• Studies involving homogeneous groups of patients are • A study's power is maximized by removing eligibility
more efficient (in terms of"residual sample size criteria and making the sample size larger, not further
requirements"). restricting the study population.
• Within a heterogeneous study population, qualitative • Trials with highly restrictive eligibility criteria maydifferences among subgroups may cancel one another have difficulty accruing adequate numbers of patients.
out, thus obscuring the treatment's "true" effect.
• Added eligibility criteria increase trial complexity and
• In a heterogeneous study population, there arc costs; miniJnizing criteria reduce complexity and cost.insufficient numbers in individual subgroups to do a
meaningful statistical analysis. • Studies involving heterogeneous groups of patients are
more efficient (in terms of accrual rate and time to
• Studies with broad inclusion criteria (and, hence, completion).
numerous subgroups of potential interest) may lead to
misleading multiple subgroup analyses. • Qualitative differences among subgroups are, generally
speaking, uncommon.
•
•
Statistical techniques exist to adjust for important
known covariates.
The results of narrowly-focused studies may not be
applicable to the patient population at large; trials with
heterogeneous patient populations are more likely to be
widely applicable in clinical practice.
~
--
Table 1. Summary of arguments for explanatory selection procedures and reasons for pragmatic selection procedures for
clinical trials. (See text for a detailed explanation of each point.)
~
--
Table 2.
Outcome measure
Treatnlent/ disease setting Death Non-fatal infarction Non-fatal stroke
Antiplatelet Therapy
1. acute MI -23% ± 4* -49%± 9 -46% ± 17
2. long-tenn following MI -15 ± 5* -31% ± 5 -42% ± II
3. cerebrovascular disease -15% ± 7* -35°~ ± 12 -220/0 ± 7
4. unstable angina -42% ± 15 -40% ± 15 incomplete data
Cardiac arrest/
Beta-blockers sudden death
1. acute MI -14% ± 6 -18% ± 7 -15% ± 7
2. long-term following MI -22% ± 4 -27% ± 5 -320/0 ± 5
3. threatened MI inadequate data -13% ± 6 inadequate data
Calcium Blockers
1. acute MI +100/0 ± 11 not available not available
2. long tenn following MI +60/0 ± 10 -9%± 7 not available
3. unstable angina +70% ± 50 O%± 12 not available
* - vascular deaths; MI - myocardial infarction.
-- "
Table 2. Reductions (% ± standard error) observed with various treatments for vascular disease, demonstrating similarity of
the direction of effect on the same endpoint in quite different populations. (Table taken from Yusuf S, Held P, Teo KK.
Selection of patients for randomized controlled trials: implications of wide or narrow eligibility criteria. Statistics i11
Medicine 1990; 9: 73-86.)
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